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posted by Fnord666 on Tuesday August 14 2018, @07:45PM   Printer-friendly
from the just-use-the-front-door dept.

Australia's promised “not-a-backdoor” crypto-busting bill is out and the government has kept its word - it doesn't want a backdoor, just the keys to your front one.

The draft of The Assistance and Access Bill 2018 calls for anyone using or selling communications services in Australia will be subject to police orders for access to private data.

That includes all vendors of computers, phones, apps, social media and cloud services in the Lucky Country, and anyone within national borders using them. These data-tapping orders will be enforced with fines of up to AU$10m (US$7.3m) for companies or $50,000 ($36,368) for individuals

The draft legislation also wants five years in prison for anyone who reveals a data-slurping investigation is going on. And while there's no explicit encryption backdoor requirements in the 110 page draft bill, our first look suggests there doesn't need to be.


Original Submission

Related Stories

Apple Speaks Out Against Australian Anti-Encryption Law; Police Advised Not to Trigger Face ID 31 comments

Apple argues stronger encryption will thwart criminals in letter to Australian government

Apple has long been a proponent for strong on-device encryption, most notably for its iPhones and the iOS operating system. This has often frustrated law enforcement agencies both in the US and overseas, many of which claim the company's encryption tools and policies are letting criminals avoid capture by masking communications and securing data from the hands of investigators.

Now, in a letter to the Australian government, Apple says it thinks encryption is in fact a benefit and public good that will only strength our protections against cyberattacks and terrorism. In Apple's eyes, encryption makes everyone's devices harder to hack and less vulnerable to take-overs, viruses, and other malicious attacks that could undermine personal and corporate security, as well as public infrastructure and services. Apple is specifically responding to the Australian Parliament's Assistance and Access Bill, which was introduced late last month and is designed to help the government more easily access the devices and data of criminals during active investigations.

Letter here (#53), or at Scribd and DocumentCloud.

Also at Ars Technica, Engadget, 9to5Mac, and AppleInsider.

Police told to avoid looking at recent iPhones to avoid lockouts

Police have yet to completely wrap their heads around modern iPhones like the X and XS, and that's clearer than ever thanks to a leak. Motherboard has obtained a presentation slide from forensics company Elcomsoft telling law enforcement to avoid looking at iPhones with Face ID. If they gaze at it too many times (five), the company said, they risk being locked out much like Apple's Craig Federighi was during the iPhone X launch event. They'd then have to enter a passcode that they likely can't obtain under the US Constitution's Fifth Amendment, which protects suspects from having to provide self-incriminating testimony.

Also at 9to5Mac.

Related:


Original Submission

Split Key Cryptography is Back… Again – Why Government Back Doors Don’t Work 23 comments

In response to the news of what's going on in Australia, Derek Zimmer over at Private Internet Access' blog covers split key cryptography and why government back doors don't/won't/can't work. Attempts to regulate cryptography have been going on for a long while and each try has failed. He starts with recent history, the cold war, and follows through to the latest attempts to stifle encryption. These past failures give a foundation which can be applied to the current situation in hopes of understanding why cryptographers around the world are universally against these kinds of schemes.

The new proposal touted by the NSA, GCHQ, The Australian government and others is a simple evolution of Key Escrow. The proposal is key escrow with split-key cryptography, which is just key escrow with extra steps. There is still a "Golden Key" that can decrypt all messages from a particular service, but this time, two or more entities have pieces of that key. The concept, popularized by a Microsoft researcher, is said to solve the problem of abuse, because all parties have to agree to decrypt the messages.

Earlier on SN:
Australia Set to Pass Controversial Encryption Law
Apple Speaks Out Against Australian Anti-Encryption Law; Police Advised Not to Trigger Face ID
When's A Backdoor Not A Backdoor? When The Oz Government Says It Isn't
Australian Government Pursues "Golden Key" for Encryption
and more


Original Submission

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  • (Score: 5, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @07:52PM (7 children)

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @07:52PM (#721501)

    Australia's promised “not-a-backdoor” crypto-busting bill is out and the government has kept its word - it doesn't want a backdoor, just the keys to your front one.

    Moral of the story: don't do business with any country whose government that requires this. At least until a critical mass do, this is about the only way to counter this. Once they all get together and do this we're screwed, at which point the business model will change from "do legitimate business with X" to "exploit government mandated front/back door requirement for profit." Which again suggests the most sensible course of action for anyone not on the criminal side of things is exactly what I led with:

    Don't do business with any country whose regime requires this.

