Submitted via IRC for TheMightyBuzzard
AMD has fixed, but not yet released BIOS/UEFI/firmware updates for the general public for a security flaw affecting the AMD Secure Processor.
[...] Cfir Cohen, a security researcher with the Google Cloud Security Team, says he discovered a vulnerability in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the AMD Secure Processor. The TPM is a component to store critical system data such as passwords, certificates, and encryption keys, in a secure environment and outside of the more easily accessible AMD cores.
"Through manual static analysis, we've found a stack-based overflow in the function EkCheckCurrentCert," Cohen says. The researcher claims that an attacker could use specially-crafted EK certificates to get remote code execution rights on the AMD Secure Processor, allowing him to compromise its security.
Cohen said that some basic mitigation techniques such as "stack cookies, NX stack, ASLR" were not implemented in AMD's Secure Processor, making exploitation trivial.
takyon: This bug is unrelated to Meltdown and Spectre. And you might be interested in this:
Source: Security Flaw in AMD's Secure Chip-On-Chip Processor Disclosed Online
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Sunday January 07 2018, @07:42PM (5 children)
But go read up on who is running the Intel ME project now, and who lead designers were on the speculative execution for the PPro, and while unlikely, may the same holds true with AMD's implementation.
Personally, judging by the requirements to trigger AMD's exploit it sounds like a perfect security flaw for end users and maybe the NSA/FBI, while not being a great flaw for remote hackers.
Assuming you have write protection on the bios, it is impossible to exploit without rebooting the system, disabling write protection, installing the rogue certificate, rebooting the system again, booting into the OS and generating a new key utilizing the stack smashing certificate already installed to nvram (read: flash, not rtc nvram) in order to inject arbitrary code. And you still need to know enough about the internals of the fTPM and TrustZone OS/Kernel to be able to take this exploit and turn it into shell access, or personal code running inside the Secure Processor.
Once you HAVE however, it sounds like it could be pretty dope for all kinds of things, including pulling out authentication keys for specific applications tied to the tpm/hardware, whether for backup or piracy purposes.
(Score: 3, Interesting) by frojack on Sunday January 07 2018, @08:33PM (3 children)
No, you are mistaken. I've always had this sig.
(Score: 2) by frojack on Sunday January 07 2018, @08:35PM (1 child)
Note horrible quoting mess in above post provided free of charge, and unhindered by the thought process. Keep the change you filthy animals.
No, you are mistaken. I've always had this sig.
(Score: 2) by takyon on Sunday January 07 2018, @10:12PM
Eat a shit sandwich! But use my extension first!
[SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday January 08 2018, @04:04AM
Manual static analysis includes ASM, reversed and decompiled code, FYI.
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Sunday January 07 2018, @09:57PM
Are you sure about that? When I first discovered the script kiddies, I was contemptuous of them, like almost everyone else. But, SOMEONE developed the exploits that the script kiddies used. In this case, it will take a pretty smart individual to set the script up, but once the script is built, the script kiddy needs understand diddly. He gains access to a machine, boots, flashes, reboots, and watches shit happen automagically. The brighter kiddies may customize the script, to some extent.