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The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is holding a "public health grand round" at its Roybal campus in Atlanta, Georgia. The topic is "Public Health Response to a Nuclear Detonation":
The CDC is holding a session January 16 to discuss personal safety measures and the training of response teams "on a federal, state, and local level to prepare for nuclear detonation."
The meeting, part of the agency's monthly Public Health Grand Rounds, will include presentations like "Preparing for the Unthinkable" and "Roadmap to Radiation Preparedness," and it will be held at the CDC's headquarters in Atlanta. "Grand rounds" are a type of meeting or symposium in which members of a public health community come together to discuss topics of interest or public importance.
This isn't the first time in recent months that official entities have informed the public about the consequences of a possible nuclear strike. In August, amid escalating nuclear rhetoric from North Korea, Guam's Homeland Security and Office of Civil Defense released a two-page fact sheet about what to do in the case of a nuclear event. And in December, Hawaii started monthly testing of a nuclear warning siren system -- the first such tests since the end of the Cold War.
It had been planned in April and has nothing at all to do with any particular statements or tweets.
Also at Time.
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Sunday January 07 2018, @05:50PM (4 children)
The US has a lot of options. That is, we don't rely solely on ICBM's. We have submarines capable of putting a nuke up Little Kim's ass, if a satellite can report Kim's location. Low flying cruise missile, no one is alerted, until it goes "BOOM".
(Score: 2) by quietus on Sunday January 07 2018, @06:23PM (3 children)
Nobody is alerted ... doesn't that undo the whole Mutual Assured Destruction thing?
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Sunday January 07 2018, @09:03PM (2 children)
You're referring to the Cold War, which ended decades ago. And, at the height of the Cold War, the submarine fleets were the "Assured" part of MAD. When all other options were depleted, when all the defenses had been fired at ICBM's and bombers, the subs would surface, and annihilate whatever was left. That was our side, as well as their side. MAD doesn't apply to any third parties, except maybe China. Korea cannot assure our destruction, nor can Pakistan, or Israel, or any of the other nuclear armed nations. If some combination of those nations were to sign on to treaties, they might be able to claim MAD against us. But, I don't really think so - only Russia and China have the resources to do so.
Both of those nations know the score with North Korea. If we were to slip a task force of submarines into Korean waters, backed by a carrier group, then warn Russia and China just about zero hour minus five or ten minutes, there would be no return strike. Even without the warning, both would figure out on their own what was happening. Whether we fired one, or sixty missiles, both of those actors would realize immediately that all the targets were in North Korea, and not on their own land.
Recriminations? Oh, sure, there would be plenty. But neither of them would fire on us. Of the two, China would be the more likely to fire, IMO, but why would they? Half of this country belongs to them, after all!
(Score: 2) by quietus on Sunday January 07 2018, @10:47PM (1 child)
You make a number of optimistic assumptions, I think.
Firstly, you assume that all parties involved have an efficiently operating command-and-control system, with flawlessly working communications between e.g. Russian headquarters in Moscow and remote missile defense bases (say, somewhere in Kamchatka), in any and all atmospheric circumstances. (For a critical view of the United States' SAC system, I'd like to refer you to the Ellsberg book mentioned in an earlier post; suffice it to say that wasn't the case for SAC during at least a very, very long time since the start of the cold war, and in all likelihood still isn't the case).
Secondly, you assume that either the reply mechanism of the other parties is not fully automated, or -- if it is fully automated [e.g. Russia's dead-hand Perimeter system] -- that it is thoroughly tested and supplied with the best safeguards money can buy.
The third assumption, I think, might be the most dangerous one: that the other parties take the time to figure out what was happening on their own. How can any missile defense mechanism be certain that the missiles approaching are conventional ICBMs, with a predictable trajectory, and known nuclear warheads, and not accompanied by a wave of stealth bombers, targeted at them?
(Score: 3, Interesting) by Runaway1956 on Monday January 08 2018, @09:17AM
Well, I've already addressed that, elsewhere in the discussion. Those Russian defense systems that might spot the missiles are most likely to assume that the missiles are coming from North Korea. Drive a submarine into the north eastern portion of Korea Bay, launch the cruise missiles, and most likely, China spots them first, then North Korea, and finally Russia. The missiles should be on target and detonating about the time that Russia sees them, but if not, they're likely to assume that they are North Korean missiles. Any retaliation would be against N. Korea.
Not to worry about China. All of my missiles are vectored AWAY FROM China.
The biggest worry is Japan. My missiles will be pointed in the direction of Japan. They might retaliate against North Korea.