    • (Score: 5, Interesting) by Mykl on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:48PM (4 children)

      by Mykl (1112) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:48PM (#721609)

      I'm not worried yet. The moment Apple tells the Government that they won't be complying, and would have to pull out of the country, will be the moment the politicians realise they would be voted into oblivion and the plan is DOA.

      • (Score: 2) by fido_dogstoyevsky on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:20AM

        by fido_dogstoyevsky (131) <axehandleNO@SPAMgmail.com> on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:20AM (#721663)

        The moment Apple tells the Government that they won't be complying, and would have to pull out of the country...

        ...will be the moment I have to decide whether I want the Coalition (of the right Liberal and far right National parties) less than I want Apple.

        --
        It's NOT a conspiracy... it's a plot.
      • (Score: 1) by pD-brane on Wednesday August 15 2018, @09:35AM

        by pD-brane (6728) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @09:35AM (#721719)

        We can keep on using secure encryption for the wrong reasons.

        But at least we can keep on using secure encryption.

      • (Score: 2) by tangomargarine on Wednesday August 15 2018, @07:02PM (1 child)

        by tangomargarine (667) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @07:02PM (#721888)

        ...wouldn't not selling in the U.S. also deal a massive blow to Apple's profits? Bit of a vacuous truth [wikipedia.org] argument.

        --
        "Is that really true?" "I just spent the last hour telling you to think for yourself! Didn't you hear anything I said?"
        • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday August 20 2018, @02:07AM

          by Anonymous Coward on Monday August 20 2018, @02:07AM (#723580)

          This story isn't about the U.S. It's about Australia.

    • (Score: 3, Funny) by driverless on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:41AM

      by driverless (4770) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:41AM (#721621)

      Australia's promised “not-a-backdoor” crypto-busting bill is out

      The Aussie politicians must be quoting that great Australian poet A.Young:

      For a fee
      I'm happy to be
      Your back door man

      Dirty deeds, done dirt cheap
      Dirty deeds, done dirt cheap
      Dirty deeds, done dirt cheap
      Dirty deeds and they're done dirt cheap yeah
      Dirty deeds and they're done dirt cheap

    • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:57PM

      by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:57PM (#721802)

      The problem is widespread, for example:

              Encryption impacts at least nine out of every ten of ASIO’s priority cases.
              Over 90 per cent of data being lawfully intercepted by the AFP now use some form of encryption.
              Effectively all communications among terrorists and organised crime groups are expected to be encrypted by 2020.

      OMG! Actual detective work may be required! Who knew?

  • (Score: -1, Flamebait) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @07:59PM (6 children)

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @07:59PM (#721508)

    So the first test of this in court, say Apple vs Oz, should be very interesting. Especially as Apple are notorious for protecting terrorists in the name of "user privacy" while screwing their users' privacy openly 24/7. If you hurry, you can get a front-row seat for this showdown.

    • (Score: 5, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:19PM

      by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:19PM (#721514)

      The trouble with fighting for human freedom is that one spends most of one's time defending scoundrels. For it is against scoundrels that oppressive laws are first aimed, and oppression must be stopped at the beginning if it is to be stopped at all. — H. L. Mencken

    • (Score: 2, Disagree) by Runaway1956 on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:28PM (4 children)

      by Runaway1956 (2926) Subscriber Badge on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:28PM (#721545) Journal

      I suspect that you might be American. Test? In court? Maybe. But, let us be aware that Oz law has little in common with US law. It has much in common with UK law though. Oz is a kind of democracy, governed by the Crown, which is not very democratic at all. We are (or should be) aware of how the law is abused in this country when government really really wants you. That sort of abuse is easier to justify when you have a Crown to blame it all on.

      • (Score: 2) by archfeld on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:59PM (1 child)

        by archfeld (4650) <treboreel@live.com> on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:59PM (#721584) Journal

        The US is NOT a democracy and never has been. We are a Republic, which on its's surface seems the same but actually isn't. We get to vote in a popular election, but the actual mechanics involve electorals who represent the population but have differing outlooks based on the state they represent.

        --
        For the NSA : Explosives, guns, assassination, conspiracy, primers, detonators, initiators, main charge, nuclear charge
        • (Score: 3, Informative) by HiThere on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:52PM

          by HiThere (866) Subscriber Badge on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:52PM (#721611) Journal

          I would have said "based on the power block" rather than "based on the state". And the results aren't really the same.

