SoylentNews is people
SoylentNews
Naval Commanders In 2 Deadly Ship Collisions To Be Charged With Negligent Homicide
The U.S. Navy announced Tuesday that the commanding officers of two vessels involved in separate collisions in the Pacific Ocean last year will face court-martial proceedings and possible criminal charges including negligent homicide.
The statement by Navy spokesman Capt. Greg Hicks says the decision to prosecute the commanders, and several lower-ranking officers as well, was made by Adm. Frank Caldwell.
[...] In the case of the USS Fitzgerald, the commander, two lieutenants and one lieutenant junior grade face possible charges of dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide.
The commander of the USS John S. McCain will face possible charges of dereliction of duty, hazarding a vessel and negligent homicide. A chief petty officer also faces one possible charge of dereliction of duty.
Previously: U.S. Navy Destroyer Collides With Container Vessel
10 Sailors Still Missing After U.S. Destroyer Collision With Oil Tanker
Chief of Naval Operations Report on This Summer's Destroyer Collisions
(Score: 3, Insightful) by Runaway1956 on Wednesday January 17 2018, @06:51PM (38 children)
A lot of things in the Navy have changed. Some good, some not-so-good. This may be one change that is very, VERY long overdue. Holding officers accountable? Who'da thunk it?
In days past, an officer couldn't be prosecuted for much of anything. Mutiny, insurrection, gross disrespect, disobeying a direct order - and in most cases he was given the option to resign to avoid prosecution. If a scapegoat were necessary, some flunky enlisted man was offered up to the gods of vengeance.
I'm all for holding officers accountable. One of the biggest benefits of doing so, is that the worst can be flushed out of the system, and the best can be promoted and otherwise rewarded.
I would readily burn an enlisted man who endangered the ship. I'll be equally happy to see commissioned officers burnt for the same offenses.
(Score: 1) by starvingboy on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:04PM (16 children)
Most of the time when things go THIS wrong, it's not that one person F-d up really bad. Instead, it is a culmination of small mistakes and bad timing. The leadership should be held accountable, but, dang, sometimes it just looks like fate conspired to ruin the day.
(Score: 4, Interesting) by bob_super on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:30PM (4 children)
> sometimes it just looks like fate conspired to ruin the day.
Still my "favorite" illustration of Rube Goldberg tragedy: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Heck_rail_crash [wikipedia.org]
When Hollywood relies on that many coincidences, I usually call Bullshit...
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday January 17 2018, @08:52PM
Awww, Heck!
(Score: 3, Insightful) by captain normal on Thursday January 18 2018, @05:22AM (2 children)
If you read the link that was caused by a lorry towing a trailer that ran off the road. Really not the fault of the crew of either train.
When life isn't going right, go left.
(Score: 2) by bob_super on Thursday January 18 2018, @05:54AM (1 child)
Read my post again, and read again the link, but correctly this time (it ain't a lorry).
How many things had to line up exactly right, causing all those deaths?
(Score: 2) by Nuke on Thursday January 18 2018, @08:01PM
The Land Rover driver, Hart, was an accident waiting to happen. The way you put it though makes him sound like an innocent victim of chance. That's BS.
I remember the reports of the accident. Hart had described himself as someone who "lived life at 1000 mph". He was known to drive like a maniac. It was determined when he left home (at the earliest) from his internet activity (he was having an on-line chat with a woman), and obviously the time of the crash was also known. As part of the investigation police drove the route themselves with the road cleared and even so they found it difficult (largely on typical British winding roads) to drive to the schedule that Hart had managed - and they were in a standard patrol car and Hart was driving with a heavy trailer. Go figure.
(Score: 4, Interesting) by frojack on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:32PM (3 children)
There are also some rumors that the somebody (state actors [snopes.com]) was spoofing the GPS, one or both ships were not running radar at the time, and one or more of the watch keepers were not at their stations. (The mentioned Chief is likely one of these).
https://newstarget.com/2017-08-26-was-the-uss-john-s-mccain-warship-gps-spoofed-to-cause-collision.html [newstarget.com]
These may be stories made up to cover various asses, but they have to be checked out, and apparently they have been, to the satisfaction of the Navy.
There are supposed to be levels of backup for everything. Multiple Radars, covered by watch standing, GPS nav, covered by old fashion course plotting, etc.
Its designed such that not everything can go gunny sack at once.
No, you are mistaken. I've always had this sig.
(Score: 5, Interesting) by gottabeme on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:51PM (1 child)
Well that's the problem: the fact that the accidents happened in spite of those levels of backup seems implausible.
