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posted by Fnord666 on Wednesday January 31 2018, @05:14PM   Printer-friendly
from the doesn't-raid-fix-this? dept.

Arthur T Knackerbracket has found the following story:

In 2015, Microsoft senior engineer Dan Luu forecast a bountiful harvest of chip bugs in the years ahead.

"We've seen at least two serious bugs in Intel CPUs in the last quarter, and it's almost certain there are more bugs lurking," he wrote. "There was a time when a CPU family might only have one bug per year, with serious bugs happening once every few years, or even once a decade, but we've moved past that."

Thanks to growing chip complexity, compounded by hardware virtualization, and reduced design validation efforts, Luu argued, the incidence of hardware problems could be expected to increase.

This month's Meltdown and Spectre security flaws that affect chip designs from AMD, Arm, and Intel to varying degrees support that claim. But there are many other examples.


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  • (Score: 1) by pTamok on Friday February 02 2018, @07:36PM

    by pTamok (3042) on Friday February 02 2018, @07:36PM (#632120)

    Thanks for the reply. I heartily recommend the first reference I gave. Give it a read - it is not overly technical.

    You are likely right that the general problem is probably NP-complete: or at least difficult, if you assume things like unbounded memory and unbounded state-tables. However, if you place bounds on such things, the problem becomes tractable.

    I put 'simply' in scare quotes because cost is a driver to the bottom as far as commercial business systems are concerned. If a business can make a short-term gain by ignoring security requirements, it will. You can keep the plates spinning for a while...

    It is not impossible to produce formally-proven systems, merely difficult, and you have to be discerning about your axioms. As long as people choose cheapness over correctness, we will continue to have problems like Meltdown, Spectre, and multifarious side-channel attacks. It probably doesn't matter for most business systems, but aerospace will continue to provide a proving ground for such things, hopefully followed by medical applications (do you want your pacemaker to be hackable?). I hope that at some point in the future, the benefit of formally-proven systems will outweigh the cost-increment over the slapdash approach currently used. I don't think that time will come soon, unfortunately.