from the Christopher,-Mike,-and-Nicole-breathe-a-sigh-of-relief dept.
NASA safety panel calls for reviews after second Starliner software problem
A NASA safety panel is recommending a review of Boeing's software verification processes after revealing there was a second software problem during a CST-100 Starliner test flight that could have led to a "catastrophic" failure.
That new software problem, not previously discussed by NASA or Boeing, was discussed during a Feb. 6 meeting of NASA's Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel that examined the December uncrewed test flight of Starliner that was cut short by a timer error.
That anomaly was discovered during ground testing while the spacecraft was in orbit, panel member Paul Hill said. "While this anomaly was corrected in flight, if it had gone uncorrected, it would have led to erroneous thruster firings and uncontrolled motion during [service module] separation for deorbit, with the potential for a catastrophic spacecraft failure," he said.
The exact cause of the failure remains under investigation by Boeing and NASA, who are also still examining the timer failure previously reported. Those problems, Hill said, suggested broader issues with how Boeing develops and tests the software used by the spacecraft.
"The panel has a larger concern with the rigor of Boeing's verification processes," he said. The panel called for reviews of Boeing's flight software integration and testing processes. "Further, with confidence at risk for a spacecraft that is intended to carry humans in space, the panel recommends an even broader Boeing assessment of, and corrective actions in, Boeing's [systems engineering and integration] processes and verification testing."
Previously:
Boeing Provides Damage Control After Inspector General's Report on Commercial Crew Program
Starliner Fails to Make Journey to ISS
Boeing's Failed Starliner Mission Strains 'Reliability' Pitch
Related Stories
Boeing seems upset with NASA's inspector general
"We strongly disagree with the report's conclusions about CST-100 Starliner pricing and readiness, and we owe it to the space community and the American public to share the facts the Inspector General missed," Jim Chilton, vice president and general manager of Boeing Space and Launch, stated in a release posted on Boeing's website.
Boeing's response takes issue with several parts of NASA's report. But the company appears especially exercised about the claim that NASA overpaid Boeing for seats on the third through sixth Starliner missions, payment over and above what was originally agreed upon as part of the company's fixed price contract with the space agency.
"Through fair and open negotiations with NASA in a competitive environment, we offered single-mission pricing for post-certification missions 3-6, thus enabling additional flexibility and schedule resiliency to enhance future mission readiness," the Boeing statement reads.
[...] In its response, Boeing said its per-seat price was not $90 million, although the company declined to say what its actual price is or provide any documentation to support this claim. "For proprietary, competitive reasons Boeing does not disclose specific pricing information, but we are confident our average seat pricing to NASA is below the figure cited," the company's statement reads.
Previously: NASA Warned Of Safety Risks In Delayed Private Crew Launches
Boeing Received 'Unnecessary' Contract Boost for Astronaut Capsule, Watchdog Says
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-50855395
The Boeing company is going to have to cut short the uncrewed demonstration flight of its new astronaut capsule.
The Starliner launched successfully on its Atlas rocket from Florida, but then suffered technical problems that prevented it from taking the correct path to the International Space Station.
It appears the capsule burnt too much fuel as it operated its engines, leaving an insufficient supply to complete its mission.
Starliner will now come back to Earth. A landing is planned in the New Mexico desert in about 48 hours.
See also:
https://spacenews.com/starliner-suffers-off-nominal-orbital-insertion-after-launch/
https://spacenews.com/starliner-anomaly-to-prevent-iss-docking/
Boeing's failed Starliner mission strains 'reliability' pitch:
Boeing Co’s (BA.N) stunted Friday debut of its astronaut capsule threatens to dent the U.S. aerospace incumbent’s self-declared competitive advantage of mission reliability against the price and innovation strengths of “new space” players like Elon Musk’s SpaceX.
Boeing, the world’s largest aerospace company, has anchored its attempt to repel space visionaries like Musk and Amazon.com (AMZN.O) founder Jeff Bezos partly on its mission safety record built up over decades of space travel.
While SpaceX and Bezos’ Blue Origin are racing to send their own crewed missions to space for the first time, Boeing or Boeing heritage companies have built every American spacecraft that has transported astronauts into space. And the single-use rockets it builds in partnership with Lockheed Martin Corp (LMT.N) have a virtually unblemished record of mission success.
