Estonia is the world leader in using online voting for its national elections. Its government has done a great deal to improve the security of the system, which is now used by up to 25% of voters. The country's "I-voting system" is touted by proponents of online voting in the U.S. to claim that secure Internet voting is possible.
It isn't. Early in May an international team of independent security experts accredited by the Estonian government reported severe security vulnerabilities in that country's "I-voting system." Elections, the researchers found, "could be stolen, disrupted, or cast into disrepute."
These results have serious implications for the push to internet voting in other countries, particularly in the U.S.
(Score: 1, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Friday May 30 2014, @12:38PM
No, they are vastly different. The biggest difference is in risk to adversaries in modifying the results of a campaign. With paper ballots you must be physically present to do something (risky), and it's expensive to modify enough physical paper to sway a result (costly). With electronic votes you can modify results from 12,000 miles away (not risky) and only need to change a single bit value to swap a result (not very costly, based on these and many other findings of e-voting systems).