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posted by takyon on Monday November 06 2017, @06:41AM   Printer-friendly
from the Is-your-management-competent? dept.

PDF warning - the entire report is in the from of a PDF. To get your copy, clicky the linky:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4165160/USS-Fitzgerald-and-USS-John-S-McCain-Collision.pdf

The collisions were avoidable between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL, and between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel ALNIC MC. Three U.S. Navy investigations concerning each of these incidents are complete.

[...] USS FITZGERALD collided with Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL on 17 June 2017 in the waters of Sagami Wan in vicinity of the approaches to Tokyo Wan. [...] The Navy determined that numerous failures occurred on the part of leadership and watchstanders as follows:

  • Failure to plan for safety.
  • Failure to adhere to sound navigation practice.
  • Failure to execute basic watch standing practices.
  • Failure to properly use available navigation tools.
  • Failure to respond deliberately and effectively when in extremis.

[...] USS JOHN S MCCAIN collided with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. [...] The collision between JOHN S MCCAIN and ALNIC resulted in the deaths of 10 U.S. Sailors due to impact with MCCAIN's berthing compartments, located below the waterline of the ship. [...] The Navy determined the following causes of the collision:

  • Loss of situational awareness in response to mistakes in the operation of the JOHN S MCCAIN's steering and propulsion system, while in the presence of a high density of maritime traffic.
  • Failure to follow the International Nautical Rules of the Road, a system of rules to govern the maneuvering of vessels when risk of collision is present.
  • Watchstanders operating the JOHN S MCCAIN's steering and propulsion systems had insufficient proficiency and knowledge of the systems.

The report, in it's entirety, is 72 pages long. There are a lot of details about how, precisely, the accidents happened. There are also photos in the PDF, before and after the respective events. The reports are damning. As already summarized, inattentive, and poorly trained officers were in charge of evolutions which they seem to have poorly understood.

[takyon: The inquiry is reported on by Navy.mil, NYT, Reuters, and Ars Technica.]

From page 26 in the report:

0125: CRYSTAL was approaching FITZGERALD from the right (starboard) side at 3 nautical miles. FITZGERALD watchstanders at this time held two other commercial vessels in addition to CRYSTAL. One was calculated to have closest approach point at 2000 yards and the other was calculated to risk collision. No contact reports were made to the Commanding Officer and no additional course and speed determinations were made on these vessels. 0125: The Officer of the Deck noticed CRYSTAL rapidly getting closer and considered a turn to 240T. 0127: The Officer of the Deck ordered course to the right to course 240T, but rescinded the order within a minute. Instead, the Officer of the Deck ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port). These orders were not carried out. 0129: The Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders. As of 0130 Neither FITZGERALD nor CRYSTAL made an attempt to establish radio communications or sound the danger signal. As of 0130 FITZGERALD had not sounded the collision alarm. 0130:34: CRYSTAL's bow struck FITZGERALD at approximately frame 160 on the right (starboard) side above the waterline and CRYSTAL's bulbous bow struck at approximately frame 138 below the waterline.

As a former watch stander, it is incomprehensible to me, that the officer of the deck (OOD) could have issued orders, then quickly rescinded them, immediately gave different orders, and then that THE HELMSMAN DID NOT CARRRY OUT THOSE ORDERS!! It was necessary for Boats to take the helm, to carry out the OOD's orders?

Of course, it was far too late already when the orders were issued. Orders should have been given a half hour earlier to request the Captain's presence on the bridge.


Original Submission

 
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  • (Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Monday November 06 2017, @06:59PM

    by Runaway1956 (2926) Subscriber Badge on Monday November 06 2017, @06:59PM (#593248) Journal

    Perhaps you missed the fact that I used a common civilian occupation to make my point - the cashier at your local grocery, or convenience store. And, maybe I should have made the point that I was a civilian for 19 years before I became a sailor. Yes, I did math in my head, on paper and pencil, and with a slide rule, before I ever laid eyes on an electronic computer. The first such computer I ever saw was at the Carnegie-Melon bulding in Pittsburgh, Pa. Aboard ship, I seldom got close to the fire control computers, since I wasn't a fire control tech. Oh, I saw them a few times, and a fire controlman showed off the equipment for me, but I certainly didn't get to touch it. The first computer that I ever laid hands on, was a TRS 80.

    So, back to my statement (and not the statement that you seemed to have thought that you read), I learned math, and relied on my own understanding of math. Today's youth, today's sailors, don't seem to understand math. All they know is some forumula with which to extract some desired answer from a computer.

    And, BTW - our guns fired with or without direction from gun plot. Gun plot made firing solutions faster by orders of magnitude, but gun plot also went down from time to time. Our gun crews could do the numbers right there in the gun mount, with or without a grease pencil with which to write on the bulkhead.

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