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posted by takyon on Monday November 06 2017, @06:41AM   Printer-friendly
from the Is-your-management-competent? dept.

PDF warning - the entire report is in the from of a PDF. To get your copy, clicky the linky:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4165160/USS-Fitzgerald-and-USS-John-S-McCain-Collision.pdf

The collisions were avoidable between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL, and between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel ALNIC MC. Three U.S. Navy investigations concerning each of these incidents are complete.

[...] USS FITZGERALD collided with Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL on 17 June 2017 in the waters of Sagami Wan in vicinity of the approaches to Tokyo Wan. [...] The Navy determined that numerous failures occurred on the part of leadership and watchstanders as follows:

  • Failure to plan for safety.
  • Failure to adhere to sound navigation practice.
  • Failure to execute basic watch standing practices.
  • Failure to properly use available navigation tools.
  • Failure to respond deliberately and effectively when in extremis.

[...] USS JOHN S MCCAIN collided with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the Straits of Singapore. [...] The collision between JOHN S MCCAIN and ALNIC resulted in the deaths of 10 U.S. Sailors due to impact with MCCAIN's berthing compartments, located below the waterline of the ship. [...] The Navy determined the following causes of the collision:

  • Loss of situational awareness in response to mistakes in the operation of the JOHN S MCCAIN's steering and propulsion system, while in the presence of a high density of maritime traffic.
  • Failure to follow the International Nautical Rules of the Road, a system of rules to govern the maneuvering of vessels when risk of collision is present.
  • Watchstanders operating the JOHN S MCCAIN's steering and propulsion systems had insufficient proficiency and knowledge of the systems.

The report, in it's entirety, is 72 pages long. There are a lot of details about how, precisely, the accidents happened. There are also photos in the PDF, before and after the respective events. The reports are damning. As already summarized, inattentive, and poorly trained officers were in charge of evolutions which they seem to have poorly understood.

[takyon: The inquiry is reported on by Navy.mil, NYT, Reuters, and Ars Technica.]

From page 26 in the report:

0125: CRYSTAL was approaching FITZGERALD from the right (starboard) side at 3 nautical miles. FITZGERALD watchstanders at this time held two other commercial vessels in addition to CRYSTAL. One was calculated to have closest approach point at 2000 yards and the other was calculated to risk collision. No contact reports were made to the Commanding Officer and no additional course and speed determinations were made on these vessels. 0125: The Officer of the Deck noticed CRYSTAL rapidly getting closer and considered a turn to 240T. 0127: The Officer of the Deck ordered course to the right to course 240T, but rescinded the order within a minute. Instead, the Officer of the Deck ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port). These orders were not carried out. 0129: The Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders. As of 0130 Neither FITZGERALD nor CRYSTAL made an attempt to establish radio communications or sound the danger signal. As of 0130 FITZGERALD had not sounded the collision alarm. 0130:34: CRYSTAL's bow struck FITZGERALD at approximately frame 160 on the right (starboard) side above the waterline and CRYSTAL's bulbous bow struck at approximately frame 138 below the waterline.

As a former watch stander, it is incomprehensible to me, that the officer of the deck (OOD) could have issued orders, then quickly rescinded them, immediately gave different orders, and then that THE HELMSMAN DID NOT CARRRY OUT THOSE ORDERS!! It was necessary for Boats to take the helm, to carry out the OOD's orders?

Of course, it was far too late already when the orders were issued. Orders should have been given a half hour earlier to request the Captain's presence on the bridge.


Original Submission

 
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  • (Score: 3, Insightful) by frojack on Monday November 06 2017, @07:22PM

    by frojack (1554) on Monday November 06 2017, @07:22PM (#593261) Journal

    Sorry, but this CBT rant totally misses the point.

    You act like these failures are something recent, something new.

    They've been with us forever. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Non-combat_naval_accidents [wikipedia.org]
    Not JUST in the Navy. And its not just [nationalinterest.org] the US Navy.

    We get complacent when we think we know something. We stop practicing emergency skills because we haven't seen an emergency in decades.
    Its not just an American issue, its just that it gets more attention when it happens to a US ship, but its far more likely to happen to a US ship because France, Australia and Russia don't routinely cruise the entire world.

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