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posted by martyb on Friday October 30 2015, @01:52PM   Printer-friendly
from the users-are-up-in-ARMs dept.

Joanna Rutkowska's blog points to recent paper on a survey of the various problems and attacks presented against the x86 platform over the last 10 years. The paper does not present new exploits but does cover: the BIOS (UEFI) and booting; peripherals; the Intel Management Engine; and several other aspects of x86 insecurity. Some of the problems appear insurmountable as described.


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  • (Score: 2) by NCommander on Friday October 30 2015, @11:40PM

    by NCommander (2) Subscriber Badge <michael@casadevall.pro> on Friday October 30 2015, @11:40PM (#256721) Homepage Journal

    There were technical justifications for why ACPI won over flattened device tree, specifically because FDT is a descriptive only environment. A properly coded ACPI table allows a LOT of hardware to just work without individually written drives. Most fan systems are controlled by a I2C chip. Withotu ACPI, you'd need to know where the I2C chip is on the system bus, a specific driver for said chip, and then a driver for fan control. With ACPI, you can define the standard fan control methods and it "just works".

    I'm not saying ACPI is genius, but if you're dealing with a vendor who actually tests their ACPI implementation against something that isn't just Windows, and follows the spec, you'd be amazed on how Linux can "just work" for the most part. A lot of the enablement of Linux for x86 laptops on an OEM side is mostly fixing the ACPI tables, and then making sure the right firmware is cooked in.

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