          --
          Javascript is what you use to allow unknown third parties to run software you have no idea about on your computer.
      • (Score: 3, Funny) by driverless on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:44AM (1 child)

        by driverless (4770) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:44AM (#721623)

        let us be aware that Oz law has little in common with US law.

        Given that Australian law trumps the laws of mathematics [newscientist.com], it's clear that Oz law has little in common with any kind of law.

        • (Score: -1, Offtopic) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @08:56AM

          by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @08:56AM (#721711)

          Given that Australian law trumps the laws of mathematics

          Trump! Trump!! Trump!!! ... MAAAGAAAAA!

  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:13PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:13PM (#721511)

    Someone has to say it, so it might as well be me, the honorable Anonymous Coward, "What could possibly go wrong?"

  • (Score: 2) by takyon on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:25PM

    by takyon (881) <takyonNO@SPAMsoylentnews.org> on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:25PM (#721518) Journal

    It's a buttface door.

    --
    [SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
  • (Score: 5, Interesting) by edIII on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:25PM (5 children)

    by edIII (791) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:25PM (#721519)

    The more precise way to say it, is that they want key-escrow. The FBI had already proposed this more than a couple of times I think, and tried to get key-escrow made into law. However, it is still a backdoor. That's because Alice and Bob are trying to have a conversation, so Mallory is given copies of the keys. Except Mallory is a wanton whore who could bend over and take a grapefruit in her backdoor without touching the sides. So key-escrow is still a backdoor because anyone with the right connections and skillsets can still gain access to the content of Alice and Bob's conversation via Mallory. The difference between a copy of the encryption keys, and embedding a 2nd encryption key (to weaken the first if possessed), is minimal. In practice they amount to the same thing.

    This is why open source movements for zero knowledge and end-to-end encryption are so important. Telegram, which isn't exactly open source, is run non-profit. SpiderOak is a zero knowledge for-profit backup service. Those are just two services that are entirely impossible to "front-door", hence will just disappear from Australia.

    Australia isn't just going after companies, but the average citizen as well. So while they won't be able to touch an org like Telegram, they will be able to fine anyone using it in Australia. Or they just create the Great Barrier of Australia and imitate China.

    I hope the average Australian resists like hell. My response is going to be to never visit Australia or do business with it, or companies based in Australia. Would you store sensitive data with an Australian company now? Didn't think so.

    --
    Technically, lunchtime is at any moment. It's just a wave function.
    • (Score: -1, Troll) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:43PM (3 children)

      by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @08:43PM (#721524)

      Outrage from incels. check

      Nobody cares. check

      Go get laid, you incel. Real men are taking care of this. We don't need input from pussies like you.

      • (Score: -1, Flamebait) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:01PM

        by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:01PM (#721536)

        Wow, you make a strong argument there, kid.

      • (Score: -1, Offtopic) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:19PM (1 child)

        by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:19PM (#721567)

        Sounds like someone needs to get laid.

        • (Score: 4, Touché) by Azuma Hazuki on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:03PM

          by Azuma Hazuki (5086) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:03PM (#721590) Journal

          s/needs to/can't and never will/g -i GPPost.pl

          In before "that's what SHE sed" (because yes, yes it is).

          --
          I am "that girl" your mother warned you about...
    • (Score: 2) by legont on Wednesday August 15 2018, @04:10AM

      by legont (4179) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @04:10AM (#721676)

      Most serious businesses are back-doored already anyway. They can not risk scenario "our admin lost the password so we are out of business".

      Hence the logic "why Joe should be more secure?".

      --
      "Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
  • (Score: 1, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:08PM (30 children)

    by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:08PM (#721540)

    Overnight all the major communication apps will switch to self-signed end-to-end encryption. They'll make their money off selling meta-data (social networking connections like who knows who stuff) instead of more specific interests. It won't be as much data or money. But they won't have as many expenses either once they stop operating huge server farms dedicated to sifting through our personal information.

    Thanks Australia!

    • (Score: 5, Interesting) by edIII on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:22PM (29 children)

      by edIII (791) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:22PM (#721542)

      You forgot that pesky little $50k for individuals caught using end-to-end encryption. The corporations aren't exactly absolved of liability either. Since they chose end-to-end encryption, it will still be on them to provide the cops access. Saying they don't have the keys will not be a defense.

