Stories
Slash Boxes
Comments

SoylentNews is people

posted by cmn32480 on Monday October 03 2016, @07:29PM   Printer-friendly
from the inherently-broken dept.

Arthur T Knackerbracket has found the following story from Bruce Schneier's blog:

Every few years, a researcher replicates a security study by littering USB sticks around an organization's grounds and waiting to see how many people pick them up and plug them in, causing the autorun function to install innocuous malware on their computers. These studies are great for making security professionals feel superior. The researchers get to demonstrate their security expertise and use the results as "teachable moments" for others. "If only everyone was more security aware and had more security training," they say, "the Internet would be a much safer place."

Enough of that. The problem isn't the users: it's that we've designed our computer systems' security so badly that we demand the user do all of these counterintuitive things. Why can't users choose easy-to-remember passwords? Why can't they click on links in emails with wild abandon? Why can't they plug a USB stick into a computer without facing a myriad of viruses? Why are we trying to fix the user instead of solving the underlying security problem?

Traditionally, we've thought about security and usability as a trade-off: a more secure system is less functional and more annoying, and a more capable, flexible, and powerful system is less secure. This "either/or" thinking results in systems that are neither usable nor secure.

[...] We must stop trying to fix the user to achieve security. We'll never get there, and research toward those goals just obscures the real problems. Usable security does not mean "getting people to do what we want." It means creating security that works, given (or despite) what people do. It means security solutions that deliver on users' security goals without­ -- as the 19th-century Dutch cryptographer Auguste Kerckhoffs aptly put it­ -- "stress of mind, or knowledge of a long series of rules."

[...] "Blame the victim" thinking is older than the Internet, of course. But that doesn't make it right. We owe it to our users to make the Information Age a safe place for everyone -- ­not just those with "security awareness."


Original Submission

 
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.
Display Options Threshold/Breakthrough Mark All as Read Mark All as Unread
The Fine Print: The following comments are owned by whoever posted them. We are not responsible for them in any way.
  • (Score: 2) by FatPhil on Tuesday October 04 2016, @10:52AM

    by FatPhil (863) <pc-soylentNO@SPAMasdf.fi> on Tuesday October 04 2016, @10:52AM (#409926) Homepage
    > And passwords ... ye god ... what a horrible method for keeping things secure. Why haven't we transitioned to a public-key infrastructure?

    Unprotected private keys are not an alternative to passwords, they are an entirely different type of security. They are "something you have (in a form inconvenient for you, but convenient for malware)" rather than "something you know (but which you share with others liberally)". Things that you have can get lost, copied, or stolen. There are also families of security exploits which can only happen in a PKI scenario, not in a password scanario, it's not a magic bullet.

    Of course, you can protect your private keys with a passphrase, but if you think that's better than a password...
    --
    Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people; the smallest discuss themselves
    Starting Score:    1  point
    Karma-Bonus Modifier   +1  

    Total Score:   2