“We are starting from a position of mission reliability and safety,” Boeing Chief Executive Dennis Muilenburg told Reuters earlier this year when asked about SpaceX and other insurgents aiming to disrupt Boeing on everything from astronaut capsules to rockets to satellites.
“There is a difference between putting cargo in space and putting humans in space, and that’s a big step. Our very deliberate, safety-based approach for things like CST-100, that will be a differentiator in the long run,” Muilenburg said.
Boeing to Launch Starliner Spacecraft for Second go at Reaching the ISS After First Mission Failed:
On Monday, Boeing announced it will take a second shot at sending an uncrewed Starliner to the station as part of NASA's Commercial Crew Program. The program aims to launch astronauts from US soil for the first time since the end of the space shuttle era in 2011.
[...] "We have chosen to refly our Orbital Flight Test to demonstrate the quality of the Starliner system," Boeing in a brief statement. "Flying another uncrewed flight will allow us to complete all flight test objectives and evaluate the performance of the second Starliner vehicle at no cost to the taxpayer."
Boeing and NASA have not yet revealed a date for the launch. Starliner must pass its uncrewed flight tests before NASA uses it to send astronauts to the ISS.
Do not cry too much for Boeing as they are the prime contractor for the SLS (Space launch System) which is currently funded to the tune of over $1 billion per year.
Previously:
(2020-03-07) Boeing Hit With 61 Safety Fixes for Astronaut Capsule
(2020-03-01) Boeing Acknowledges "Gaps" in its Starliner Software Testing
(2020-02-07) NASA Safety Panel Calls for Reviews after Second Starliner Software Problem
(2019-12-24) Boeing Starliner Lands Safely in the Desert After Failing to Reach Correct Orbit
(2019-12-23) Boeing's Failed Starliner Mission Strains 'Reliability' Pitch
(2019-12-20) Starliner Fails to Make Journey to ISS
(2019-11-19) Boeing Provides Damage Control After Inspector General's Report on Commercial Crew Program
(2019-11-06) Boeing Performs Starliner Pad Abort Test. Declares Success Though 1 of 3 Parachutes Fails to Deploy.
(2019-09-03) Boeing Readies "Astronaut" for Likely October Test Launch
(2018-04-07) Boeing Crewed Test Flight to the ISS May be Upgraded to a Full Mission
Click to search SoylentNews for more Starliner stories.
Boeing hit with 61 safety fixes for astronaut capsule:
In releasing the outcome of a joint investigation, NASA said it still has not decided whether to require Boeing to launch the Starliner again without a crew, or go straight to putting astronauts on board.
Douglas Loverro, NASA's human exploration and operation chief, told reporters that Boeing must first present a plan and schedule for the 61 corrective actions. Boeing expects to have a plan in NASA's hands by the end of this month.
Loverro said the space agency wants to verify, among other things, that Boeing has retested all the necessary software for Starliner.
"At the end of the day, what we have got to decide is ... do we have enough confidence to say we are ready to fly with a crew or do we believe that we need another uncrewed testing," Loverro said.
Boeing's Jim Chilton, a senior vice president, said his company is ready to repeat a test flight without a crew, if NASA decides on one.
"'All of us want crew safety No. 1," Chilton said. "Whatever testing we've got to do to make that happen, we embrace it."
Loverro said he felt compelled to designate the test flight as a "high-visibility close call." He said that involves more scrutiny of Boeing and NASA to make sure mistakes like this don't happen again.
Software errors not only left the Starliner in the wrong orbit following liftoff and precluded a visit to the International Space Station but they could have caused a collision between the capsule and its separated service module toward the end of the two-day flight. That error was caught and corrected by ground controllers just hours before touchdown.
Citation: Boeing hit with 61 safety fixes for astronaut capsule (2020, March 6) retrieved 6 March 2020 from https://phys.org/news/2020-03-boeing-safety-astronaut-capsule.html
Independent reviewers offer 80 suggestions to make Starliner safer
Following the failed test flight of Boeing's Starliner spacecraft in December, NASA on Monday released the findings of an investigation into the root causes of the launch's failure and the culture that led to them.
