Estonia is the world leader in using online voting for its national elections. Its government has done a great deal to improve the security of the system, which is now used by up to 25% of voters. The country's "I-voting system" is touted by proponents of online voting in the U.S. to claim that secure Internet voting is possible.
It isn't. Early in May an international team of independent security experts accredited by the Estonian government reported severe security vulnerabilities in that country's "I-voting system." Elections, the researchers found, "could be stolen, disrupted, or cast into disrepute."
These results have serious implications for the push to internet voting in other countries, particularly in the U.S.
(Score: 2) by Geezer on Friday May 30 2014, @09:22AM
Data is data. All data can be manipulated. Whether this makes E-voting more or less secure than the traditional stuffed ballot box is open to debate, but there is not, and can never, ever, be a guaranteed secure system of electronic voting. Why? Because even with "impartial" 3rd-party validation of proprietary software and auditing of results, the so-called impartial 3rd parties will still have human failings and interests, either ideological or monetary (maybe both). All code is written and QA'd by humans. 'nuff said.
(Score: 1, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Friday May 30 2014, @01:06PM
Electronic signatures can prevent data manipulation (especially since with electronic voting, it suffices if the votes are secure until any dispute has been settled; or at worst until the end of the legislation period).
The challenge is to combine electronic signatures with anonymity on one hand, and the prevention of double-voting or ballot stuffing on the other hand. Anonymity requires that your identity cannot be associated with your vote, while prevention of double-voting/ballot stuffing requires that you actually identify yourself when voting.