"Richard Hartmann, Peter Palfrader, and Jonathan McDowell have set up the first official onion service mirrors of the Debian operating system's software package infrastructure. This means that it is now possible to update your Debian system without the update information or downloaded packages leaving the Tor network at all, preventing a network adversary from discovering information about your system. A follow-up post by Richard includes guidance on using apt-transport-tor with the new mirrors.
These services are only the first in what should hopefully become a fully Tor-enabled system mirroring "the complete package lifecycle, package information, and the website". "This service is not redundant, it uses a key which is stored on the local drive, the .onion will change, and things are expected to break", wrote Richard, but if you are interested in trying out the new infrastructure, see the write-ups for further information."
This was orignially found at Blog.TorProject.org
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday September 07 2015, @07:59AM
The only draw here seems to be to prevent someone else from determining what OS you are using.
But who cares about that? Your browser gives you away on the first web server you hit, tor or no tor.
Actually this will prevent someone from learning what software you have installed, which is much more useful for an attacker.
You can choose and configure your browser to not spill the beans if you wish to.