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posted by martyb on Saturday July 15 2017, @09:57AM   Printer-friendly
from the getting-to-the-root-of-things dept.

The Register reports that registrar logins hacked and 750 web addresses were compromised:

More than 750 domain names were hijacked through the internet's own systems, registrar Gandi has admitted.

Late last week, an unknown individual managed to get hold of the company's login to one of its technical providers, which then connects to no fewer than 27 other top-level domains, including .asia, .au, .ch, .jp and .se.

Using that login, the attacker managed to change the domain details on the official nameservers for 751 domains on a range of top-level domains, and redirect them all to a specific website serving up malware.

The changes went unnoticed for four hours until one [of] the registry operators reported the suspicious changes to Gandi. Within an hour, Gandi's technical team identified the problem, changed all the logins and started reverting the changes made – a process that took three-and-a-half hours, according to the company's incident report, published this week.

[...] "We sincerely apologize that this incident occurred," said its report. "Please be assured that our priority remains on the security of your data and that we will continue to protect your security and privacy in the face of ever-evolving threats."


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  • (Score: 4, Interesting) by romlok on Saturday July 15 2017, @11:58AM (2 children)

    by romlok (1241) on Saturday July 15 2017, @11:58AM (#539515)

    It appears that the credentials were able to be intercepted, because the third-party site that Gandi used for administering those top-level domains was using plain HTTP.

    From their incident report [gandi.net]:

    4. How was this attack even possible?

    First of all, we should be clear that the attack did not involve any breach of our databases or back end nor did it involve a breach of our technical partner’s infrastructure. The attacker was able to make the changes by accessing the web portal of our technical partner using our login credentials, which they obtained surreptitiously.

    These credentials were likewise not obtained by a breach of our systems and we strongly suspect they were obtained from an insecure connection to our technical partner’s web portal (the web platform in question allows access via http).

    As a rule, we have always systematically implemented all available security measures at all registries and technical partners (such as TOTP, IP restriction, etc.). Unfortunately, these security measures were only recently added, in 2016, by the technical partner in question and had not been identified at the date of our most recent security audit.

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  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Saturday July 15 2017, @05:37PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Saturday July 15 2017, @05:37PM (#539597)

    "Unfortunately, these security measures were only recently added, in 2016, by the technical partner in question and had not been identified at the date of our most recent security audit."

    years too late. stupid fucks probably didn't have any trouble spending the money they were earning prior to 20 fucking 16.

  • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Saturday July 15 2017, @10:11PM

    by kaszz (4211) on Saturday July 15 2017, @10:11PM (#539665) Journal

    Obtained "surreptitiously" only made possible by http without the "s". And by 2013 ie Snowden all security people worth their salt should demand https as minimum. It occurred to me that a lot of trust to not peak or manipulate were put into ISPs and backbone providers for years. Then once Room 641A got out in 2006 it should have hinted everybody as to what was up. And by 2013 only braindeads could miss it.

    But customers should have taken notice when http were being used. It's a dead giveaway if any login page uses it.

    So to conclude: Inept security policy and customers results in breach, news at 11.