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posted by Dopefish on Sunday March 09 2014, @01:30AM   Printer-friendly
from the back-in-the-USSR dept.

Papas Fritas writes:

"James B. Stewart writes in the NYT that there's one major difference between now and the last time Russia invaded a neighbor (Czechoslovakia in 1968): Now Moscow has a stock market that provides a minute-by-minute referendum on Putin's military and diplomatic actions.

On Monday, the Russian stock market index (RTSI) fell more than 12 percent, in what a Russian official called panic selling and the ruble plunged on currency markets, forcing the Russian central bank to raise interest rates by one and a half percentage points to defend the currency. On Tuesday, as soon as Mr. Putin said he saw no need for further Russian military intervention, the Russian market rebounded by 6 percent. With tensions on the rise once more on Friday, the Russian market may again gyrate when it opens on Monday. Russia is far more exposed to market fluctuations than many countries, since the Russian government owns a majority stake in a number of the country's largest companies and many Russian companies and banks are fully integrated into the global financial system.

The old Soviet Union, in stark contrast, was all but impervious to foreign economic or business pressure, thanks in part to an ideological commitment to self-sufficiency. By contrast, today "Russia is too weak and vulnerable economically to go to war," says Anders Aslund. "The Kremlin's fundamental mistake has been to ignore its economic weakness and dependence on Europe." Almost half of Russia's exports go to Europe, and three-quarters of its total exports consist of oil and gas. The energy boom is over, and Europe can turn the tables on Russia after its prior gas supply cuts in 2006 and 2009 replacing this gas with liquefied natural gas, gas from Norway and shale gas.

If the European Union sanctioned Russia's gas supply to Europe, Russia would lose $100 billion or one-fifth of its export revenues, and the Russian economy would be in rampant crisis. Other penalties might include asset freezes and the billionaire Russian elite who are pretty much synonymous with Mr. Putin's friends and allies are the ones who are being severely affected by visa bans, which were imposed by President Obama on Thursday. "The recent events were completely irrational, angering the West for no reason," says one Russian economist. "This is what is most scary, especially for businesses. Instead of reforming the stagnating economy, Putin scared everybody for no reason and with no gain in sight. So it is hard to predict his next actions. But I think a real Cold War is unlikely.""

 
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  • (Score: 5, Informative) by zeigerpuppy on Sunday March 09 2014, @05:17AM

    by zeigerpuppy (1298) on Sunday March 09 2014, @05:17AM (#13450)

    I have spent a lot of time with Russians, rightly or wrongly,
    they regard Ukraine as a little brother who they permitted limited independence.
    The Crimean bases are also Russia's only southern naval access and are essential strategic assets.
    The situation is somewhat like the Trident bases in Scotland, England cannot and will not give
    up their interests there because they are deemed strategically essential.
    Economics comes second (not that I agree that the military should run the world, but my wishing doesn't change the fact they do).
    Russia always had control in Crimea and will continue to control, there will be a degree of dummy spitting
    but they have made a move that was predictable and which the west will not challenge,
    they all play in the same swill pen now.

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  • (Score: 1, Informative) by Anonymous Coward on Sunday March 09 2014, @11:49PM

    by Anonymous Coward on Sunday March 09 2014, @11:49PM (#13684)

    "The situation is somewhat like the Trident bases in Scotland, England cannot and will not give up their interests there because they are deemed strategically essential."

    Yeah, but unlike the strategic situation in Ukraine, England is currently -- and will remain for a minimum of two years -- in a political union with Scotland and the two nations share foreign and defence policy, among many other powers that are retained by Westminster. The name "United Kingdom" was not chosen for our health; it was chosen because it was first a personal union of James VI and I, and then a century or so later was a genuinely politically United Kingdom under Anne and her successors.

    In Ukraine, on the other hand, we have a situation where a former colonial power (as England was not, never has been unless you *really* want to go back to the days of Longshanks and seriousky odn't go there, and is not currently in Scotland) gifted a region -- Crimea -- to a constituent federal state -- Ukraine. That gift was retained and guaranteed after the dissolution of the Soviet Empire, in return for a guarantee of Russian military presence in Crimea and in particular, as you rightly point out, a vital base for the Black Sea Fleet.

    Conversely, while the government of the UK -- which is, after all, the government of, err, the UK and therefore is the government of both England and Scotland which are both merely constituent states of the UK -- has based its nuclear subs primarily at Faslane, in the event of Scottish independence those subs can either remain at Faslane under an agreement with the new Scottish government which is yet to be negotiated or else, much more likely, will be gradually rebased at Plymouth and Portsmouth where they have often spent time anyway.

    The situations are in no way comparable. On the one hand, a government legitimately basing a nuclear fleet in a region of its own nation which has a long history of ship-building and maintenance, and which confers neither strategic advantages or disadvantages over the South-Coast alternatives. (Except keeping them further away from the French, a facile aim in the modern world where the French are easily our masters in nuclear technology, and likely not a consideration when Faslane was chosen anyway.) On the other hand, a government legitimately basing a (generally conventional) fleet in a region of *another* nation, under treaty, for entirely strategic reasons. On the one hand, naval vessels from a nation's own navy, based in a nation's own naval base. On the other, naval vessels from a foreign navy based in a foreign base. I'm sure you get the point.

    In other news, I otherwise agree, I've also spent a lot of time with Russians and much to my exasperation and the occasional argument they very much view Ukraine as at the least within their sphere of influence and at the most "ours". The same goes for Georgia, Belarus, Lithuania and Latvia. On the other hand, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and East Germany do not seem to incite the same opinions, chiefly I think because they had only small or practically non-existent Russian-speaking populations, whereas the others have large or significant Russian minorities.

    Me, I tend to view the Slavic languages and Russian as so close together that it's a silly argument to make and that it would justify a Danish takeover of Norway, a Swedish takeover of Denmark, a united Scandinavian takeover of Iceland and, of course, a British takeover of Canada, the USA, Australia and New Zealand and a return to the good old days. None of which are justifiable. (Except the last. BBC > CBC and BBC > NBC. Trufax.) It would also justify German Anschluss with Austria and the German-speaking areas of Switzerland, and at that point I Godwin the argument. That doesn't make me popular :)