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posted by chromas on Thursday May 24 2018, @01:24PM   Printer-friendly
from the 694a5b3e413a0ac1a7daaba2116966ea356ff40328b556ed14781f2a67e2e909 dept.

Aaron Toponce demonstrates why he thinks that using sha256crypt or sha512crypt on current GNU/Linux operating systems is dangerous, and why he thinks that the developers of GLIBC should move to scrypt or Argon2, or at least bcrypt or PBKDF2. After going into a bit of analysis, he concludes that practically everything else should be avoided, especially md5crypt, sha256crypt, and sha512crypt and many others.


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  • (Score: 3, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday May 24 2018, @02:30PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday May 24 2018, @02:30PM (#683557)

    Just saw this in the article...

    Where [Ulrich Drepper] said "I went with the one which involves less code", he should have gone with PBKDF2, as code had already long since existed in all sorts of cryptographic software, including OpenSSL. This seems to be a very clear case of NIH syndrome.

    To be fair to Drepper, while OpenSSL is free software, the copyright license of OpenSSL is not compatible with the license of the GNU C library so in general it is not legally possible to use OpenSSL code in glibc. That's isn't NIH syndrome.

    The author did not mention any other specific implementations but perhaps similar arguments would apply to others.

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