      The police are technology agnostic here. All they care about is access. Whatever way that happens, at the point of a sword so to speak. This may not be the 5-pound hammer version of cryptanalysis, but it might as well be for normal people.

      Of course, this raises the biggest question for me, just what fucking level of crime is going in Australia that they need this at all?

      --
      Technically, lunchtime is at any moment. It's just a wave function.
      • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:46PM (11 children)

        by JoeMerchant (3937) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @09:46PM (#721552)

        So, they can:

        calls for anyone using or selling communications services in Australia will be subject to police orders for access to private data.

        but can they prove that, when you give them access to "private data" under orders, that you have in-fact given them access to ALL of the private data?

        Seems like a great application for multi-level data interleaving / steganography. First layer is an album of 100,000 cute cat pictures, next layer (easily broken by brute force) reveals a famous Rick Astley video. Then you give them the "real" password that reveals your daily "I'm leaving the office now" and shopping list conversations with your significant other, possibly including some embarrassing details about your 9 year old's bedwetting episodes. Honest, officers, that's all that's in there, I have complied with you twice.

        --
        🌻🌻 [google.com]
        • (Score: 2) by Mykl on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:32PM

          by Mykl (1112) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:32PM (#721603)

          Can we call this 'Turtle encryption'?

        • (Score: 3, Insightful) by legont on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:48AM (9 children)

          by legont (4179) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:48AM (#721671)

          In real life cases like this officers continue to interrogate you even if you opened everything as there is no poof that you did it.

          Using an encryption system where one can not prove that he gave up all the layers may become very unpleasant.

          --
          "Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
          • (Score: 4, Informative) by maxwell demon on Wednesday August 15 2018, @07:04AM (4 children)

            by maxwell demon (1608) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @07:04AM (#721702) Journal

            Using an encryption system where one can not prove that he gave up all the layers may become very unpleasant.

            You can never prove it. Even if you don't actually use encryption or steganography at all. Prove that there's no secret data hidden in your photo collection.

            --
            The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
            • (Score: 2) by legont on Wednesday August 15 2018, @10:52PM (3 children)

              by legont (4179) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @10:52PM (#721948)

              I would not go as far as to call it impossible. We definitely need one and perhaps should work on it.

              Outside of high tech life this system definitely exists. One just gives the data to an attorney and refuses to give it to the authorities. At some point the data can be obtained from the attorney and this closes the case (no more torture).

              It is probably not very difficult to come up with a similar strategy. In fact it probably already exists, but I am not an expert.

              --
              "Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
              • (Score: 2) by legont on Wednesday August 15 2018, @10:58PM (2 children)

                by legont (4179) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @10:58PM (#721951)

                Come to think about it, perhaps it is exactly what authorities want when they ask for so called back doors. They want an ability to get to the data given a due legal process. Looks like a reasonable wish and our job is to provide a reasonable solution. Otherwise we'll end up in dark ages of investigations.

                --
                "Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
                • (Score: 4, Insightful) by edIII on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:32PM (1 child)

                  by edIII (791) on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:32PM (#722489)

                  Fuck that noise. I want to go back to the "dark ages" of investigations. Where they did actual work again. Generated enough evidence to convince the judicial branch to allow them to probe for more. None of this fishing shit.

                  The feature you allude to is called Deniable encryption, and is a very valuable feature when supported correctly. I want extremely strong encryption in use, everywhere. Zero mass surveillance, distributed social media systems (Diaspora), and in general, extremely strong privacy for all communications between citizens. If we can construct a network that provides anonymity too, all the better.

                  Here's the catch though, and why I have zero fucking sympathy for the cops (or pigs): Extremely effective side-channel attacks. If the police are doing their jobs, and collecting enough evidence of your crimes to judicially warrant more extreme measures, it's already possible to monitor them in such ways that make it all but impossible to defeat the cops. We have NSA tech that can read shit going across USB from thousands of feet in the air. Stringray drones that hijack and intercept smartphone signals. Audio surveillance sophisticated enough to listen to whole buildings. Cheap tools ($1,000 USD) to read encryption keys in use, and only requires being in proximity to the target. Side channel attacks against various communication systems are developed all the time. Security is so weak right now, that it is almost funny that they think they must compromise encryption to get the job done, when compromising shoddy implementations is so much easier.

