Robert X. Cringely points out the hidden costs of running corporate IT over the public internet:
How cheap is IT, really, if it compromises customer data? Not cheap at all. Last year’s Target hack alone cost the company more than $1 billion, estimated Forrester Research. The comparably-sized Home Depot hack will probably cost about the same. JP Morgan Chase is likely to face even higher costs.
He wonders why companies aren't shifting to dedicated networks, like they used to make with leased lines.
Taking a bank or retail network back to circa 1989 would go a long way toward ending the current rash of data breaches. It would be expensive, sure, but not as expensive as losing all the money that Target and others have recently done.
Is this practical? If so, how would it be accomplished with modern equipment?
(Score: 2, Informative) by goody on Friday October 10 2014, @12:36PM
Dedicated networks built with leased facilities are fine and dandy, but there will always be some portion of a company's network facing the outside hostile network to provide things like customer portals, email, links with other companies that are in their supply chain, banking, etc. I don't think most of the high profile hacks have been due to lack of layer one security. If you have hacks coming in your private WAN, whether it's built from public or private network links, you've got some bigger problems than leased lines can solve.
I'm sure it can be accomplished with modern equipment if you don't mind bonding T1s and DS3s. But you'd have the same level of security if you did something with a reputable carrier and used MPLS and encryption.
Overall, it doesn't sound like Cringely knows what he is talking about.
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday October 10 2014, @03:22PM
Most of these sorts of attacks seem to be using leveraged assets ladders.
Where you compromise one computer to get at another with every higher rights.
So even though you may have 100% secure leased lines. The other side of the house may want to use the internet. Then there is some bridge between the two...
To do it truly right you have to have 100% segregated network and computers with review boards and change controls. Now that crap builds in time to complete and boring meeting headaches and empire building CYA managers. It also builds in a distrust of building a better network. Because 'should not do this' turns into 'do not ever do this even though now it is way better to do'. So you have to figure out what is your compromise just so you can have 'ease of use' vs 'security'.