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posted by janrinok on Thursday June 04 2015, @11:53PM   Printer-friendly

THE NATIONAL SECURITY Agency knows Edward Snowden disclosed many of its innermost secrets when he revealed how aggressive its surveillance tactics are. What it doesn't know is just how much information the whistle-blower took with him when he left.

For all of its ability to track our telecommunications, the NSA seemingly has little clue exactly what documents, or even how many documents, Snowden gave to the media. Like most large organizations, the NSA had tools in place to track who accessed what data and when. But Snowden, a system administrator, apparently was able to cover his tracks by deleting or modifying the log files that tracked that access.

An Estonian company called Guardtime says it has a solution to that: using the same ideas that underpin the digital currency Bitcoin, the company says it can ensure no one can alter digital files, not even an organization's most senior executives or IT managers. The idea is to stop the next Snowden in his tracks by making it impossible to tamper with data, such as the NSA log files, in secret.


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  • (Score: 5, Insightful) by physicsmajor on Friday June 05 2015, @12:29AM

    by physicsmajor (1471) on Friday June 05 2015, @12:29AM (#192313)

    Sounds like a great idea. Until they realize that such a system would hold those senior execs & IT managers to the same standards as everyone else.

    What they really wants is everyone else's data, but the ability to ghost theirs at will.

    • (Score: 1) by rliegh on Friday June 05 2015, @01:25AM

      by rliegh (205) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:25AM (#192332)

      The first thing I thought of when I read the summary was the Watergate Tapes. The absolutely last thing authorities want is an unalterable digital trail which can be used against them.

      --
      I just tell 'em the truth and they think it's trolling!
      • (Score: 2) by bob_super on Friday June 05 2015, @01:27AM

        by bob_super (1357) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:27AM (#192333)

        quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

        And who reads the unfalsifiable above-top-secret log?

    • (Score: 3, Interesting) by davester666 on Friday June 05 2015, @07:48AM

      by davester666 (155) on Friday June 05 2015, @07:48AM (#192411)

      Did Snowden "tamper" with the data? As in, modify it in some way.

      Everything I have read indicates that he copied it.

      So, this would help in verifying that the information someone copies is legit.

      Excellent.

      • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Friday June 05 2015, @01:22PM

        by kaszz (4211) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:22PM (#192506) Journal

        He modified the logs of the accessed data it seems.
        Kind of "vi /var/log/messages"..

      • (Score: 2) by Snow on Friday June 05 2015, @02:51PM

        by Snow (1601) on Friday June 05 2015, @02:51PM (#192551) Journal

        No, I think the idea is that you take a copy of the log file, hash it, and then insert the hash into the blockchain. The integrity of the .log file can then be verified against the hash signature in the blockchain to confirm that it hasn't been altered. This would make it impossible to cover your tracks by altering .log files after the fact without it being detected.

        • (Score: 2) by Snow on Friday June 05 2015, @02:51PM

          by Snow (1601) on Friday June 05 2015, @02:51PM (#192553) Journal

          Ugh, just reread your comment... Sorry, I think I need more coffee.

  • (Score: 1) by Absolutely.Geek on Friday June 05 2015, @12:46AM

    by Absolutely.Geek (5328) on Friday June 05 2015, @12:46AM (#192319)

    Do they reall want the defense of pluasable deniability removed?
    NSA: "I don't know what you are talking about"
    Lawyer: "But you accessed the file on your computer, had it open for 25 minutes and then accessed other documentation related to the file. How can you claim that you don't don't know what I am talking about?"
    NSA: "Ummmm.......shit!"

    --
    Don't trust the police or the government - Shihad: My mind's sedate.
  • (Score: 3, Interesting) by stormwyrm on Friday June 05 2015, @12:59AM

    by stormwyrm (717) on Friday June 05 2015, @12:59AM (#192322) Journal
    If a malicious entity takes control of at least 51% [learncryptography.com] of the computing power of the Bitcoin network they could prevent transactions of their choosing from going through, and reverse transactions that they make. I suppose the analogue of this attack on Black Lantern would have the effect of allowing the attacker to cause a valid transaction recording an alteration in, say, a document access log to fail, an otherwise valid log entry recording that a sensitive document been accessed by, say, Edward Snowden, as being rejected. So then the log doesn't think that Snowden accessed the document even though he had. What incentive do the various people in the organisation running this auditing system have for running it properly? Bitcoin gives its independent miners an incentive by paying them bitcoins, but if someone in a high enough position in the organisation decides that certain embarrassing records documenting their malfeasance should not be made, then well, what's to stop them from taking control of the network in the same way?
    --
    Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate.
  • (Score: 2) by c0lo on Friday June 05 2015, @01:04AM

    by c0lo (156) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:04AM (#192324) Journal
    Now, that would be a nice feature for NSA log files if not even the log-deamon can modify them.
    But... if the log deamon can modify them, then the problem becomes "How can I impersonate/substitute a log daemon?" - maybe a bit harder for a sysadm, but I don't think its impossible.
    --
    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0
    • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @07:40PM

      by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @07:40PM (#192650)

      you realize how much bandwidth a bitlog system would waste, and consider this on a high demand, high reliability network like is being discussed. All you need to do to slow this down is get a few key systems spamming out log entries and the entire network would grind to a halt. And if it DIDN'T it would give you time to alter the logs before they were resubmitted to the network. It might not be 100 percent foolproof, but it certainly could be within the realm of acceptable odds for corporate/government espionage agencies.