                  In other words, there are plenty of tools beyond weak encryption that allow cops to do their jobs. It does require them to actually get up and move their asses though, instead of sifting through citizens activity looking for crimes and other "low hanging fruit". Which is fucking stupid and offensive anyways, and will miss the more sophisticated groups that will still communicate silently regardless of how totalitarian the government becomes.

                  We don't owe them jack shit, and we certainly don't owe them our willing abrogation of our human and civil rights for purported safety.

                  --
                  Technically, lunchtime is at any moment. It's just a wave function.
                  • (Score: 2) by legont on Friday August 17 2018, @01:45AM

                    by legont (4179) on Friday August 17 2018, @01:45AM (#722635)

                    I accept your arguments and I actually moderated you up; thank you. I do agree with it.

                    Perhaps, the issue is that the US wants 100% success period, which is not reasonable. The whole airplane security nightmare started with one successful hijacking. Before that folks would hijack airplanes at gun point legally brought on-board and ask for money. FBI would give them money and then hunt and catch them; case closed. Nobody gave a shit except some fun flying. Then one guy got away using parachute and the whole system is downhill since then.

                    We all need to relax a little, do our jobs, and not try to be the fucking world leaders.

                    --
                    "Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
          • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Wednesday August 15 2018, @01:46PM (3 children)

            by JoeMerchant (3937) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @01:46PM (#721767)

            There is no encryption system which can "prove" that you haven't hidden another message in it.

            --
            🌻🌻 [google.com]
            • (Score: 2) by edIII on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:19PM (2 children)

              by edIII (791) on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:19PM (#722474)

              Depends on what you mean by "prove". Technically, the feature you alluded to previously is called Deniable encryption [wikipedia.org]. Encryption that supports that feature allows you to never be able to prove that you had hidden another message. You're asking for the opposite, to prove that no other message exists.

              Not all encryption supports deniability. In those methods, it's not difficult to more or less prove that the encryption method isn't hiding additional data. At least not facilitated by that encryption. However, nothing prevents you from performing multiple passes, with each pass differently encrypted. If the final plaintext that is produced has no datatype signatures, conforms to no standards we know, contains no known data structures, and essentially looks like random noise, then yes, it will be very difficult to prove that another message was NOT hidden in it. That's because deniable encryption looks just like noise. The high entropy of that noise, the better.

              Many traditional encryption methods leave identifiable signatures too. Deniable encryption is about removing all such signatures and leaving you with "unprovable" noise that resists all analysis.

              --
              Technically, lunchtime is at any moment. It's just a wave function.
              • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:35PM (1 child)

                by JoeMerchant (3937) on Thursday August 16 2018, @08:35PM (#722494)

                Some story I recently consumed about WWII African mail back home included a bit about the code that the corresponding couple used to communicate through the censors. They basically blathered on about inane stuff like the recent cricket match, the weather, somebody's scorpion bite, whatever, and the real message was encoded in the second letter of each first word on each line. The messages were still somewhat cryptic, such as "bowlerhatsoon", but that's enough for one to tell the other that they are being discharged (only civilians wear bowler hats) and rotating home soon, which is big/important news that the censors would have struck out (simply discarded the letter, most likely). The censors were free to read the entire message, but unable to decipher the true meaning and of course let it pass.

                No information theory will ever manage to prove or disprove the existence of such messages, as long as you're allowed to send enough crap along, and with people sharing 16MP color photos of their meals every day, plus cat videos, I think there's plenty of bandwidth in which to cleverly hide just about any text you might ever want to communicate.

                --
                🌻🌻 [google.com]
                • (Score: 2) by edIII on Thursday August 16 2018, @10:30PM

                  by edIII (791) on Thursday August 16 2018, @10:30PM (#722561)

                  That's reminiscent of the Japanese code book encryption, and to the Navajo communications, both in WWII as well.

