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posted by martyb on Saturday April 29 2017, @01:57PM   Printer-friendly
from the CARDiac-surgery dept.

On Wednesday, large chunks of network traffic belonging to MasterCard, Visa, and more than two dozen other financial services companies were briefly routed through a Russian government-controlled telecom under unexplained circumstances that renew lingering questions about the trust and reliability of some of the most sensitive Internet communications.

Anomalies in the border gateway protocol—which routes large-scale amounts of traffic among Internet backbones, ISPs, and other large networks—are common and usually the result of human error. While it's possible Wednesday's five- to seven-minute hijack of 36 large network blocks may also have been inadvertent, the high concentration of technology and financial services companies affected made the incident "curious" to engineers at network monitoring service BGPmon. What's more, the way some of the affected networks were redirected indicated their underlying prefixes had been manually inserted into BGP tables, most likely by someone at Rostelecom, the Russian government-controlled telecom that improperly announced ownership of the blocks.

If you did nothing wrong and have nothing to hide, then you have nothing to fear. In Soviet Russia.


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  • (Score: 2) by art guerrilla on Saturday April 29 2017, @11:14PM (2 children)

    by art guerrilla (3082) on Saturday April 29 2017, @11:14PM (#501711)

    not at all...
    saying the breathless, pearl-clutching neocons, neolibtards, and assorted toadies and lickspittles of Empire are grasping at any/all straws to paint putin as the devil incarnate; facts be damned, they want to pin everything from this inertnet hiccup, to athlete's foot on putin/rooshia...

    Starting Score:    1  point
    Karma-Bonus Modifier   +1  

    Total Score:   2  
  • (Score: 2) by captain normal on Sunday April 30 2017, @12:56AM

    by captain normal (2205) on Sunday April 30 2017, @12:56AM (#501741)

    Do you mean this isn't the first real volley in the Cyber War to end all Cyber Wars? Damn I was about to pack up and head to somewhere where there are no wires or cell towers. ;-)

    --
    Everyone is entitled to his own opinion, but not to his own facts"- --Daniel Patrick Moynihan--
  • (Score: 3, Informative) by NotSanguine on Sunday April 30 2017, @03:19AM

    saying the breathless, pearl-clutching neocons, neolibtards, and assorted toadies and lickspittles of Empire are grasping at any/all straws to paint putin as the devil incarnate; facts be damned, they want to pin everything from this inertnet hiccup, to athlete's foot on putin/rooshia...

    If you understood how BGP worked, you wouldn't be so blase about it.

    When there are hiccups (usually fat fingers or inexperienced network engineers) the route advertisement changes are overly broad, causing routers to claim to be the correct path for networks (IP address-wise) adjacent to the networks for which they are actually responsible.

    The routes advertised were very specific. In fact, many of them were *more* specific than those used by the network providers who are actually authorized and responsible for that traffic. This raises a *big* red flag, as the BGP protocol will prefer more specific routes over less specific ones.

    Given that the network ranges involved were *not* adjacent to each other, and not adjacent to network ranges managed by the ISP in question, that raises a big red flag as well. What's more, most of the network ranges belonged to banks/financial institutions, with a few tech companies to round it out, that raises additional red flags.

    Is this a "volley in the cyber war?" Probably not. However, it wouldn't surprise me if some unscrupulous operator (whether it be related to a state actor or another organized group) either inadvertently pushed the route updates to production routers, or this was a test to see whether and how long it would take for the misdirection to be discovered and remediated. They might also have want to find out how much data could be slurped before the Internet at-large addressed the issue.

    I'm a big fan of Hanlon's Razor [wikipedia.org], but If you look at how this happened, it's unlikely that this was just incompetence, an honest mistake or crappy network engineering.

    If it was a cyberwar "volley," then it was poorly crafted and executed.

    --
    No, no, you're not thinking; you're just being logical. --Niels Bohr