Submitted via IRC for TheMightyBuzzard
Since 2008, most of Intel's chipsets have contained a tiny homunculus computer called the "Management Engine" (ME). The ME is a largely undocumented master controller for your CPU: it works with system firmware during boot and has direct access to system memory, the screen, keyboard, and network. All of the code inside the ME is secret, signed, and tightly controlled by Intel. Last week, vulnerabilities in the Active Management (AMT) module in some Management Engines have caused lots of machines with Intel CPUs to be disastrously vulnerable to remote and local attackers. While AMT can be disabled, there is presently no way to disable or limit the Management Engine in general. Intel urgently needs to provide one.
[...] EFF believes that Intel needs to provide a minimum level of transparency and user control of the Management Engines inside our computers, in order to prevent this cybersecurity disaster from recurring. Unless that happens, we are concerned that it may not be appropriate to use Intel CPUs in many kinds of critical infrastructure systems.
It's a crying shame the what the EFF says doesn't hold a whole lot of weight.
Source: The Electronic Frontier Foundation
(Score: 3, Interesting) by TheRaven on Monday May 15 2017, @07:46AM (14 children)
We had a similar wake-up call from a Dell (I think) remote management system that shipped with an ancient (and known insecure) version of OpenSSH. We discovered this when Facebook contacted us to ask why we were attacking them - apparently someone had compromised the management system and was using it to attack Facebook. This is perhaps more of a problem than the Intel hack, because the owner of the compromised system has far less of an incentive to fix it if it's being used to attack computers off their network.
sudo mod me up
(Score: 3, Informative) by kaszz on Monday May 15 2017, @08:13AM (8 children)
The point is that with Intel Management Engine you don't have the option to turn off the LOM facilities.
(Score: 2) by TheRaven on Monday May 15 2017, @09:05AM (3 children)
sudo mod me up
(Score: 2) by kaszz on Monday May 15 2017, @09:16AM (2 children)
Not from what I have read. But then how can one be sure anyway?
(Score: 1) by fustakrakich on Monday May 15 2017, @12:24PM (1 child)
Um, network sniffer between the machine and the outside world?
La politica e i criminali sono la stessa cosa..
(Score: 3, Insightful) by kaszz on Monday May 15 2017, @05:00PM
Then you got to be sure what to look for among the gazillion of bits passing over the network. And that the sniffer platform don't fool you either.
Then there's the RF backdoor. Connect to your neighbor and establish a system prompt.
(Score: 1, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Monday May 15 2017, @10:32AM (3 children)
You can minimize the attack surface by using a pci(-e) network card instead of the untrusted on-board NIC.
(Score: 1, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Monday May 15 2017, @02:10PM (1 child)
On a laptop?
(Score: 2) by Jeremiah Cornelius on Monday May 15 2017, @04:16PM
USB C or Thunderbolt!
You're betting on the pantomime horse...
(Score: 3, Insightful) by kaszz on Monday May 15 2017, @04:54PM
And you think that little spy engine of Intel won't find your wired network card? ;)
(Score: 1, Touché) by Anonymous Coward on Monday May 15 2017, @08:14AM
Facebook contacted us to ask why we were attacking them
I don't need a reason!
Hells bells, no matter what you're doing, some pissant somewhere wants you to stop. Fuck the world!
(Score: 2) by butthurt on Monday May 15 2017, @08:15AM (1 child)
Checkpoint, Fujitsu and Sun had separate physical ports for lights-out management. Is that typical?
https://downloads.checkpoint.com/fileserver/SOURCE/direct/ID/12676/FILE/CP_4800_12000_LOM_AdminGuide.pdf [checkpoint.com]
http://www.fujitsu.com/downloads/SPARCE/manuals/sparc-t1-t2e/alom1.3-en-01.pdf [fujitsu.com]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/LOM_port [wikipedia.org]
(Score: 4, Informative) by TheRaven on Monday May 15 2017, @09:03AM
sudo mod me up
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday May 15 2017, @11:32AM (1 child)
So you told them, it wasn't you attacking them but Dell enabling the compromise of your machine and allowing a 3rd party to use your network to attack them?
Serious point being, could Intel's insurers take the hit from a bug in the ME that was exploited on the scale of the recent ransomware attack?
(Score: 2) by TheRaven on Monday May 15 2017, @01:37PM
So you told them, it wasn't you attacking them but Dell enabling the compromise of your machine and allowing a 3rd party to use your network to attack them?
[Disclaimer: I wasn't involved in the incident directly, so this is all from what people who were have told me:] They were actually very helpful in pinpointing the source and once the attacks were stopped didn't take it any further. I doubt that they had a case against Dell.
Serious point being, could Intel's insurers take the hit from a bug in the ME that was exploited on the scale of the recent ransomware attack?
There isn't any precedent for liability for associating liability with off-the-shelf software and it's not really a precedent that I'd be happy seeing set.
sudo mod me up