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Harry J. Kazianis writes at The National Interest that due to advances in big data and new detection methods modern attack subs may soon face the same problem as surface combatants around the world, where some areas are simply too dangerous to enter, thanks to pressing anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) (PDF) challenges:
"Since the Cold War submarines, particularly quiet American ones, have been considered largely immune to adversary A2/AD capabilities," says Bryan Clark, a former submariner and Navy strategist now with the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. "But the ability of submarines to hide through quieting alone will decrease as each successive decibel of noise reduction becomes more expensive and as new detection methods mature that rely on phenomena other than sounds emanating from a submarine. These techniques include lower frequency active sonar and non-acoustic methods that detect submarine wakes or (at short ranges) bounce laser or light-emitting diode (LED) light off a submarine hull. The physics behind most of these alternative techniques has been known for decades, but was not exploited because computer processors were too slow to run the detailed models needed to see small changes in the environment caused by a quiet submarine. Today, “big data” processing enables advanced navies to run sophisticated oceanographic models in real time to exploit these detection techniques. As they become more prevalent, they could make some coastal areas too hazardous for manned submarines."
"We need to think about a new strategy for undersea warfare," says Clark "Right now we tend to rely on submarines doing tactical operations on their own, in an environment where they can operate largely with impunity. All those things are going to change in the future. The threat is going to improve, opportunities to offload missions onto other vehicles are going to improve, and we can take advantage of that if we're going to again be the first mover into this new technology of undersea networks, unmanned vehicles and communication technologies."
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Monday February 23 2015, @01:53AM
I wouldn't be so sure we are not going back. Fancy first-strike delivery systems are prohibitively expensive on an ongoing basis and are surplus to MAD requirements. Nuclear capable nations can't afford to maintain the current footing as it is. In any case, if submarines can not remain undetected their usefulness as a component of the first-strike system has come to and end.
(Score: 4, Interesting) by Non Sequor on Monday February 23 2015, @03:32AM
From what I understand, first strike isn't really a strategic asset. During the cold war, weapon systems that required a lot of time to ready were deemed to only be useful in a first strike scenario. In at least one case (i.e. the UK's nuclear program), these kinds of systems were seen as undermining rhetoric about weapons being obtained for defensive purposes only.
Weapons which can be readied quickly, have a long range, or which can be deployed from subs are capable of delivering retaliatory strikes. They put the mutual in MAD. The first strike only type weapons don't have the attributes that make retaliatory strikes possible.
Write your congressman. Tell him he sucks.