Over the course of its review, an independent team identified 80 "recommendations" for NASA and Boeing to address before the Starliner spacecraft launches again. In addition to calling for better oversight and documentation, these recommendations stress the need for greater hardware and software integration testing. Notably, the review team called for an end-to-end test prior to each flight using the maximum amount of flight hardware available.
This is significant, because before the December test flight, Boeing did not run an integrated software test that encompassed the roughly 48-hour period from launch through docking to the station. Instead, Boeing broke the test into chunks. The first chunk ran from launch through the point at which Starliner separated from the second stage of the Atlas V booster.
Previously: Boeing's Failed Starliner Mission Strains 'Reliability' Pitch
Boeing Starliner Lands Safely in the Desert After Failing to Reach Correct Orbit
NASA Safety Panel Calls for Reviews after Second Starliner Software Problem
Boeing Acknowledges "Gaps" in its Starliner Software Testing
Boeing Hit With 61 Safety Fixes for Astronaut Capsule
Boeing to Launch Starliner Spacecraft for Second Go at Reaching the ISS after First Mission Failed
(Score: 2) by DannyB on Friday February 07 2020, @09:59PM (1 child)
NASA already paid Boeing to build the Starliner.
Now NASA will pay Boeing to fix the broken software.
If that fix is also broken, then NASA will pay Boeing even more to fix the broken fix.
I almost, but not quite, think I almost see a pattern here.
Everyone at Boeing should be happy. I don't see a problem.
They can put some of their 737 MAX software wizards on this right away. Boeing also can draw on their expertise in SLS -- milking every last possible taxpayer dollar out of it.
Q. How much did Santa's sled cost?
A. Nothing. It was on the house.
(Score: 2) by coolgopher on Saturday February 08 2020, @12:39AM
+1 Depressingly true
(Score: 3, Interesting) by ikanreed on Friday February 07 2020, @10:06PM (1 child)
Suddenly exploding due to bad design decisions made by management?
Naaaaaaaah.
(Score: 2) by takyon on Friday February 07 2020, @10:09PM
Known unknown.
[SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday February 07 2020, @10:11PM (14 children)
If it killing airplanes isn't enough for The Infallible Management to get the clue.
(Score: 3, Informative) by takyon on Friday February 07 2020, @10:14PM (6 children)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-28/boeing-s-737-max-software-outsourced-to-9-an-hour-engineers [bloomberg.com]
Coof
[SIG] 10/28/2017: Soylent Upgrade v14 [soylentnews.org]
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday February 07 2020, @10:27PM (4 children)
That "flight-display software" might be the in-flight entertainment screens. Resumes are padded. I wouldn't read much into it.
American programmers can screw up, too.
(Score: 2) by MostCynical on Saturday February 08 2020, @01:00AM
"rely" is different to "use"
Who did the code verification?
Who did the testing?
Who did the regression testing? ( was there any?)
Who wrote the test scripts?
Whi checked the test scripts?
What percentage of variable options were tested?
Etc etc..
"I guess once you start doubting, there's no end to it." -Batou, Ghost in the Shell: Stand Alone Complex
(Score: 2) by legont on Saturday February 08 2020, @02:48AM
If you think American Indians are better, think again.
"Wealth is the relentless enemy of understanding" - John Kenneth Galbraith.
(Score: 3, Insightful) by Grishnakh on Saturday February 08 2020, @03:19AM (1 child)
I haven't seen any kind of indication that the programmers who wrote the MCAS software screwed up at all. As far as I can tell, the software worked perfectly (as it flew the planes into the ground).
The problem wasn't the software, it was the design, which came from the systems engineers. What kind of fucking moron designs a flight-critical system and has it use data from only a single sensor? Whoever thought that was a great idea should seriously be executed by drawing and quartering for murdering hundreds of people.
The software people just implemented the design as it was given to them.
(Score: 2, Informative) by khallow on Saturday February 08 2020, @01:31PM
The kind of moron who wants to get regulatory approval and doesn't want the regulators to get the impression that the flight-critical system is a flight-critical system which requires a new, costlier training regime. Add backup sensors and someone might ask why it's so important that it needs backup sensors.
(Score: 4, Insightful) by ElizabethGreene on Friday February 07 2020, @11:32PM
It doesn't matter if they outsourced it or developed it in house. They have a quality culture problem. It's effecting civilian aviation (737 Max), military aviation (KC-46 FOD [businessinsider.com]), and their space business (Starliner). It is a the kind of systemic problem that you very much do not want in any company.
