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posted by mrcoolbp on Thursday March 05 2015, @10:46AM   Printer-friendly
from the flies-with-honey dept.

Ars Technica reports:

On Wednesday, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced another contest to design a system to "identify unwanted robocalls received on landlines or mobile phones, and block and forward those calls to a honeypot." The agency will select "up to five contestants" as part of what it’s calling "Robocalls: Humanity Strikes Back."

The first qualifying phase launches Wednesday and runs through June 15, 2015 at 10:00pm Eastern Time, while the final phase concludes at DEF CON 23 on August 9, 2015.

Here's the FTC contest page. There's another similar contest (with no cash prize) being held "as part of the National Day of Civic Hacking." It appears they have done something similar in previous years as well.

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  • (Score: -1, Offtopic) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @11:00AM

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @11:00AM (#153463)

    Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio:
    Cheap Electromagnetic Attacks on Windowed Exponentiation

    http://www.cs.tau.ac.il/~tromer/radioexp/ [tau.ac.il]

    "Overview

    We demonstrate the extraction of secret decryption keys from laptop computers, by nonintrusively measuring electromagnetic emanations for a few seconds from a distance of 50 cm. The attack can be executed using cheap and readily-available equipment: a consumer-grade radio receiver or a Software Defined Radio USB dongle. The setup is compact and can operate untethered; it can be easily concealed, e.g., inside pita bread. Common laptops, and popular implementations of RSA and ElGamal encryptions, are vulnerable to this attack, including those that implement the decryption using modern exponentiation algorithms such as sliding-window, or even its side-channel resistant variant, fixed-window (m-ary) exponentiation.

    We successfully extracted keys from laptops of various models running GnuPG (popular open source encryption software, implementing the OpenPGP standard), within a few seconds. The attack sends a few carefully-crafted ciphertexts, and when these are decrypted by the target computer, they trigger the occurrence of specially-structured values inside the decryption software. These special values cause observable fluctuations in the electromagnetic field surrounding the laptop, in a way that depends on the pattern of key bits (specifically, the key-bits window in the exponentiation routine). The secret key can be deduced from these fluctuations, through signal processing and cryptanalysis."

    #########################################

    Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/170

    http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/170 [iacr.org]

    "Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio: Cheap Electromagnetic Attacks on Windowed Exponentiation

    Daniel Genkin and Lev Pachmanov and Itamar Pipman and Eran Tromer
    Abstract: We present new side-channel attacks on RSA and ElGamal implementations that use the popular sliding-window or fixed-window (m-ary) modular exponentiation algorithms. The attacks can extract decryption keys using a very low measurement bandwidth (a frequency band of less than 100 kHz around a carrier under 2 MHz) even when attacking multi-GHz CPUs.

    We demonstrate the attacks' feasibility by extracting keys from GnuPG, in a few seconds, using a nonintrusive measurement of electromagnetic emanations from laptop computers. The measurement equipment is cheap and compact, uses readily-available components (a Software Defined Radio USB dongle or a consumer-grade radio receiver), and can operate untethered while concealed, e.g., inside pita bread.

    The attacks use a few non-adaptive chosen ciphertexts, crafted so that whenever the decryption routine encounters particular bit patterns in the secret key, intermediate values occur with a special structure that causes observable fluctuations in the electromagnetic field. Through suitable signal processing and cryptanalysis, the bit patterns and eventually the whole secret key are recovered.

    Category / Keywords: side channel, electromagnetic analysis, RSA, ElGamal

    Date: received 27 Feb 2015, last revised 3 Mar 2015

    Contact author: tromer at cs tau ac il"

    #########################################
    EOF

  • (Score: 4, Interesting) by CirclesInSand on Thursday March 05 2015, @01:45PM

    by CirclesInSand (2899) on Thursday March 05 2015, @01:45PM (#153491)

    Glad to hear the FCC is doing something about those robocallers. Rather than hire a team of engineers with the authority of the FTC behind them, and paying them appropriate annual salaries (a few hundred thousand a year), they will be spending $25,000 for some amateurs to create crap.

    Maybe they could ... demand call information from the phone companies (which they can do anyway) and prosecute robocallers? Is that too radical?

    • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:05PM

      by kaszz (4211) on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:05PM (#153496) Journal

      Perhaps it's all a diversion?

    • (Score: 5, Informative) by Thexalon on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:36PM

      by Thexalon (636) on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:36PM (#153507)

      I've worked for a company that among other services manages to block most robocalls. It's not *that* hard of a problem to detect them, because of two characteristics of robocalls:
      1. Because they aren't people, they can't handle instructions like "please press 4 now".
      2. The caller audio is identical across a wide range of calls and target numbers.

      So I suspect that some amateurs who really thought about it could create something decently effective, and if the government can do that for $25,000 I'd consider it money well-spent.