And, in fact, the public report the Navy issued does not explain why the collisions happened. It explains factors that led to them, but it does not explain why those factors happened. For example, it doesn't explain why the CICs failed to communicate with the bridges, nor why the captain was not alerted despite his orders to do so, nor why the visual lookouts failed to report the other ships, etc.
Poor training, while apparently a contributing factor, is not a sufficient explanation, because it doesn't explain why the guys with binoculars, ostensibly, stood idly by while the other ships approached. It doesn't explain why the crews allowed the collisions to occur.
For those reasons, as well as the timing, location, and the matter of North Korean nuclear ambition and ballistic missile defense, I think there is much that was left out of the Navy's publicly issued reports, and much more to the stories than we will ever hear.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday January 18 2018, @03:41PM
You know those ships do not turn and tack on a dime, don't you? Because you think you understand collision avoidance in a moving vehicle, don't assume you know how naval vessels and especially container ships maneuver.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday January 18 2018, @09:28AM
No matter whether you are in a car, a plane or on a ship, what's outside the window ALWAYS overrules what theGPS says.
While the old lady who followed the GPS' instructions to drive onto the ferry without first checking that the ferry was docked could be excused (GPS wasn't around when she got her drivers license), those in command of a navy ship should be aware of this.
(Score: 4, Interesting) by Runaway1956 on Wednesday January 17 2018, @08:17PM (1 child)
Things do conspire to ruin lives. Small mistakes and bad timing, yes. But, that is a big part of leadership. When lives depend on the actions of several men, and many sensors, the drills are in order, until each man understands his part in the entire process. Hopefully, he understands more of the process than just his own part, but he MUST understand his part. Drill, drill, drill.
Those drills must also require precision, and accuracy. In one of those collisions, it was reported that the OOD seemed to be unaware that there were TWO ships in proximity, on similar relative headings. Obviously, the reporting was imprecise and/or inaccurate. What ever happened to "skunk able", "skunk baker", "skunk charlie" and so one? Maybe the Navy doesn't use grease boards and grease pens anymore, but the designators? What was reported to the OOD? "There's a ship over yonder, and maybe another one beyond it" is hardly precise, or accurate.
Now, the thing I'm getting to here is - if imprecise and inaccurate information is the norm aboard ship, then leadership is responsible. They have accepted slipshod work over the years, and everyone has grown accustomed to it. The bar has been lowered, and the lower ranks are taking advantage of it. Several layers of leadership are at fault in this situation. Captain, Executive, Quartermaster/Navigation division officer, the division Chief, and the division's Leading Petty Officer are all at fault, for failure to correct the situation.
Back in my day, we used a grease board, and a grease pencil, which was illuminated at night by a ring of lights around it. My first time with it, was at night. Guy in CIC would tell me, via sound powered phone, what they were seeing, and it was my job to update the board, AS WELL AS to announce those changes for the benefit of the OOD and bridge crew. I got my ass reamed, first time around, because I was timid about speaking up. I marked my board, and stated the changes aloud, so that the guy on the other end of the phone could confirm that I got it right. But - it was my JOB to BROADCAST all of that information, and ensure that the OOD was aware of updates. What was actually happening, because I was timid, was that the OOD was completely unaware of some of my updates. A first class petty officer jumped all over my ass, declared me to be an incompetent worm, and that he was going to use my boot camp ass for bait the next time he went fishing.
In my case, a lowly first class petty officer corrected the problem. And, in almost all cases, a petty officer SHOULD BE correcting deficiencies. If the third class accepts substandard performance, and the second class does the same, right on up through the CO, then you have multiple layers of incompetent leadership.
And, that seems to be exactly what TFA is suggesting.
Or, in terms a court martial will understand, you have "ineffective leadership". That is an unforgiveable offense in the military. No court martial will accept that fate conspired to ruin the day.
(Score: 5, Interesting) by Grishnakh on Wednesday January 17 2018, @08:59PM
Yeah, but the problem I see here is that the leadership is trained based on policies that are set at a level far above even a commander or captain, and really goes up to the Pentagon or even Congress. What's the captain supposed to do when the Navy itself refuses to provide proper schooling in maritime operations to any of its officers? How's he supposed to correct that systemic deficiency all by himself? This problem wasn't caused by a few officers on ships, or else we wouldn't have seen 4 ships have major accidents so close together. This problem was caused by policy problems within the Navy itself. Now the Navy is working to correct the policy and improve training and other policies (like with crewmen not getting enough rest, another thing the captain has little control over since he's given operational orders from people above him), but they're using these officers as scapegoats for their own incompetence at training them properly.
