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Boeing Co. limited the role of its own pilots in the final stages of developing the 737 MAX flight-control system implicated in two fatal crashes, departing from a longstanding practice of seeking their detailed input, people familiar with the matter said.
As a result, Boeing test pilots and senior pilots involved in the MAX' development didn't receive detailed briefings about how fast or steeply the automated system known as MCAS could push down a plane' nose, these people said. Nor were they informed that the system relied on a single sensor, rather than two, to verify the accuracy of incoming data about the angle of a plane's nose, they added.
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Boeing’s Own Test Pilots Lacked Key Details Of 737 Max Flight-Control System
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(Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Sunday May 05 2019, @12:41PM (3 children)
There's a balance between being a "team player" and zealously following "best practices."
"Team players" might do a quick and dirty install, leave a few shavings, and get it out on-time, while other "team players" would suck it up and clean up the mess when they find it, understanding how things get left like that sometimes. In design, we call it "technical debt" and it's a very real thing: today's shortcuts are going to cost you in the future, plus interest.
"Best practices" would clean up those shavings 100% before calling the job done, and that is all kinds of good, but it does mean slower initial delivery, higher initial costs, and more missed deadlines. The best best practices optimize for minimum total lifecycle costs, including the costs of reduced reliability when things aren't done "the best way we know how..." Unfortunately, it is too easy to gild the lilly, for instance, one might make the case that the shavings not only be cleaned, but the compartment also be wiped down with a tack cloth, followed by a cleaner, and then an anti-oxidant sealer - requiring additional ventilation for safe use of the chemicals and extra time for not only the three extra wipe downs, but also adequate drying time between them, and a tighter environmental control (temperature and humidity) for proper use of the wipe-down chemicals. At some point, it's increasing total life-cycle costs for no measurable benefit.
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(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Sunday May 05 2019, @04:04PM (2 children)
'Best practices' sounds like there might be other acceptable practices? I don't see how.
Leaving metal shavings inside a car or mobile home is probably ok, because things tend to gravitate and stay put.
If they don't and the thing stops working, you can always pull over and figure out what happened.
This is not the case in something that flys. Expecting things to stay put and being able to just pull over and stop are not options.
An airplane mechanic that leaves metal shavings or spare parts lying about has simply not done his job.
A management plan that leads to this has a serious problem.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Sunday May 05 2019, @08:51PM (1 child)
Exactly. Management didn't care.
They moved some construction to a cheap Southern state with no union I presume all in the name of cutting costs.
Something tends to give when the overall focus is cheaper and faster. Don't think management is unaware. They gambled on it by pushing quality aside thinking it wouldn't matter (much).
(Score: 2) by bob_super on Tuesday May 07 2019, @04:23PM
> They moved some construction to a cheap Southern state with no union I presume all in the name of cutting costs.
That was both cutting costs on that plane, and putting pressure on the unions back in Everett. Combined with the headquarter move to Chicago, the whole plan was designed to tell the historical expensive workers that the diversified company wasn't stuck having to deal with them, so they'd better be reasonable.
Given the results, it seems to have backfired (if the executives can realize that)