Submitted via IRC for TheMightyBuzzard
Since the launch of AMD Ryzen, a small piece of hardware that handles basic memory initialization as well as many security functions has been the center of some controversy. Called the Platform Security Processor (the "PSP" for short) it is essentially an arm core with complete access to the entire system. Its actions can be considered "above root" level and are for the most part invisible to the OS. It is similar in this regard to Intel's Management Engine, but is in some ways even more powerful.
Why is this a bad thing? Well, let's play a theoretical. What happens if a bug is discovered in the PSP, and malware takes control of it? How would you remove it (Answer: you couldn't). How would you know you needed to remove it? (answer, unless it made itself obvious, you also wouldn't). This scenario is obviously not a good one, and is a concern for many who asked AMD to open-source the PSPs code for general community auditing.
Bit late to the reporting but we haven't covered it yet, so here it is. And I was so looking forward to a new desktop too. Guess this one will have to stay alive until ARM becomes a viable replacement.
Previous:
The Intel Management Engine, and How it Stops Screenshots
Intel x86 Considered Harmful
Of Intel's Hardware Rootkit
Intel Management Engine Partially Defeated
EFF: Intel's Management Engine is a Security Hazard
Malware uses Intel AMT feature to steal data, avoid firewalls
(Score: 1, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Monday August 21 2017, @03:25AM
TCP/UDP (inet routable) → IP (inet routable) → MAC (link local) → Ethernet (link local)
OSI model [wikipedia.org]
I don't believe this is possible, unless..,
What's really going to bake your noodle later on is whether or not this code detects packets with the evil bit set, intercepts them, and prevents the OS network driver from even seeing them.
Of course there's also things like hiding a payload in ICMP packets or whatnot. Perhaps sufficiently advanced stenography could hijack DNS queries without hiding them from the OS network driver and without alerting security researchers to the presence of stenography. I'm certain the NSA has thought about all of this before.
It's too bad the NSA's mission cannot be changed from weakening information system security to building the most hardened information system security possible. (Something a bit easier to approach than selinux plz.)