This is basically like sending a kid to ITT Tech instead of MIT, and then penalizing him when he doesn't do work at the level of a MIT grad. WTF did you expect? Remember, the Navy eliminated its training courses for maritime operations, and replaced them with a set of CD-ROMs to be read at sea. WTF kind of training is that?
(Score: 4, Informative) by Arik on Wednesday January 17 2018, @09:00PM (3 children)
[cite=https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2017/11/01/navy-crews-at-fault-in-fatal-collisions-investigations-find/]
Sanchez ordered the crew to set sea and anchor detail at 6 a.m. instead of an hour prior, when the ship entered the shipping lane heading into the Strait of Malacca. The ship’s operations officer, executive office and navigator had all recommended the ship set sea and anchor at 5 a.m. for safety reasons.
The critical failure came when the current was pushing the ship left and Sanchez noticed the helmsman — usually a junior sailor charged controlling the ship’s steering and speed when ordered by the officer of the deck or conning officer — was having trouble keeping the ship on course.
The master helmsman who would perform these tasks during a sea and anchor detail was still in the chow line at the time.
At 5:20 a.m., Sanchez ordered a second watch-stander to help run the controls to steer the ship, letting the helmsman keep control of the rudder while giving the second watch-stander control of the speed and position of the ship’s two propellers — a position known as the lee helm.
Putting two sailors at the separate positions required changing the ship’s steering configuration and shifting control of engine propeller speed to another part of control console.
But changing the control mechanisms immediately led to confusion because they mistakenly shifted all of the controls — both rudder and engine speed — to the second console.
As a result, the helmsman could no longer control the steering. He initially believed he had lost steering due to a mechanical failure, when in fact, he was just confused about the configuration of the equipment.
Four minutes before the collision, confusion began to run wild on the bridge while watch-standers attempted to fix a nonexistent loss of steering.
Complicating the situation further, changing in steering configurations forced the rudder to revert to a center line position, releasing the previous position that was set to the right between one and four degrees to fight the current that was pushing the ship left.
With the rudder unintentionally set to center line, the current continued to push the ship left of track.
During the confusion, when the bridge thought they had lost control of steering, the commanding officer ordered the engine to slow the ship’s speed from 20 knots to five. But the sailor at the console controlling the speed of the two propellers only slowed the port shaft to five knots, while the starboard shaft was still turning at 20 knots, abruptly pushing the ship sharply to the left and into the track of the Alnic MC for more than a minute.
An officer on the bridge ordered the steering controls to be shifted to a space near the rear of the ship that can also control steering, known as aft steering. But that was not yet manned due to Sanchez’s decision to man sea and anchor at 6 instead of 5 a.m.
The McCain’s steering configuration was changed five times in the roughly three minutes before the collision, according to the Navy report.
By the time the aft steering was manned and the sailor on the bridge fixed the speed issue that was forcing McCain left of track, it was too late.
The collision with Alnic MC at 5:23 a.m. created a 28-foot hole in the side of McCain, flooding spaces within seconds and killing 10 sailors, most of whom appear to have been crushed to death or drowned in the berthing.
[endcite]
Not mentioned in this source but recalled from another report, several of the crew had just transferred from another ship with similar, but subtly different computers, and had not qualified on this particular setup.
If laughter is the best medicine, who are the best doctors?
(Score: 2) by leftover on Thursday January 18 2018, @12:31AM (1 child)
Somebody please tell me the Navy does not use computer UX practices to control helm and rudder -- please? And the ability to shift control around without it being obvious? Shit. I haven't been on the bridge of a warship since mid 1970's but I can recall the benefit of having a great big brass wheel and big helm control levers front and center on the bridge. It was immediately obvious where control was being maintained and every single person there could see the control positions, even in hectic conditions. Especially in hectic conditions.
Did ship designers confuse the selection and training level of submariners with those of regular Navy? Did actual experienced officers and senior crew not have veto power over REMFs who only imagined being underway? There have always been reasons behind mariner's legendary resistance to change. One of those reasons is the predictable behavior of frightened people in a shitstorm. We become very easy to confuse and then we rely on overtrained responses to Really Obvious Information. Visceral representations like Big Fucking Lever Up, certainly not abstract text on a console.
Bent, folded, spindled, and mutilated.
