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From the IEEE, an algorithm that creates "background noise" during data transmission that alerts officials to hacking:
Some of the most important industrial control systems (ICSs), such as those that support power generation and traffic control, must accurately transmit data at the milli- or even mirco-second range. This means that hackers need interfere with the transmission of real-time data only for the briefest of moments to succeed in disrupting these systems. The seriousness of this type of threat is illustrated by the Stuxnet incursion in 2010, when attackers succeeded in hacking the system supporting Iran's uranium enrichment factory, damaging more than 1000 centrifuges.
Now a trio of researchers has disclosed a novel technique that could more easily identify when these types of attacks occur, triggering an automatic shutdown that would prevent further damage.
The problem was first brought up in a conversation over coffee two years ago. "While describing the security measures in current industrial control systems, we realized we did not know any protection method on the real-time channels," explains Zhen Song, a researcher at Siemens Corporation. The group began to dig deeper into the research, but couldn't find any existing security measures.
[...] The approach involves the transmission of real-time data over an unencrypted channel, as conventionally done. In the experiment, a specialized algorithm in the form of a recursive watermark (RWM) signal is transmitted at the same time. The algorithm encodes a signal that is similar to "background noise," but with a distinct pattern. On the receiving end of the data transmission, the RWM signal is monitored for any disruptions, which, if present, indicate an attack is taking place. "If attackers change or delay the real-time channel signal a little bit, the algorithm can detect the suspicious event and raise alarms immediately," Song says.
Critically, a special "key" for deciphering the RWM algorithm is transmitted through an encrypted channel from the sender to the receiver before the data transmission takes place.
Tests show that this approach works fast to detect attacks. "We found the watermark-based approach, such as the RWM algorithm we proposed, can be 32 to 1375 times faster than traditional encryption algorithms in mainstream industrial controllers. Therefore, it is feasible to protect critical real-time control systems with new algorithms," says Song.
Originally spotted on The Eponymous Pickle.
Previously:
Cyber Threats from the US and Russia are Now Focusing on Civilian Infrastructure
Hackers Behind Dangerous Oil and Gas Intrusions are Probing US Power Grids
Stuxnet-Style Code Signing is More Widespread Than Anyone Thought
(Score: 5, Insightful) by JoeMerchant on Monday March 30 2020, @05:50PM
Anybody remember the PGP basics? Take your data, include a timestamp, compute a signature of the whole thing.
Data received without a valid signature is suspect, at best.
Overhead of transmitting a signature is minimal, 64 bytes per signed frame would far over-kill the needs.
If they have updated the compute hardware used to gather the data in the last 20 years, overhead of computing a cryptographically secure signature should be trivial for all but the most frugal of embedded processors.
If they are used to transmitting data "in the clear" I can see all kinds of use cases where fully encrypting the data would screw up workflows. But, including a signature with each frame of data (whatever a "critical frame" is determined to be for the system) shouldn't mess anybody up.
While I approve of subtle techniques like steganography, it seems like a misplaced use case here. You want to be confident your data isn't being replay-attacked? Check the signatures and the timestamps, game over. Of course, if your data has 12 or maybe 14 bits of resolution, you can chop up the signature data and stuff it into the low order bits of a 16 (or even 32) bit storage variable and maybe attackers won't know about your scheme and never know how to start trying to fake the data, and when they try you'll be onto them instantly. I think it's more likely that the attackers will know all about the signature scheme before they start - your real hope lies in secure key exchange - leave the data open for all users to see (that helps keep the key more secure, since most users don't need it) - but critical users will need the key in order to be able to check the signatures.
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