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posted by janrinok on Thursday August 04, @01:51PM   Printer-friendly
from the attack-of-the-clones dept.

Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:

Thousands of GitHub repositories were forked (copied) with their clones altered to include malware, a software engineer discovered today.

While cloning open source repositories is a common development practice and even encouraged among developers, this case involves threat actors creating copies of legitimate projects but tainting these with malicious code to target unsuspecting developers with their malicious clones.

GitHub has purged most of the malicious repositories after receiving the engineer's report.

Today, software developer Stephen Lacy left everyone baffled when he claimed having discovered a "widespread malware attack" on GitHub affecting some 35,000 software repositories.

Contrary to what the original tweet seems to suggest, however, "35,000 projects" on GitHub have not been affected or compromised in any manner.

Rather, the thousands of backdoored projects are copies (forks or clones) of legitimate projects purportedly made by threat actors to push malware.

Official projects like crypto, golang, python, js, bash, docker, k8s, remain unaffected. But, that is not to say, the finding is unimportant, as explained in the following sections.

While reviewing an open source project Lacy had "found off a google search," the engineer noticed the following URL in the code that he shared on Twitter:

hxxp://ovz1.j19544519.pr46m.vps.myjino[.]ru

BleepingComputer, like many, observed that when searching GitHub for this URL, there were 35,000+ search results showing files containing the malicious URL. Therefore, the figure represents the number of suspicious files rather than infected repositories:

We further discovered, out of the 35,788 code results, more than 13,000 search results were from a single repository called 'redhat-operator-ecosystem.'

[...] As a best practice, remember to consume software from the official project repos and watch out for potential typosquats or repository forks/clones that may appear identical to the original project but hide malware.

This can become more difficult to spot as cloned repositories may continue to retain code commits with usernames and email addresses of the original authors, giving off a misleading impression that even newer commits were made by the original project authors. Open source code commits signed with GPG keys of authentic project authors are one way of verifying the authenticity of code.


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  • (Score: 3, Interesting) by darkfeline on Friday August 05, @03:29AM

    by darkfeline (1030) on Friday August 05, @03:29AM (#1265030) Homepage

    Come to the Go side, we have pinned and hashed dependencies by default. It is effectively impossible to modify a package once published (there is a global, zero-trust hash store of every version of every public package), and dependencies are never upgraded implicitly. Of course, that doesn't stop you from adding an update deps script to your CI, but that's your problem.

    From https://research.swtch.com/vgo-principles [swtch.com]

    "The usual first objection to prioritizing repeatability is to claim that preferring the latest version of a dependency is a feature, not a bug. The claim is that programmers either don’t want to or are too lazy to update their dependencies regularly, so tools like Dep should use the latest dependencies automatically. The argument is that the benefits of having the latest versions outweigh the loss of repeatability.

    But this argument doesn’t hold up to scrutiny. Tools like Dep provide lock files, which then require programmers to update dependencies themselves, exactly because repeatable builds are more important than using the latest version. When you deploy a 1-line bug fix, you want to be sure that your bug fix is the only change, that you’re not also picking up different, newer versions of your dependencies.

    You want to delay upgrades until you ask for them, so that you can be ready to run all your unit tests, all your integration tests, and maybe even production canaries, before you start using those upgraded dependencies in production. Everyone agrees about this. Lock files exist because everyone agrees about this: repeatability is more important than automatic upgrades."

    For the checksum database:

    https://go.dev/ref/mod#checksum-database [go.dev]
    https://research.swtch.com/tlog [swtch.com]

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