(Score: 2) by Arik on Thursday January 18 2018, @02:15AM
If laughter is the best medicine, who are the best doctors?
(Score: 2) by captain normal on Thursday January 18 2018, @05:30AM
In other words...poor or lack of training of junior officers and crew.
When life isn't going right, go left.
(Score: 2) by bzipitidoo on Thursday January 18 2018, @04:40AM
That was similar to the conclusion on the USS Greeneville collision with Ehime Maru in 2001. The sub took too many chances, was operating without some sonar equipment in working order, and was been driven too recklessly, pushing too much to impress civilian passengers who'd been given too much leeway and were getting in the way of the crew.
The captain was forced to retire, but not further punished. He was not court martialed, and was given an honorable discharge.
(Score: 2) by frojack on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:38PM (2 children)
I have no clue who's Navy you served in, but major damage (to say nothing about loss of life) to a ship, in peace time, due to navigational fuckups has ALWAYS been a career ending mistake in the US Navy.
No, you are mistaken. I've always had this sig.
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Wednesday January 17 2018, @08:25PM (1 child)
There are "career ending mistakes" which are kept out of the public view, and there are courts martials. How many officers in decades past have been put on public display, and charged with heinous offenses? Negligent homicide is a damned serious charge. One which the Navy would prefer be kept hush-hush. The Pentagon and the entire chain of command would much rather sacrifice an enlisted man, than admit that an officer could be so negligent.
I don't know whose Navy YOU served in, either, if you can pretend to be unaware of all of that.
This incident was handled very differently from our current disasters:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_C._Rogers_III#Naval_career_following_Vincennes [wikipedia.org]
(Score: 2) by sjames on Wednesday January 17 2018, @09:19PM
To be fair, Rogers didn't wreck his ship and was engaged with unfriendly vessels at the time. He was also awake at the time.
(Score: 2) by NewNic on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:42PM (14 children)
There was an episode of This American Life that discussed these accidents.
There were lookouts who should have alerted the bridge to impending collisions. Why are they not being prosecuted?
The fundamental problem is that the ships are undermanned and there is a culture within the Navy of not being a "rack-hound" (not sleeping). So people in the Navy go absurd amounts of time between sleeps and are not fit for duty. Because of the shortage of manpower, training is poor, etc.. Most likely, the lookouts were too tired to do their jobs properly.
Meanwhile, the Pacific fleet is being tasked with ever more work.
Blaming the ships' commanders for organizational issues is simply deflection of blame from where is should be: at the top brass of the Navy.
lib·er·tar·i·an·ism ˌlibərˈterēənizəm/ noun: Magical thinking that useful idiots mistake for serious political theory
(Score: 2) by bob_super on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:58PM (2 children)
In peace time, the captain's duties are:
1) protect the ship's integrity and maintain readiness
2) don't embarrass the brass
3) be where you're supposed to be, on time
4) pesky annoyances, paperwork, and others...
I believe someone failed at the important ones.
You're describing a readiness issue, which is ultimately the captain's job to enforce, as long as he has enough crew.
(Score: 2) by NewNic on Wednesday January 17 2018, @09:52PM (1 child)
And when he doesn't have enough crew? What then?
lib·er·tar·i·an·ism ˌlibərˈterēənizəm/ noun: Magical thinking that useful idiots mistake for serious political theory
(Score: 3, Interesting) by bob_super on Wednesday January 17 2018, @10:06PM
If he filed paperwork logging his severe concerns that being under-crewed is affecting readiness and safety, and is not otherwise at fault in maintaining discipline prior to the collision, then he can escape being the scapegoat. He may still be pushed aside for PR reasons, but is less likely to be dishonorably discharged or jailed.
Still not a great career move, but CYA does work in the military, as long as the brass doesn't get negatively impacted.
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Wednesday January 17 2018, @08:30PM (10 children)
I pretty much disagree. Any lookouts will likely face intense grilling, and possible prosecution. But, ultimately, the ship's commander is responsible. Always and forever, amen and pass the ammunition. If the lookouts are poorly trained, the captain and his executive are responsible. Department and division officers are responsible, as are chief petty officers.
That is the nature of responsibility - the commander can never shirk it. He may delegate authority, but he cannot delegate responsibility.
If rust is eating his ship up, the captain IS RESPONSIBLE.
(Score: 2) by Grishnakh on Wednesday January 17 2018, @09:03PM (9 children)
How the hell is the captain responsible for rust on his ship if the Navy refuses to fix it, for a hypothetical situation? What's he supposed to do, invade some foreign port and force them to drydock the boat and fix it?
