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"The blockchain method primarily used by those engaging in cryptocurrency transactions is a decentralized mechanism where all the information is stored in blocks, can be viewed and altered by registered users. In the case of Sierra Leone elections, allows the votes to be seen by voters who are registered within the system, in the public ledgers, but only allowed authorized persons to make any changes, this, in turn, prevents the chances of fraud since the voting information is available to all the blockchain users."
I would personally like it if they would explain the mechanics of their so-called "blockchain" to us mortals.
As I understand a blockchain, it is an extensible data structure that (when used in a bitcoin context) incorporates sequentially applied, recursively structured self-referential checksum mechanisms to counter efforts at tampering with the contents of the blocks; usually, via recursive encryption.
~childo
(Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday March 15 2018, @08:34PM (2 children)
The whole point of blockchain-ish technology is to remove the mutability from the electronic record. Pen on paper can be forged, or lost, while electronic records can be distributed to multiple backup sites for redundant validation and loss prevention.
If we could train the local election officials how to do signed check-ins to git, they could hand tally their local results, take a cellphone snapshot of their smiling face with the results, and do a signed checkin and merge to a repository on github, or wherever, including the photo and their tally results. Preferably merging their results with multiple copies of the election result repository around the globe. The final results should be consistent at all sites, and no "station checkin" should be able to be forged - starting with the official's secret key, and including his photo with the results. You can get trickier, but the only way this situation is getting undetectably forged is if the local official is bought, killed, or otherwise silenced.
Seems like a photo-mural of all the local results should keep people happy.
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(Score: 2) by Thexalon on Thursday March 15 2018, @10:10PM (1 child)
You seem to be working under a few assumptions that aren't necessarily true:
1. The organization conducting the election is trying to be fair.
2. Each of the parties will not be willing to cheat in order to win.
My assumptions:
1. A blockchain is ultimately a string of bits. Anybody with access to the computer storing that string of bits can modify that string of bits, and also modify the software used to manipulate the string of bits.
2. All parties will attempt to cheat if they think they can successfully do so.
3. The election is being carried out by some branch of the government, which is under the control of the ruling party.
Some scenarios I can think of, off the top of my head:
1. The local election officers are bribed to report incorrect tally results. You mentioned that the local official could in fact be bought, and that's a major hole in your system, particularly in third-world countries where most people are desperate for money.
2. The local election officers, thanks to poll watchers and international observers, report results correctly. The main office changes the total numbers to ensure the ruling party is re-elected, releases a pre-made blockchain that backs up those numbers, and distributes it to all the backup sites before anyone notices. In other words, in your scenario, the github equivalent isn't honest in the slightest.
3. In order to prevent the first scenario, the opposition parties are also given backup copies of the blockchain. The opposition parties, along with the ruling party's official tally, each produces versions of the blockchain that say that they won, and who the citizens believe is now a matter of which party you support. Again, all you have are strings of bits, so who's to say they have the definitively correct copy? This is a recipe for civil war.
4. Ahh, but you say what about the international sites? International sites only help so much with this, because each of the international entities likely to observe may also have a stake in who wins: The US will like the US-friendly candidate, China the China-friendly candidate, Russia the Russia-friendly candidate, etc. And so they'll take whatever version of the blockchain they want, spout that off as "The Truth", and now you've turned a potential civil war into a potential international war. Congratulations.
As for all your photographs, do you not think that somebody with access to Gimp couldn't easily change those photos to say whatever they wanted them to say? These are strings of bits with no immutable record of how they came to be the way they are (and no, a log stored on an ordinary hard drive or RAM is not immutable).
The only thing that stops a bad guy with a compiler is a good guy with a compiler.
(Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday March 15 2018, @10:34PM
Without this, you're screwed, period. No amount of technology, procedure, or oversight is going to keep a hostile organizer from being able to skew or completely fabricate the results.
Of course the parties are willing to cheat - that's what the local election oversight committees are for, transparency in the process, etc. etc. In the U.S. some sites are still overseen by 100% partisan groups and do cheat, but they are a small minority and somewhat balanced by cheaters for the other side. In an ideal world, independent observers for all major candidates in the election would have shared oversight of each balloting location. In the real world, we're doing good to get 15% turnout of voters, so....
The fault in this assumption is that the string of bits lives alone in the dark. The strength/power/value/whatever you want to call it of blockchain is that it is verified and known by a large number of independent entities. I agree that results should not be rendered to a string of bits, alone in the dark, before being shared with multiple outside verifiers.
Again, you'll never fix this with choice of technology or procedure, only independent oversight at the location of the initial tally can help.
There's a looming paradox between anonymity of the voter's choice and veracity of the tally. If the voters would shed their anonymity, then the tally could be perfect, but that has other problems. Even when votes are aggregated by district, there's the possibility for retaliation against the minority dissenting district.
This wouldn't happen if the local election officers verify their results in the final tally. Again, the anonymity paradox looms, but if the local officers can all see the main office tally including their results, they can confirm or deny the accuracy of their results in that total, and each can run the final sums to verify the overall result.
If that string of bits confirms a collection of believable information, like photographs of officials including their final tally results - sure the photos can be doctored, but presumably not on the local officials' personal cell phones, the result in the final should match what they snapped at the time of reporting. And, again, two strings of bits alone in the dark are not of any particular value, but 200 copies of those 2 strings distributed to 200 "trusted, independent reviewers" starts to carry some weight.
Now you're messing with the CIA, MSS, KGB, etc. and if they're playing dirty, you're likely to be nerve gassed, fed polonium, kidnapped, waterboarded, and killed. The only hope there is that the opposing agencies don't really want a war, because when they do want a war, they have proven their ability to have one.
Sure, one copy can be doctored by one bad actor. When it's distributed to many and there's a doctored copy out there, then they'll notice the discrepancy and re-verify with the source. Source can't be trusted? Well, then you're screwed, aren't you - no amount of technology or procedure is going to fix that one.
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