BBC reports the co-pilot of the Germanwings flight that crashed in the Alps intentionally locked the pilot out of the cabin and initiated the flight's descent into the ground:
The co-pilot of the Germanwings flight that crashed in the French Alps, named as Andreas Lubitz, appeared to want to "destroy the plane", officials said.
Marseille prosecutor Brice Robin, citing information from the "black box" voice recorder, said the co-pilot was alone in the cockpit.
He intentionally started a descent while the pilot was locked out.
Mr Robin said there was "absolute silence in the cockpit" as the pilot fought to re-enter it.
Air traffic controllers made repeated attempts to contact the aircraft, but to no avail, he said.
The story seems SN-worthy because it is an object lesson in the consequences for our lives when we put complex machines and systems into the hands of others. In this case it was a trained pilot who killed a plane full of people who were powerless to stop him. Another example could be engineers who sabotage a dam and wipe out entire communities downstream. We mostly don't think about stuff like this because there is an invisible web of trust, sometimes called a "social contract," that leads people to get on a plane, or go to work, or take their kids to school without giving it a second thought. But when that social contract unravels, all bets are off...
(Score: 3, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 26 2015, @04:54PM
Because it's impossible to predict with 100% certainty what a person will do.
(Score: 1, Interesting) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 26 2015, @05:19PM
Yes, there are many reasons that, "it's impossible to predict with 100% certainty what a person will do."
Before I heard the current version of the story, including overt control actions, I was wondering if the co-pilot had a stroke or other medical problem (in the interval after the Captain left the cockpit).
(Score: 3, Informative) by kaszz on Thursday March 26 2015, @05:19PM
That's why no critical system should rely on a single person. Just like missile silos are organized. The
low-cost carrier Norwegian Air Shuttle will now require two people in cockpit at all times effective tomorrow.
So I would say, these things happens when you didn't do your probability and failure point analyze. Shit happens but some have more failures than they actually need.
(Score: 2) by kaszz on Thursday March 26 2015, @05:37PM
Low-cost carrier Norwegian Air Shuttle to require two people in cockpit at all times [straitstimes.com]
(Bug report: HTML tags are now removed in "Plain old text" mode!!)
(Score: 2) by kaszz on Thursday March 26 2015, @06:15PM
Easyjet follows suit:
Easyjet to change cockpit rules after Alps disaster [itv.com]
"@easyjet tells me it is changing its rules to require 2 people to be present on the Flight Deck at all times. Effective from tomorrow."
(Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Thursday March 26 2015, @05:42PM
And what happens if your two people in the cockpit at all times, in the course of random events, suddenly agree to a suicide pact? The same outcome, that's what. Why not put three people in there, or four, or 150? Why not insist that every passenger have a pilot's license so anyone aboard the plane can fly it to safety? You're not thinking safe enough!
(Score: 2) by kaszz on Thursday March 26 2015, @06:55PM
There is normally at least two crew members available to be in the cockpit so it won't cost much extra if any. And being two instead of one decreases the risk substantially. It's essentially the optimal risk/cost point.