The captain cannot physically be responsible for everything; he can only work with the tools he's given, just like any other worker in any other job. He's not the top person in the chain of command. This situation was caused by admirals well above the captains' level, and probably ultimately by Congressional mismanagement.
(Score: 3, Informative) by stormwyrm on Wednesday January 17 2018, @09:51PM (2 children)
Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate.
(Score: 2) by Grishnakh on Wednesday January 17 2018, @10:19PM (1 child)
Right, that's what I would expect too. This whole idea that the captain is somehow punishable for things totally outside his control really rubs me the wrong way. And these latest charges just reek of scapegoating. The ultimate problem was the top brass, and probably also Congress. Why aren't they being court-martialed for negligent homicide for not providing any training, for insisting that the automatic locater systems be kept off in busy shipping lanes, and for giving these crews too much work to do with the manpower they have?
(Score: 2) by stormwyrm on Thursday January 18 2018, @02:48AM
Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate.
(Score: 2) by Bobs on Wednesday January 17 2018, @10:41PM (5 children)
I agree witth StormW [soylentnews.org].
The Captain is responsible, is God on that ship while underway.
Clearly, there is a systemic problem, too, as it happened on multiple ships across the fleet in a short period of time.
Congress and their inability to pass a budget are making everything harder.
Yet it is still the Captains' responsibility to take care of the ship and crew and mission, to anticipate and find the problems, correct the problems, and keep the ship safe and on mission. Or to report up what the problem is and what is required to fix it.
Sea Captain's responsibilities [wikipedia.org]
How. pray tell, is a Congressman going to know about and fix the problem of a poorly trained ship handler?
The only way for them to know is because a Captain identified that the crew is under trained, reported up the line that he needs more time/resources to get them trained up to be able to do their mission.
Fleet / Pentagon leaders, once they know there is a problem, are responsible for dealing with the resource requests and dealing with resource and systemic issues.
How is an Admiral back at the Pentagon going to know about and fix systemic problems of poorly trained ship handlers?
If the Captain hasn't identified the problem, they how are the REMFs supposed to know about it and come up with a response?
The Captain is responsible for making sure that his ship and crew are safe and ready, and understanding what it is capable and not capable of, and coming up with a plan to deal with problems before they happen.
It is only the Captains who are going to be able to identify potential problems, and request something be done, before there are failures. That is part of their responsibility. Not to blame somebody else.
It is a tough job, and only a few people in the Navy are trusted with it.
(Score: 2) by Grishnakh on Wednesday January 17 2018, @11:34PM (4 children)
And what's the Captain going to do when he reports to his superiors that his crew isn't up to the task, and they say "too bad, you have a mission, now do it"? Why do you absolve the Captain's superiors of all responsibility and place it solely on the Captain?
(Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Thursday January 18 2018, @02:29AM
If things are as dire as you suggest, then maybe those captains should be charting courses somewhere near the Snowden Sea. Let me check the charts again - where is Edward Harbor?
(Score: 3, Insightful) by stormwyrm on Thursday January 18 2018, @08:12AM (1 child)
Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday January 18 2018, @10:32PM
(Score: 2) by Bobs on Thursday January 18 2018, @05:03PM
And what evidence do you have that he reported an issue up the chain, or that he even knew there was an issue?
I don't have the details, but it is the responsibility of the Captain to make sure the ship and crew are ready.
If he did know there was a problem, and he reported it up the chain, that will come out and be a mitigating factor at the trial.
But if he did know there was a problem, why did he not come up with a way to mitigate it until it was fixed?
If he didn't know there was a problem, then why not?
This is a terrible situation, but it is the Captain's responsibility to see that these things do not happen to his ship and crew.
(Score: 3, Interesting) by leftover on Wednesday January 17 2018, @07:50PM
Definitely. The fact that so many individual people somehow missed the BFO on CBDR (constant bearing, decreasing range) meant they were half asleep, not running a tight watch. Doing that out in the middle of the ocean is something you can get away with but still shouldn't. Allowing that while close to islands and shipping? NOT! It is also not the time to put the B-team in across the board.
Bent, folded, spindled, and mutilated.
(Score: 2) by Nuke on Wednesday January 17 2018, @11:03PM (1 child)
What navy are you refering to? The Ruritanian? In the past, officers of the British Navy have been shot. It led to the famous comment by Voltaire that the British shot their admirals "to encourage the others".
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday January 18 2018, @12:16AM
Where is your sense of tradition? Keelhaul them.