                  Because Navajo has a complex grammar, it is not nearly mutually intelligible enough with even its closest relatives within the Na-Dene family to provide meaningful information. It was still an unwritten language, and Johnston thought Navajo could satisfy the military requirement for an undecipherable code. Navajo was spoken only on the Navajo lands of the American Southwest. Its syntax and tonal qualities, not to mention dialects, made it unintelligible to anyone without extensive exposure and training. One estimate indicates that at the outbreak of World War II, fewer than 30 non-Navajo could understand the language.[21]

                  Code Talkers Monument Ocala, Florida Memorial Park
                  Early in 1942, Johnston met with Major General Clayton B. Vogel, the commanding general of Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, and his staff. Johnston staged tests under simulated combat conditions which demonstrated that Navajo men could encode, transmit, and decode a three-line English message in 20 seconds, versus the 30 minutes required by machines at that time. The idea was accepted, with Vogel recommending that the Marines recruit 200 Navajo. The first 29 Navajo recruits attended boot camp in May 1942. This first group created the Navajo code at Camp Pendleton, Oceanside, California.[22]

                  The Navajo code was formally developed and modeled on the Joint Army/Navy Phonetic Alphabet that uses agreed-upon English words to represent letters. The Navajo Code Talkers were mainly Marines. As it was determined that phonetically spelling out all military terms letter by letter into words—while in combat—would be too time-consuming, some terms, concepts, tactics and instruments of modern warfare were given uniquely formal descriptive nomenclatures in Navajo (for example, the word for "shark" being used to refer to a destroyer, or "silver oak leaf" to the rank of lieutenant colonel).[23]

                  A codebook was developed to teach the many relevant words and concepts to new initiates. The text was for classroom purposes only, and was never to be taken into the field. The code talkers memorized all these variations and practiced their rapid use under stressful conditions during training. Uninitiated Navajo speakers would have no idea what the code talkers' messages meant; they would hear only truncated and disjointed strings of individual, unrelated nouns and verbs.

                  It's worth noting that the reason why code books are secure, is that nobody understands the meaning of the individual words. However, the more they are used, and the more you can perform analysis of subsequent events associated with the coded conversations, the more you can deduce their meaning.

                  Code books not invulnerable precisely because they reuse the codes, and the opposite is the reason why one-time-pad encryption is the only provably unbreakable encryption around. One of the reasons why the Navajo were so secure is noted in bold above. That would not have protected them though over time, if the Japanese or Germans had enough transmissions and activity to analyze.

                  What you refer to at the end is Steganography, which can be combined with deniable encryption to encode messages in the random noise found in pretty much all pictures. Especially pictures in a night time setting produced by equipment not suited to low-light conditions.

                  WWII is indeed a very fascinating time period for the study of encryption.

                  --
                  Technically, lunchtime is at any moment. It's just a wave function.
      • (Score: 1, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:09PM (2 children)

        by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:09PM (#721561)

        You forgot that pesky little $50k for individuals caught using end-to-end encryption.

        Nonsense. It's trivial to setup an encryption relay overseas that returns a one-time key pair that makes user keys useless to decrypt past messages:

        1. You write message.
        2. You request server for a one time key using your own key.
        3. The server provides it.
        4. Other party receives a suitable decryption key in a message encrypted exclusively for them.
        5. You sign, encrypt and send.
        6. Other party decrypts and reads.
        7. Clients never retain keys.

        If the government asks for the keys, you give it to them. They can't use them to read past messages they intercepted and no local company ever stored those keys. If they read old copies of messages off your phone/computer, all they have is plain text messages you can claim someone planted. Only you know what's real and what's fake.

        • (Score: 2) by jasassin on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:28PM (1 child)

          by jasassin (3566) <jasassin@gmail.com> on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:28PM (#721571) Homepage Journal

          4. Other party receives a suitable decryption key in a message encrypted exclusively for them.

          That doesn't make sense to me. Send a decryption key in an encrypted message? It just sounds redundant, but maybe I'm missing something?

          --
          jasassin@gmail.com GPG Key ID: 0xE6462C68A9A3DB5A
          • (Score: 4, Informative) by RamiK on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:25PM

            by RamiK (1813) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:25PM (#721600)

            These sort of schemes fall under mutual authentication. Best known example is kerberos. Some blockchain designs are there explicitly to further decentralize such ticketing servers. Most self-destructing messages are implemented in a similar way.

            --
            compiling...
      • (Score: -1, Flamebait) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:23PM (6 children)

        by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday August 14 2018, @10:23PM (#721570)

        Two somewhat recent things have caused crime to shoot way up:

        1. guns are pretty much banned, along with the right to fight back when being attacked

        2. some parts are now overrun with Muslims; they will never accept western values

      • (Score: 4, Informative) by PartTimeZombie on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:21PM (5 children)

        by PartTimeZombie (4827) on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:21PM (#721598)

        There's very little chance of this passing, as the Australian Senate is not controlled by the current government.