      As to why they have a hard time tracking down and prosecuting robocallers, that's basically because robocalls are basically a more modern version of email spam, which means that all the techniques the email spammers used are in use for robocallers. They're hiding the origins of the calls (hacking into vulnerable phone systems if necessary to do that), they're fly-by-night companies that disappear as soon as anyone starts scrutinizing them, and they're taking advantage of national and state boundaries.

      --
      The only thing that stops a bad guy with a compiler is a good guy with a compiler.
      • (Score: 3, Interesting) by kaszz on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:57PM

        by kaszz (4211) on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:57PM (#153518) Journal

        Just listening into the SS7 signaling ought to reveal these spam callers. A small pool of originating numbers that calls a large pool of numbers within a short time. Just identify that source pool and block them?

        The technology is there. It's just ineptitude withing telecommunication companies that hinders this from happening. But then handling lot's of calls means money so why "fix it".

        • (Score: 4, Insightful) by MrGuy on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:05PM

          by MrGuy (1007) on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:05PM (#153522)

          A small pool of originating numbers that calls a large pool of numbers within a short time. Just identify that source pool and block them?

          Except that this also describes outgoing call centers, which have a variety of legitimate purposes. For example, a customer service team that contacts customers with problem orders placed online would look similar (small number of outgoing numbers, large number of contacted numbers, frequent calls, many short duration calls because a lot of the time you'll get voicemail....)

          Not saying it's not possible to identify "highly likely to be robocalling" by data mining, just that there's a difference between "a lot of outbound calls" and "robocalls"

          • (Score: 3, Interesting) by kaszz on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:15PM

            by kaszz (4211) on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:15PM (#153525) Journal

            Add call length to the data mining? Lack of anyone calling back etc..

        • (Score: 3, Informative) by Thexalon on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:32PM

          by Thexalon (636) on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:32PM (#153535)

          It's not a small pool of originating numbers, because the robocallers spoof the originating numbers to get around the fact that there are blacklisting services out there for phone numbers.

          And as a sibling poster points out, even if they didn't do that a legitimate call center (e.g. a utility customer service department) would look identical to a robocaller from the metadata-only viewpoint.

          --
          The only thing that stops a bad guy with a compiler is a good guy with a compiler.
          • (Score: 1, Interesting) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:02PM

            by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:02PM (#153580)

            as a sibling poster points out, even if they didn't do that a legitimate call center (e.g. a utility customer service department) would look identical to a robocaller from the metadata-only viewpoint.

            Furthermore, we should expect that whatever differences in meta-data there might be would be quickly emulated by the spammers. No incoming calls? Start sending in bogus incoming calls. Duration too short? Start making long bogus calls to phone numbers under control of the spammers.

            These guys may be assholes, but to assume they aren't clever is just wishful thinking.

          • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Friday March 06 2015, @08:23AM

            by kaszz (4211) on Friday March 06 2015, @08:23AM (#153754) Journal

            There's a difference in SS7 numbers and the one presented as caller-identification to the customer.

            One could perhaps use voice fingerprinting used in several successive calls as well.

      • (Score: 2) by Joe Desertrat on Thursday March 05 2015, @08:13PM

        by Joe Desertrat (2454) on Thursday March 05 2015, @08:13PM (#153633)

        As to why they have a hard time tracking down and prosecuting robocallers, that's basically because robocalls are basically a more modern version of email spam, which means that all the techniques the email spammers used are in use for robocallers. They're hiding the origins of the calls (hacking into vulnerable phone systems if necessary to do that), they're fly-by-night companies that disappear as soon as anyone starts scrutinizing them, and they're taking advantage of national and state boundaries.

        So let the government go hard after those who are benefiting from these promotions. If someone is outsourcing promotions they they should have to put strict guidelines in the contracts so they know exactly how their promotions will be handled. The excuse that they did not know the promotions company was going to make robocalls is, well, inexcusable.

        • (Score: 3, Insightful) by Thexalon on Thursday March 05 2015, @08:48PM

          by Thexalon (636) on Thursday March 05 2015, @08:48PM (#153647)

          Most robocalls aren't advertising or promotions of legitimate services, but scam artists of various kinds. The FTC has caught a few people, most notably one of the organizations responsible for "Rachel from Cardholder Services" [consumeraffairs.com].

          --
          The only thing that stops a bad guy with a compiler is a good guy with a compiler.
          • (Score: 2) by NotSanguine on Friday March 06 2015, @02:52AM

            Most robocalls aren't advertising or promotions of legitimate services, but scam artists of various kinds. The FTC has caught a few people, most notably one of the organizations responsible for "Rachel from Cardholder Services".

            Funny that. I get calls from group(s) engaged in an identical scam just about every day.

            --
            No, no, you're not thinking; you're just being logical. --Niels Bohr
    • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:13PM

      by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:13PM (#153567)

      A honeypot isn't a filter. It is a misdirection and surveillance system. So the FTC says: "Robocalls bad", and everybody fails to consider that what their suggesting is dual use. Isn't that how the national do not call list got started?

      • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:05PM

        by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:05PM (#153581)

        > everybody fails to consider that what their suggesting is dual use. Isn't that how the national do not call list got started?

