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posted by martyb on Wednesday July 08 2020, @10:26AM   Printer-friendly
from the Feinman's-Fuming dept.

Independent reviewers offer 80 suggestions to make Starliner safer

Following the failed test flight of Boeing's Starliner spacecraft in December, NASA on Monday released the findings of an investigation into the root causes of the launch's failure and the culture that led to them.

Over the course of its review, an independent team identified 80 "recommendations" for NASA and Boeing to address before the Starliner spacecraft launches again. In addition to calling for better oversight and documentation, these recommendations stress the need for greater hardware and software integration testing. Notably, the review team called for an end-to-end test prior to each flight using the maximum amount of flight hardware available.

This is significant, because before the December test flight, Boeing did not run an integrated software test that encompassed the roughly 48-hour period from launch through docking to the station. Instead, Boeing broke the test into chunks. The first chunk ran from launch through the point at which Starliner separated from the second stage of the Atlas V booster.

Previously: Boeing's Failed Starliner Mission Strains 'Reliability' Pitch
Boeing Starliner Lands Safely in the Desert After Failing to Reach Correct Orbit
NASA Safety Panel Calls for Reviews after Second Starliner Software Problem
Boeing Acknowledges "Gaps" in its Starliner Software Testing
Boeing Hit With 61 Safety Fixes for Astronaut Capsule
Boeing to Launch Starliner Spacecraft for Second Go at Reaching the ISS after First Mission Failed


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  • (Score: 2) by DannyB on Wednesday July 08 2020, @01:42PM (2 children)

    by DannyB (5839) Subscriber Badge on Wednesday July 08 2020, @01:42PM (#1018191) Journal

    I still can't believe their procedure didn't have a step saying "ensure all clocks show the same time"

    Having such a procedure would require spending time (and thus money) on someone to perform this step of the procedure. Thus decreasing costs.

    It is better to charge a price that reflects the expected reliability of having such a safety procedure, but yet not actually have that safety step in the checklist. Sort of like Max 737 not retraining pilots. Or making a safety system that compensates be an extra cost item.

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  • (Score: 2) by DannyB on Wednesday July 08 2020, @04:44PM

    by DannyB (5839) Subscriber Badge on Wednesday July 08 2020, @04:44PM (#1018259) Journal

    Ugh! -- thus decreasing profits

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    The lower I set my standards the more accomplishments I have.
  • (Score: 2) by RS3 on Wednesday July 08 2020, @05:52PM

    by RS3 (6367) on Wednesday July 08 2020, @05:52PM (#1018305)

    My argument regarding the 737 MAX insanity was that if the pilots knew about MCAS, they would have figured out what to do. I don't know the numbers, but there are many many documented flights where MCAS sent the trim system into chaos and someone had the wits to turn off trim motor circuit breaker. But that was dumb luck. Boeing was far far far too confident of the new tech. New tech is so totally awesome, right? It's always way better than any old tech, right? I guess the fact that MCAS was a patch that Boeing wasn't proud of having to do was a big factor in them keeping it a secret. It all rings too familiar with some of my work experiences, except for the people's lives depending on it part.

    My assessment of Boeing is they have too much non-technical power at the top. They need to either: A) fire all the management and replace them with actual technical people, or B) give all technical people the power to make the decisions with final say and veto power.