That it's infected a too big to fail company only makes it worse.
(Score: 2) by deimtee on Saturday February 08 2020, @12:43AM (6 children)
I don't want to defend Boeing here, but didn't the MCAS software work until the sensor failed?
Depending on a single sensor was incredibly bad design, and the devious shit they pulled to get around re-certification and training expenses was criminal, but the coders weren't responsible for either of those.
200 million years is actually quite a long time.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Saturday February 08 2020, @01:22AM (5 children)
"I don't want to defend Boeing here, but didn't the MCAS software work until the sensor failed"
You are definitely not defending BA, but you might be defending a S/w team in a borked system.
If the goal of the software team is to design to a spec, sure, maybe the spec was broke and the team did ok, but you ended up with a flawed airplane.
If the goal of the software team is to understand how their stuff will actually work in the field and adjust the spec to make that ok, then no, they didn't do ok and you ended up with a flawed airplane.
The experience expected from BA is that either they have done this enough to be able to make a good spec, or they would expect the s/w team to think it through.
I would actually expect both, but it appears neither actually happened.
(Score: 2) by Rich on Saturday February 08 2020, @02:36AM
The problem with specifications is that for them to be unambiguously complete, they need to be completely equivalent to the software they specify.
(Score: 2) by Grishnakh on Saturday February 08 2020, @03:24AM (3 children)
If the goal of the software team is to design to a spec, sure, maybe the spec was broke and the team did ok, but you ended up with a flawed airplane.
If the goal of the software team is to understand how their stuff will actually work in the field and adjust the spec to make that ok, then no, they didn't do ok and you ended up with a flawed airplane.
The team did just fine as far as I can tell: they were given a stupid spec, and they implemented it. There's no evidence that their software failed. It's not their job to come up with the spec; that comes from the systems engineers. They might have some amount of ability to push back, but corporations are not democratic; if they were told "your concerns have been noted, now implement it as specified or you're fired", well, what do you expect? Most likely, they were told (remember, these are software engineers, not pilots and not systems engineers) that this was a not-very-critical system just there as insurance for rare cases where the plane is operating at the edge of its envelope. Once the software was written, and then the systems engineers decided they needed to greatly increase the authority given to MCAS, it was probably just a matter of changing some constants in the software.
(Score: 2) by fido_dogstoyevsky on Saturday February 08 2020, @04:16AM (2 children)
Which is when "insurance" can suddenly become "critical". But they may not have even been told as much as "that this was a not-very-critical system', but just "this code will be to handle one sensor".
But if programmers get a pass for just doing as they're told or getting fired, what about systems engineers? I don't know who insisted on relying on a single point of failure, but it does seem more MBA thinking than BEng. Regardless, heads (from the top, for being in charge of this mess, to anybody who just went along with it) need to roll.
It's NOT a conspiracy... it's a plot.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Saturday February 08 2020, @09:58PM (1 child)
The problem was there was only one sensor. How often do software guys get to demand hardware changes?
(Score: 2) by fido_dogstoyevsky on Saturday February 08 2020, @11:25PM
Apparently not often enough.
It's NOT a conspiracy... it's a plot.
(Score: 5, Informative) by Snotnose on Saturday February 08 2020, @01:09AM (1 child)
When Boeing "acquired" McDonnell Douglass the bean counters that ran the latter into the ground took over the management of Boeing. Then Boeing turned into an MBA's dream, and actual engineers got squeezed out.
Look at the MAX. Look at the Dreamliner issues, where sharp metal pieces are being left in wiring harnesses. Look at the past couple of Starliner failures.
The bean counters are in control, the engineers who actually understand stuff are on the sidelines, and anyone in the latter camp who dares stick their neck out quickly gets their head chopped off.
Every time a Christian defends Trump an angel loses it's lunch.
(Score: 2) by Pslytely Psycho on Saturday February 08 2020, @01:29AM
So, to summarize your statement...
Never trust a company whose name sounds like something breaking in a cartoon, or from an old comedy like this: https://youtu.be/PoDPR1lhzak?t=159 [youtu.be]
Alex Jones lawyer inspires new TV series: CSI Moron Division.