Toshiba has reported another huge loss as it continues to try to recover from the bankruptcy of its Westinghouse nuclear unit:
Toshiba has filed its delayed financial results, warning that the company's survival is at risk. "There are material events and conditions that raise substantial doubt about the company's ability to continue as a going concern," the company said in a statement.
The electronics-to-construction giant reported a loss of 532bn yen (£3.8bn; $4.8bn) for April to December. However, the results have not been approved by the firm's auditors. These latest financial results have already been delayed twice and raise the possibility that Toshiba could be delisted from the Tokyo Stock Exchange.
Previously: Toshiba Nuked Half its Assets
Huge Nuclear Cost Overruns Push Toshiba's Westinghouse Into Bankruptcy
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday April 13 2017, @01:05AM
Your "biggest purse" problem is not solved by "government"; indeed, your "government" is simply that biggest purse.
Rather, it's solved by 2 things: (a) by separation of powers, and checks and balances (e.g., by competition within a market); (b) by a culture that respects a certain way of interaction (e.g., a culture of contracts).
A government like the United States provides a primitive, somewhat arbitrary separation of powers, as well as checks and balances—ones that are increasingly being consolidated under the executive branch; a government like the United States sits atop a culture of representative democracy, which is still founded on the principle that one group dictates to another.
Those paying protection money to a mafioso would definitely agree that they are living under the governance of that mafioso.
Like it or not, a mafioso or a warlord or a dictator is just as much a government as a representative democracy; in a given jurisdiction, the one organization that is called "government" is just the one that has the most recognized monopoly on allocating resources by decree.
Your mafioso is the only example that explicitly involves the governmental behavior of allocating resources by decree rather than agreement; the other examples are not manifestly governmental, and may well exist in a market of voluntary interaction—though it seems like such situations would indicate quite readily to the market that there is a great deal of opportunity for competing endeavors.