Kevin Beaumont reports that, by compromising a router at Equinix in Chicago, attackers were able to forge DNS responses for myetherwallet.com, with users "redirected to a server hosted in Russia, which served the website using a fake certificate." Victims' online wallets were drained of cryptocurrency.
Also at The Verge and Ars Technica which said
Amazon lost control of a small number of its cloud services IP addresses for two hours on [April 24] when hackers exploited a known Internet-protocol weakness that let them to redirect traffic to rogue destinations. By subverting Amazon's domain-resolution service, the attackers masqueraded as cryptocurrency website MyEtherWallet.com and stole about $150,000 in digital coins from unwitting end users. They may have targeted other Amazon customers as well.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday April 30 2018, @01:22PM (2 children)
Are you using Let's Encrypt as an example, or are you saying there's something especially lax about Let's Encrypt? Other CAs offer certificates that are verified by showing control of a hostname by putting a special file on a website, or by receiving an e-mail. Reportedly, that didn't happen in this attack: the Verge says visitors to the malicious site were getting warned by their browsers because of problems with the certificate.
(Score: 2) by maxwell demon on Monday April 30 2018, @01:50PM (1 child)
I used LE specifically because I knew that LE uses such a mechanism, but I didn't know that other CAs use similar mechanisms. Of course as far as other CAs use similar mechanisms, similar strategies should work for them as well.
The Tao of math: The numbers you can count are not the real numbers.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday May 01 2018, @01:48PM
> I didn't know that other CAs use similar mechanisms
Think about it. There has to be a way to transfer domains to new, legitimate owners. There has to be a way to verify ownership in the first place. Maybe the WHOIS data has a working phone number - but what are the odds that goes to the person making the request, in a large org?
Point being: it's not write-once. IP control is over-relied upon as identity proof.