The Virginia election commission, which is responsible for certifying whether machines are fit to be used in elections, has decertified the Advanced Voting Solutions WINVote and for many very good reasons. Amongst the many security flaws in this product are:
Worse still, this machine has been used in actual elections and its lack of any logging or record-keeping means that we'll never know if its weaknesses were used to manipulate the outcome of an election. As a proof of concept, security researchers successfully demonstrated accessing the machine and manipulating the recorded vote counts.
(Score: 2) by c0lo on Friday April 17 2015, @12:43PM
You lnow what a hash of the vote is? You take the serial of the ballot, concat the chosen option on the ballot and the timestamp, and apply a hash function [wikipedia.org]. You print that hash on a piece of paper (transparent plastics would be better) to act as a receipt which you hand to the voter (make it a QR code, if you like). The voter can ask the central system, based on the serial number of the ballot, to regenerate the hash on all the recorded info at any time: if any info was changed, there's no way the hash will be the same (if the hash is printed on on transparent plastic, the voter needs just to overlap it over an image on the screen for comparison).
But it's still a problem. Since you can use the very technology you proposed to address it, why not take the opportunity?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0