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posted by takyon on Thursday December 08 2016, @05:49PM   Printer-friendly
from the gears-of-war dept.

David Swanson, author of "War is a Lie", writes via CounterPunch:

The facts [of the Pearl Harbor story] do not support the mythology. The United States government did not need to make Japan a junior partner in imperialism, did not need to fuel an arms race, did not need to support Nazism and fascism (as some of the biggest U.S. corporations did right through the war), did not need to provoke Japan, did not need to join the war in Asia or Europe, and was not surprised by the attack on Pearl Harbor. For support of each of these statements, keep reading.

[...] Churchill's fervent hope for years before the U.S. entry into the war was that Japan would attack the United States. This would permit the United States (not legally, but politically) to fully enter World War II in Europe, as its president wanted to do, as opposed to merely providing weaponry and assisting in the targeting of submarines as it had been doing. On December 7, 1941, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt drew up a declaration of war on both Japan and Germany, but decided it wouldn't work and went with Japan alone. Germany quickly declared war on the United States, possibly in hopes that Japan would declare war on the Soviet Union.

Getting into the war was not a new idea in the Roosevelt White House. FDR had tried lying to the U.S. public about U.S. ships including the Greer and the Kerny, which had been helping British planes track German submarines, but which Roosevelt pretended had been innocently attacked. Roosevelt also lied that he had in his possession a secret Nazi map planning the conquest of South America, as well as a secret Nazi plan for replacing all religions with Nazism. The map was of the quality of Karl Rove's "proof" that Iraq was buying uranium in Niger.

And yet, the people of the United States didn't buy the idea of going into another war until Pearl Harbor, by which point Roosevelt had already instituted the draft, activated the National Guard, created a huge Navy in two oceans, traded old destroyers to England in exchange for the lease of its bases in the Caribbean and Bermuda, and--just 11 days before the "unexpected" attack, and five days before FDR expected it--he had secretly ordered the creation (by Henry Field) of a list of every Japanese and Japanese-American person in the United States.

[...] On November 15th, Army Chief of Staff George Marshall briefed the media on something we do not remember as "the Marshall Plan". In fact we don't remember it at all. "We are preparing an offensive war against Japan", Marshall said, asking the journalists to keep it a secret, which as far as I know they dutifully did.

[...] Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin (R-MT), the first woman ever elected to Congress, and who had voted against World War I, stood alone in opposing World War II [...] found that the Economic Defense Board had gotten economic sanctions under way less than a week after the Atlantic Conference [of August 1941]. On December 2, 1941, the New York Times had reported, in fact, that Japan had been "cut off from about 75 percent of her normal trade by the Allied blockade". Rankin also cited the statement of Lieutenant Clarence E. Dickinson, U.S.N., in the Saturday Evening Post of October 10, 1942, that on November 28, 1941, nine days before the attack, Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr., (he of the catchy slogan "Kill Japs! Kill Japs!") had given instructions to him and others to "shoot down anything we saw in the sky and to bomb anything we saw on the sea".

The article is very detailed and shows repeatedly the duplicity of those who have claimed that the strike on Pearl Harbor was a "surprise".


Original Submission

 
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  • (Score: 3, Insightful) by tangomargarine on Thursday December 08 2016, @06:37PM

    by tangomargarine (667) on Thursday December 08 2016, @06:37PM (#438798)

    As opposed to what? Having them constantly on patrol without docking? I'm sure that would use up a trivial amount of fuel. /s

    than a deployed position

    I was under the impression that when you have bigass ships like battleships, you can't tie them up just anywhere you want. You need a deep-water harbor. They did a whole thing around the Normandy invasion of having to sink a bunch of ships full of concrete to make Cherbourg usable as a major port.

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  • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:19PM

    by JoeMerchant (3937) on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:19PM (#438842)

    Yes, the big ships dock at big ports, but what good reason is/was there for having them ALL in port ALL at the same time?

    Send them out in smaller groups, or send them out as a big fleet, but, hell yes, having them on the move on the open ocean, location unknown to the enemy, even if the uncertainty is only a few hundred miles, is a hell of a lot safer than keeping them docked next to a big civilian city with significant foreign population for extended periods of time.

    "Loose lips sink ships" wasn't a sudden post Pearl Harbor realization.

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    • (Score: 2) by tangomargarine on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:29PM

      by tangomargarine (667) on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:29PM (#438853)

      Well, the carriers *were* out on patrol.

      And Hawaii is a decent uniform distance from Guam, Wake Island, and Midway. Keeping them where they can deploy to any keeps you flexible.

      And finally, as mentioned elsewhere, nobody really thought the Japanese could mount an attack at that distance using carriers at the time. You might recall the Dolittle Raid not long after, where the U.S. had to use B-25s, which weren't capable of landing on carriers, and barely had the range to ditch in China/the China Sea.

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      • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:41PM

        by JoeMerchant (3937) on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:41PM (#438861)

        Underestimation of the Japanese carriers' capabilities certainly weighs in on the "doh!" side of the argument.

        I've had some "bad things" happen in my life, and doing the post-game analysis, I can usually line up three or four (or more) things I did wrong simultaneously that enabled the "bad thing" to take occur. The concentration of forces in Pearl, combined with the lack of radar coverage and lack of air patrols could have just been a coincidence of bad judgement, perfectly timed with Yamamoto's arrival. Usually, large groups of people don't make so many simultaneous oversights all at once.

