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from the newer-is-not-necessarily-better dept.
The Intercept reports
The nation's secretaries of state gathered for a multi-day National Association of Secretaries of State (NASS) conference in Washington, D.C., this weekend, with cybersecurity on the mind.
Panels and lectures centered around the integrity of America's election process, with the federal probe into alleged Russian government attempts to penetrate voting systems a frequent topic of discussion.
[...] One way to allay concerns about the integrity of electronic voting machine infrastructure, however, is to simply not use it. Over the past year, a number of states are moving back towards the use of paper ballots or at least requiring a paper trail of votes cast.
For instance, Pennsylvania just moved to require all voting systems to keep a paper record of votes cast. Prior to last year's elections in Virginia, the commonwealth's board of elections voted to decertify paperless voting machines--voters statewide instead voted the old-fashioned way, with paper ballots.
[...] Oregon is one of two states in the country to require its residents to vote by mail, a system that was established via referendum in 1998. [Oregon Secretary of State Dennis] Richardson argued that this old-fashioned system offers some of the best defense there is against cyber interference.
"We're using paper and we're never involved with the Internet. The Internet is not involved at all until there's an announcement by each of our 36 counties to [the capital] Salem of what the results are and then that's done orally and through a confirmation e-mail and the county clerks in each of the counties are very careful to ensure that the numbers that actually are posted are the ones that they have," he said. "Oregon's in a pretty unique situation."
[...] In New Hampshire, the state uses a hybrid system that includes both paper ballots and machines that electronically count paper ballots with a paper trail.
Karen Ladd, the assistant secretary of state for New Hampshire, touted the merits of the system to The Intercept. "We do a lot of recounts, and you can only have a recount with a paper ballot. You can't do a recount with a machine!" she said.
America's paper ballot states may seem antiquated to some, but our neighbors to the north have used paper ballots for federal elections for their entire history. Thanks to an army of officials at 25,000 election stations, the integrity of Canada's elections is never in doubt.
(Score: 2) by jimtheowl on Tuesday February 20 2018, @10:22PM (1 child)
"Even in an unobfuscated open source program, that just means that the non-malicious bits are unobfuscated, the malicious parts are going to be hidden."
I know that there is some very impressive code written to that effect, and even contests, but checks and balances can be added in at different levels. Take for example a completely different program written by a different entity and provide it with the same input. If it doesn't provide the same output there is a problem. It is not a mathematical proof, but is an added level of verification.
Perhaps it is possible to build a system where the voter can check his own vote while remaining anonymous (using private/public key to vote and count?). Again, that alone isn't sufficient.
I'm all for paper, line phones and networks, but what worries me is that at some point, enough people are going to want to vote with their phones because it is easier. It would be nice if a relatively good system could be designed before, even if that is not likely to happen.
(Score: 2) by dry on Thursday February 22 2018, @04:00AM
Even a perfect system can't be trusted by the average person, which can lead to the loser screaming fraud and being believed by their base.
Having everyone trust the results is actually more important then having trustworthy results.