The Register reports that registrar logins hacked and 750 web addresses were compromised:
More than 750 domain names were hijacked through the internet's own systems, registrar Gandi has admitted.
Late last week, an unknown individual managed to get hold of the company's login to one of its technical providers, which then connects to no fewer than 27 other top-level domains, including .asia, .au, .ch, .jp and .se.
Using that login, the attacker managed to change the domain details on the official nameservers for 751 domains on a range of top-level domains, and redirect them all to a specific website serving up malware.
The changes went unnoticed for four hours until one [of] the registry operators reported the suspicious changes to Gandi. Within an hour, Gandi's technical team identified the problem, changed all the logins and started reverting the changes made – a process that took three-and-a-half hours, according to the company's incident report, published this week.
[...] "We sincerely apologize that this incident occurred," said its report. "Please be assured that our priority remains on the security of your data and that we will continue to protect your security and privacy in the face of ever-evolving threats."
(Score: 2) by kaszz on Saturday July 15 2017, @10:32PM
So "SCRT" is a domain-name customer to the registrar "Gandi" which sends update requests to the "SWITCH" domain name service. The requests from Gandi to SWITCH are done using http?
If so, that is INCREDIBLY stupid.
Is there any other registrar domain service communications done over http?
SCRT seems to go for browser Strict-Transport-Security and implementing DNSSEC.