        The deployment of the relatively newer aircraft carriers elsewhere only lends weight to the "got hit on purpose, now we can kill 'em" side, for me.

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        • (Score: 3, Informative) by tangomargarine on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:54PM

          by tangomargarine (667) on Thursday December 08 2016, @08:54PM (#438867)

          Usually, large groups of people don't make so many simultaneous oversights all at once.

          "Large groups of people?" I would assume it was about a dozen guys in command of the base, and everybody else following orders (well, plus the captains of the ships, I suppose). This is the military we're talking about; you don't go to your commander and say, "Gee I dunno, boss, maybe we should be doing something else instead of these preparations it's your job to be knowledgeable on."

          combined with the lack of radar coverage

          They did detect the first wave on radar; they just thought it was a flight of B-17s that was scheduled to arrive.

          As the first wave approached Oahu, it was detected by the U.S. Army SCR-270 radar at Opana Point near the island's northern tip. This post had been in training mode for months, but was not yet operational.[84] The operators, Privates George Elliot Jr. and Joseph Lockard, reported a target.[85] But Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, a newly assigned officer at the thinly manned Intercept Center, presumed it was the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers from California. The Japanese planes were approaching from a direction very close (only a few degrees difference) to the bombers,[86] and while the operators had never seen a formation as large on radar, they neglected to tell Tyler of its size.[87] Tyler, for security reasons, could not tell the operators of the six B-17s that were due (even though it was widely known).[87]

          https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attack_on_Pearl_Harbor#First_wave_composition [wikipedia.org]

          I could see the argument that any military base should be ready to be attacked at any given time, I suppose. Especially with everything Japan had been getting up to at the time.

          --
          "Is that really true?" "I just spent the last hour telling you to think for yourself! Didn't you hear anything I said?"
          • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday December 08 2016, @09:04PM

            by JoeMerchant (3937) on Thursday December 08 2016, @09:04PM (#438871)

            any military base should be ready to be attacked at any given time

            Yeah, that's my basic point of view... especially with the world at war and all that.

            As for the large groups of people, those 12 guys in that room each have 12 more guys that they meet with who are getting all kinds of information fed to them along with discussion of tactics, threats, potential and probably future outcomes, etc. When I screw up big, one of my primary mistakes is doing something dangerous while tired (thereby: relatively mentally impaired) - larger groups of people shouldn't be making mentally impaired decisions - that's why there are 12 guys, even if most of them are mentally impaired the chances of them all choosing to do the same dumb thing at once, in defiance of the better decision makers in the room, should be a rare thing.

            Also, things like the military strategy leading up to Pearl Harbor - that developed over the course of weeks to months. My solo bad decisions usually take place within the space of a few minutes, or less.

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    • (Score: 2) by Thexalon on Thursday December 08 2016, @11:27PM

      by Thexalon (636) on Thursday December 08 2016, @11:27PM (#438924)

      Yes, the big ships dock at big ports, but what good reason is/was there for having them ALL in port ALL at the same time?

      1. They can (and did) support each other in case of attack.
      2. They can easily transfer personnel between ships.
      3. They can take advantage of land-based defenses and the barriers around the port to fight.
      4. They can be easily supplied.
      5. It doesn't require any fuel to leave them in port.
      6. The sailors like shore leave, all other things being equal.
      7. The US was in negotiations with the Japanese at the time, and there was a significant chance of a deal being cut. Having your fleet out and about is a provocation.
      8. Ships sunk in port are much easier to salvage, resurface and repair. 13 of the 16 ships hit would return to service during the war.

      The main reason the US was caught by surprise is that they expected the Japanese to hit them in the Philippines first, not in Hawaii, in part because the Philippines were much closer to their bases of operations.

      --
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      • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday December 09 2016, @02:07AM

        by Anonymous Coward on Friday December 09 2016, @02:07AM (#438967)

        the US [...] expected the Japanese to hit them in the Philippines first

        You left out the good part: (Later that day). [wikipedia.org]

        As dawn moved westward across the Pacific (and the International Date Line), daylight airstrikes followed [...] on Wake Island, [...] on Guam, [...] on Davao [in the Philippines], [...] on Baguio [in the Philippines], and on Clark Field [in the Philippines]

        -- OriginalOwner_ [soylentnews.org]]

      • (Score: 2) by edIII on Friday December 09 2016, @02:12AM

        by edIII (791) on Friday December 09 2016, @02:12AM (#438968)

        Don't forget that the primary reason why it's so easy to believe that our leaders betrayed us, and those soldiers, is hindsight.

        From the Tuskegee experiments and onward, there have been many reasons for us to distrust the U.S military command's commitment to the troops. Those troops were expendable in order to win a larger war.

        It's so easy to believe when you view history as one long running game that the Elite's play.

        --
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  • (Score: 2) by infodragon on Friday December 09 2016, @01:03PM

    by infodragon (3509) on Friday December 09 2016, @01:03PM (#439135)

    So many big ships clustered together except the aircraft carriers. They were vital to the war effort against Japan except not even one was in Pearl Harbor. Too much to be coincidence.

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