        This is pretty much just the current ruling coalition pandering to a weird, authoritarian wing of their own base.

        I work for a massive US-owned multinational with extensive manufacturing all over Australia, and I can tell you that we use end-to-end encryption. The chances of us handing keys over to the Australian Federal Police or whoever are slim to none.

        I would not be at all surprised if companies like ours use the threat of job losses to lobby these idiots.

        • (Score: 3, Insightful) by HiThere on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:57PM (3 children)

          by HiThere (866) Subscriber Badge on Tuesday August 14 2018, @11:57PM (#721613) Journal

          Yeah. And Trump never had a chance, and neither did BREXIT.

          --
          Javascript is what you use to allow unknown third parties to run software you have no idea about on your computer.
          • (Score: 1, Redundant) by PartTimeZombie on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:24AM (1 child)

            by PartTimeZombie (4827) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:24AM (#721617)

            Neither of which happened in Australia.

            • (Score: 1, Interesting) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:46AM

              by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:46AM (#721670)

              USA got Trump after multiple "will not win there", "will not win here" and the final "will not win against Hilary" or "electoral college was created to avoid clowns like this".
              Great Britain got Brexit from a consultive referendum that was pretty close and with fuzzy conditions (and lies, we learnt later), and multiple reaffirmations by those that really have the sovereignty (judges were asked about who really decides), even when conditions are starting to point pretty damaging or useless (= just stay in EU and keep the pros too, morons).
              Australia can do join the club of retarded political choices with this law.

              And remember, even if it looks completly nonsense, keep on digging once the hole is deep enough.
              Never stop. Politicians of the world, your job is to put all comendians out of work, specially the absurd kind.

          • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @06:33AM

            by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @06:33AM (#721693)

            So what you're saying is that it'll happen if Putin wants it to happen?

        • (Score: 3, Informative) by c0lo on Wednesday August 15 2018, @04:31AM

          by c0lo (156) Subscriber Badge on Wednesday August 15 2018, @04:31AM (#721678) Journal

          There's very little chance of this passing, as the Australian Senate is not controlled by the current government.

          You reckon? Wanna bet it will pass?
          Labor party is an equal sell-out when it comes to internet freedom.
          Remember Stephen Conroy?

          http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/12/31/2129471.htm [abc.net.au]
          https://www.smh.com.au/technology/senators-red-undie-remarks-fall-flat-in-new-york-20120928-26pqt.html [smh.com.au]

          --
          https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0 https://soylentnews.org/~MichaelDavidCrawford
      • (Score: 2) by Nerdfest on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:49AM

        by Nerdfest (80) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:49AM (#721651)

        Crime? As I keep saying, Authoritarianism is the new black. Governments and the media are spreading the fear that makes a large percentage of the populace want it.

  • (Score: 4, Interesting) by arslan on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:14AM

    by arslan (3462) on Wednesday August 15 2018, @12:14AM (#721615)

    The claim TFS doesn't seem to match the bill itself. Reading through it, all it is proposing is companies that have the ability to decrypt must assist law enforcement. There was an explicit paragraph that states it is not about making companies design back-doors into their solutions, i.e. design new solutions that allow decryption - it is about where the design does allow the company to decrypt or if they design something new that actually has the capability for them to decrypt they must assist law enforcement.

  • (Score: 3, Insightful) by deimios on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:26AM

    by deimios (201) Subscriber Badge on Wednesday August 15 2018, @03:26AM (#721664) Journal

    A hole is a hole. And if there is a hole it can be used to fuck you. I don't trust any government to have security professionals and protocols sufficiently good to be able to keep any backdoor a secret for long.

  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:40PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 15 2018, @02:40PM (#721788)

    I dont understand why the burden is placed on manufacturers.
    just ask the person owning the data to decrypt it(*).
    related, were technical limitations in old-skool safe construction also governed by the law?

    probably this is bankrolled by some for-profit-no-service OS manufacturer.
    testing the idea, to control computer hardware BY LAW, in some backwater country, first.
    a beta run, so to speak.
    once all the hurdles have been documented and cleared, i bet it will get rolled-out globally.

    and then in some 10 years, people start asking what this code-routin or this clipperchip does anymore,
    since now we're all living in happy, fairy land, drinking unicorn milk and lying in the shade of unicorn-fart rainbows ...

    (*) if there is ever scientific proof that getting a blow job makes you smarter, then
    surely the clubberment will press us all into service... for national security.

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