Clearly forged video footage was submitted as evidence recently regarding an international crime investigation. The forgery was detected because it not smoothly done. But that is changing. So while the countries involved might seem out of the way, recent news about algorithm-enhanced falsified video footage and the social and legal repercussions of realistic but completely fabricated videos make this kind of a warning shot for the admissibility of recordings in general.
Regarding the particular case in question and the forged video, YLE reports:
Aliganyira said that local police were using doctored footage which contained "insertions, removal of images, creating someone to look like [the victim] yet it wasn't him."
Earlier, The Daily Monitor had reported on the footage.
The Internal Security Organisation (ISO) on Tuesday said the footage that is currently in the hands of security and intelligence agencies on the death of the Finnish national who died at Pearl of Hotel on February 6, in Kampala was manipulated.
Already, realistic voice forgery can be done affordably. Soon video capabilities will be realistic enough to cause real difficulties. Then investigations will depend even more so on advanced forensics, if audio and video are even still admissible. Realistic forgeries also allow real snakes to stir up denials and long delays when real evidence is produced by asserting that it is "fake news".
Sources :
Fake video? New twist in case of Finnish businessman's death in Uganda. .
CCTV footage of Kampala hotel where Finnish businessman died was doctored, says ISO. Daily Monitor.
(Score: 2) by canopic jug on Sunday March 11 2018, @10:05AM (2 children)
I'll leave that to others. It probably needs some months of dedicated thought to come up with several possible solutions that could possible withstand the first round of pre-peer review. Any hash functon speedy enough to run real time, frame-by-frame in an affordable camera is probably weak enough to allow collisions when set upon by real hardware.
... with a crypto signature and require, for a trusted recording chain ...
Hmm. That appears you are saying "blockchain" even you do have a lot of words there to try to hide it. I assume the standard rules of order apply here. Gan bei.
Money is not free speech. Elections should not be auctions.
(Score: 2) by c0lo on Sunday March 11 2018, @11:24AM
Addressing the prices, Field-programmable gate array [wikipedia.org]
$27 [digikey.com] at retail price. In ASIC implementation, probably in the <$10 range per chip for a 256bit signature, I'm quite tempted to say in the $1 range more likely than $10 range
Besides the collisions aren't as relevant for signatures as you may think: to insert a replacement that signature-collides with the original frame and does show something visually recognizable (instead of just visual noise) is computational expensive. Even more so if you want a substitute frame that needs to show a person against the same background but doing something else. Do it for every frame for some minutes of footage and the expense for an attacker becomes prohibitive
(remember, there's no absolute security, it is only a game of "with cheap means, make the would-be attack too expensive to worth being carried").
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0 https://soylentnews.org/~MichaelDavidCrawford
(Score: 2) by c0lo on Sunday March 11 2018, @11:32AM
No, there's nothing in what I said that has any touch-point with "blockchain".
I said "trusted recording chain" in the sense of: camera (e.g. mobile device), transmission (e.g. mobile comms provider), storage (e.g. Apple cloud, Facebook, youtube, etc) - all of them keep a trace of the interaction and all of them are controlled by different/independent entities - thus the corroboration between the traces left in each part of the chain contribute to the authenticity of the recording.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0 https://soylentnews.org/~MichaelDavidCrawford