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UK reportedly planning to phase out Huawei equipment from its 5G networks
After resisting pressure from the US for months, Prime Minister Boris Johnson is apparently preparing to phase out the use of Huawei equipment from the UK's 5G networks, the Financial Times reported. Citing national security concerns, members of the UK's Conservative party have pushed for Huawei technology to be removed from the UK's 5G infrastructure and the rest of its telecom network by 2023.
[...] Trump reportedly called Johnson earlier this year to discuss the matter, and at least one member of Congress said the US was reconsidering its intelligence partnership with the UK.
Johnson had limited how much Huawei equipment could be used for 5G networks in the UK, banning the use of the company's technology in the most sensitive parts of the network. He said in January that there were not a lot of other options available for the UK's 5G infrastructure, and telecom Vodafone said removing Huawei equipment from its networks would be extremely costly.
See also: Reports: UK to cut Huawei's involvement in 5G network
Boris Johnson forced to reduce Huawei's role in UK's 5G networks
Previously:
U.S. Intelligence Agency Heads Warn Against Using Huawei and ZTE Products
Huawei's Equipment Removed from UK Telecom BT's Network for Emergency Services
EU to Drop Threat of Huawei Ban but Wants 5G Risks Monitored
UK to Toughen Telecoms Security Controls to Shrink 5G Risks
How China Is Building A World-Beating Phone Network
Using Huawei in UK 5G Network 'Madness', Says US
Getting Huawei Out of US Networks Requires Gov't Funding, Senators Say
Huawei Fires Back, Points To US' History Of Spying On Phone Networks
TSMC Dumps Huawei
(Score: 4, Insightful) by zocalo on Sunday May 24 2020, @10:40AM
Either way, all this is overlooking two rather fundamental concepts in security - defence in depth, and assuming that you will be compromised and considering how you will contain the damage - the whole point of which is that if any link in the chain is compromised then you are still protected by the rest. The trick is to build your chain (design the system architecture) in such as way that even if Vendor A has state enforced backdoors then they are useless because all your other hardware from other vendors will prevent access. A simplistic example of this would be to use two different hardware vendors to provide firewalling capability; one at the outer perimeter of your DMZ and the other at the inner; even if both were backdoored by their respective vendors, the other firewall should still be capable of denying them access to the interior network.
Ultimately though it's a variation of the old procurement dilemma - you can only choose two from cheap, convenient, and secure - which is pretty much the same order that they usually get prioritised in.
UNIX? They're not even circumcised! Savages!