Ars Technica is reporting that there are
critical PGP and S/MIME bugs which can reveal encrypted e-mails. Their advice is to uninstall the plugins, for the time being. More information will be released tomorrow (Tuesday at 07:00 UTC, 3:00 AM EDT, midnight PDT).
Little is publicly known about the flaws at the moment. Both Schinzel and the EFF blog post said they will be disclosed late Monday night California time in a paper written by a team of European security researchers. Schinzel's Twitter messages used the hashtag #efail, a possible indication of the name the researchers have given to their exploit.
The EFF also published a warning, Attention PGP Users: New Vulnerabilities Require You To Take Action Now:
A group of European security researchers have released a warning about a set of vulnerabilities affecting users of PGP and S/MIME. EFF has been in communication with the research team, and can confirm that these vulnerabilities pose an immediate risk to those using these tools for email communication, including the potential exposure of the contents of past messages.
The full details will be published in a paper on Tuesday at 07:00 AM UTC (3:00 AM Eastern, midnight Pacific). In order to reduce the short-term risk, we and the researchers have agreed to warn the wider PGP user community in advance of its full publication.
The EFF also gives additional advice on disabling PGP in Thunderbird with Enigmail as well as other mail and mail-like clients.
takyon: The embargo is broken and the full details, including the paper (PDF), have been published.
(Score: 4, Informative) by takyon on Monday May 14 2018, @08:56AM (4 children)
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2018/q2/104 [seclists.org]
[SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
(Score: 1) by adun on Monday May 14 2018, @10:16AM
> GnuPG has posted a tweet (https://twitter.com/gnupg/status/995931083584757760)
indicating it's likely a vulnerability in mail clients themselves and not in
the protocol, and which is related to HTML mail handling.
Given how flaky, say, KMail is (I *really* tried to like it post-KDE 3.5, and *really* failed), I wouldn't be surprised. Same with Enigmail.
(Score: 4, Insightful) by Runaway1956 on Monday May 14 2018, @11:42AM (2 children)
On the first page, we find
Second page, I'm reading how these manipulations work - and they do REQUIRE that some application that interacts with the internet contact $server.
So, yes - it's a flaw in the client, not in PGP. If you never set your mail client up to decrypt stuff, then the client isn't going to do anything with your encrypted material.
I've not yet found that an encrypted file, created directly with PGP, then mailed as an attachment, can be manipulated. Still reading . . .
n the email context, both S/MIME and PGP use hybrid encryption, in which the sender generates a random ses-sion key that is used to symmetrically encrypt the mes-
sage into a cipher text
Again, the fault seems to be in the mail client. It isn't using PGP or S/mime - it is using some hybrid encryption scheme. And, yet again,
There is more, but everything seems to point to the mail client being exploited, rather than the encryption itself.
My take is, if you encrypt a file, then forward it by some means, the file is probably safe. If, however, you allow an internet connected application to do your encryption, that application can be tricked in a number of ways to interact with a malicious third party, who can then read your encrypted data. A workaround might be to encrypt your file first, using one set of keys - then use your encrypted mail client to send that file as an attachment.
Or, another method might be to encrypt your file, then put it on an FTP server.
The old *nix thing: Do one thing, and do it well. The more things that you ask your browser to do, the less secure it will be. (Face it - most people's email client is their web browser.)
(Score: 2) by takyon on Monday May 14 2018, @11:53AM
Yup. EFF's vague hype of this was annoying.
[SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
(Score: 2) by pvanhoof on Monday May 14 2018, @02:55PM
Which in a security sensitive environment is a bad idea. As suddenly you are exposing an enormous amount of locally running HTML rendering code to input provided to you by a possibly malicious actor.
On top of that is your web browser rarely going to show the E-mails in so called offline mode. Most MUA's have a feature called "Load remote images" or something similar. This will load IMG tags that have images that are not embedded in the E-mail. It usually gets implemented by putting the whole HTML rendering component in offline mode.
A MUA that is configured for a seriously secure environment will simply not render any HTML. You use the text/plain MIME part and if that way the E-mail ain't readable then the E-mail is for your spam folder.