        What, exactly, is this "dual use" for the do not call list?

  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:04PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:04PM (#153495)

    Like the death penalty for you and all your offspring. Also de-exempt politicians since they use robocalls too. This place will be habbitable again in no time.

    • (Score: 3, Informative) by kaszz on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:00PM

      by kaszz (4211) on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:00PM (#153519) Journal

      If politicians use robocalls, it will be allowed for an eternity..

      (thanks for telling us what will block any solution)

  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:54PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 05 2015, @02:54PM (#153515)

    1. Why is the FTC getting into law enforcement?

    2. Why is the FTC paying for technology that already exists, but isn't implemented due to trade regulation? (or weren't they aware of that, being the Federal TRADE Commission?)

    3. Isn't that more of a legal problem than a technological problem, since the judiciary has no capacity for on-demand consumer requested wiretap warrants?

    4. Doesn't question 3 suggest that the FTC is solving a problem that cannot be legally implemented?

    5. Shouldn't the FTC document the legal scope of its actions BEFORE setting off on some NCIS inspired adventure?

    How about this as a contest instead:

    25k$ to the first soundbite of a Congressman captured at home from his Samsung TV posted online. Bonus points if he's watching porn.

    • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Friday March 06 2015, @08:32AM

      by kaszz (4211) on Friday March 06 2015, @08:32AM (#153756) Journal

      Perhaps the FTC is gaming the system to beat any "donors" that would otherwise stall any attempt like this?

  • (Score: 3, Interesting) by richtopia on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:36PM

    by richtopia (3160) on Thursday March 05 2015, @03:36PM (#153537) Homepage Journal

    What would happen if phone calls were taxed something like 1c per call? To almost every user this would be a few dollars a year, but call spammers would see their margins hurt significantly.

    This isn't terribly well thought out; there are perhaps "legit" mass callers out there. Charities asking for donations for example, although I despise that practice also.

    • (Score: 3, Funny) by redneckmother on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:57PM

      by redneckmother (3597) on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:57PM (#153579)

      Back when I had a landline, and didn't pay for incoming calls, I used telemarketers' tactics against them. The poor shmuck who calls gets paid based on making a "sale", and the longer you string 'em along, the more painful a "lost sale" will be. One poor soul spent 25 minutes on the line before he realized he was wasting time on me. It was more entertaining than watching crap TV.

      --
      Mas cerveza por favor.
  • (Score: 3, Interesting) by fatuous looser on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:12PM

    by fatuous looser (2550) on Thursday March 05 2015, @05:12PM (#153566)

    Gee, where is there already a gigantic honeypot up & running?  The one that sucks down every little upstream photon from every corner of the globe?  Lemme think.  Oh, that would be the Bluffdale facility in Utah.  Works great for blackmail & industrial espionage.  We just LOVE it for that here in Amerika.  A technological wonderment, it is.

    We already know where the robocallers will be phoning to next.  Right here at my house, this very evening, as one simple example.  Why not fashion some robo-tracing "algorithms" for our lovely panopticon surveillance machine & document every detail of the robocalling activity with that?

    We spent billions on the Bluffdale dragnet.  Let's use it for something worthwhile, for a change.

    • (Score: 2) by urza9814 on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:43PM

      by urza9814 (3954) on Thursday March 05 2015, @06:43PM (#153590) Journal

      Jesus man, stop giving them ideas of how to make the general public *support* their behavior!

  • (Score: 2) by FakeBeldin on Friday March 06 2015, @03:29PM

    by FakeBeldin (3360) on Friday March 06 2015, @03:29PM (#153853) Journal

    "Thank you for calling $PERSON. Please have your credit card details ready to effectuate payment for this call.
    <change voice>Calls to this number are charged at $8 per minute.</change voice>
    We would now like to take the time to inform you about our discount programs.
    For a mere $50, you will be upgraded to per-call billing for the low-low fee of only $10 per call!
    At this rate, you'll make back your investment with 3 five minute calls already!
    Thank you for holding while we prepare the payment backend.
    If you have an account with us, please say or press one. Otherwise, hold the line.

    <mute the phone for a minute>

    Please speak or key in the number of five minute slots you wish to purchase.
    Don't forget that you have already used two and a half minutes now! So buy at least two slots!

    <mute the phone for a minute>
    I understood 20. Please say or press one if that is incorrect, and hold the line otherwise.
    <mute the phone for 1 second>
    Okay, purchasing 20 slots of five minutes each. With this purchase, you qualify for a discount!
    You will get your slots for the low-low price of only $170!

    Now please speak or key in your credit card number.
    ...
    I understood the number $GARBLED. Say or press one if that is correct.
    <<keypress>>
    I'm sorry I misunderstood you. I will now connect you to an operator who will validate your payment details personally."

    Feel free to donate any unexpected income (minus your payment processing fee, of course) towards the EFF, OpenBSD, or another worthy and nerdy cause of your choosing.