      And that is assuming the malicious actor doesn't have either legitimate or illegitimate access to enough nodes to forge log entries, as mentioned elsewhere in this thread. Which could make it very easy to take out one's enemies by claiming the unbreakable (but broken) logfiling system irrefutably proved that a particular person had done illegal accesses, when an entirely different person had done so to get rid of them.

  • (Score: 5, Funny) by Ethanol-fueled on Friday June 05 2015, @01:04AM

    by Ethanol-fueled (2792) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:04AM (#192325) Homepage

    Snowden was able to do what he did because a system that was already in place at other locations was not implemented in the NSA's Hawaii location where Snowden pilfered the data.

    Of all the fucking places, Hawaii. Even scum like me know that Hawaii is a nexus for Asian (okay, Chinese) intelligence and their attempts to infiltrate their American counterparts through hot women wearing way too much red who ask too many questions and yet are good at lying in wait, plying dumb pedophiliac White men with alcohol and then luring those same suckers into bed with their tight little yellow bodies.

    All it takes is a few drinks and dips of the wick and even the most hardened (heh) and patriotic security personnel are biddy-bub blabbin' all kinds of little operational details for the Yellow menace in the red uniform to consider. Of all the fucking places in the world to neglect the security upgrade, the NSA neglected fucking Hawaii?!

    Jesus Christ, if Snowden was an inside job, it was because all of the NSA took a cue from Google and hired all-Chinese senior staff.

    • (Score: 2) by Gaaark on Friday June 05 2015, @01:48AM

      by Gaaark (41) Subscriber Badge on Friday June 05 2015, @01:48AM (#192337) Journal

      I am a fan, man... Being correct and outrageous all in one!

      The NSA fracked up, and probably not the best location to do it, and WHAM, YOU let the dogs out in that special way you have.

      Thumbs up... Keep posting: I'll keep reading! B-)

      --
      --- Please remind me if I haven't been civil to you: I'm channeling MDC. ---Gaaark 2.0 ---
    • (Score: 2) by c0lo on Friday June 05 2015, @01:49AM

      by c0lo (156) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:49AM (#192338) Journal

      Of all the fucking places in the world to neglect the security upgrade, the NSA neglected fucking Hawaii?!

      Oh, no. Of course they didn't negled to fuck Hawaii, they fucked it properly, even deeper and longer than other places.
      So properly that, post coitus, they were too exhausted to upgrade its security.
      (grin)

      --
      https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aoFiw2jMy-0
  • (Score: 2) by MichaelDavidCrawford on Friday June 05 2015, @01:27AM

    Tor Browser Bundle [torproject.org].

    It's not like my posts are anonymous nor private but I figure that my encrypted traffic will help protect those of others.

    Some sites don't work well with Tor, some don't work at all, any site that uses Cloudflare will present me with a captcha.

    --
    Yes I Have No Bananas. [gofundme.com]
    • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @01:57AM

      by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @01:57AM (#192340)

      Are you the AC who is always hating on gewg_?

  • (Score: 2) by Runaway1956 on Friday June 05 2015, @02:19AM

    by Runaway1956 (2926) Subscriber Badge on Friday June 05 2015, @02:19AM (#192343) Homepage Journal

    TFS describes how Snowden would have been identified AFTER THE FACT, and proceeds to suggest that all of the data that Snowden accessed would then be identified. But, it wouldn't have stopped him from accessing and copying data in the first place. And, I'm less sure than the authors that they would have identified all the data that he downloaded. Did Snowden not suggest that he used login credentials that were not his own? I would have to go search for that bit of information, but it seems like Snowden mostly used his own login credentials, but at other times used office identifying credentials, or shared credentials. If that is the case, the NSA still couldn't be certain which data he took.

    --
    Abortion is the number one killed of children in the United States.
    • (Score: 2) by FatPhil on Friday June 05 2015, @03:41PM

      by FatPhil (863) <{pc-soylent} {at} {asdf.fi}> on Friday June 05 2015, @03:41PM (#192569) Homepage
      Agree. You seem to be the only one reading it the same way as I do. If this technology were in place, and a whole bunch of other conditions, then Snowden wouldn't have been able to get away with it. Hmmm, but he didn't get away with it. So this technology made no difference.
      --
      Great minds discuss ideas; average minds discuss events; small minds discuss people; the smallest discuss themselves
  • (Score: 3, Informative) by SlimmPickens on Friday June 05 2015, @02:24AM

    by SlimmPickens (1056) on Friday June 05 2015, @02:24AM (#192344)

    Snowden, a system administrator, apparently was able to cover his tracks by deleting or modifying the log files that tracked that access.

    Glenn Greenwald's book says that Snowden left a trail of "digital breadcrumbs" so they would know what he took. He called them incompetent for not being able to follow it.

  • (Score: 2, Funny) by bandrami on Friday June 05 2015, @03:17AM

    by bandrami (5256) on Friday June 05 2015, @03:17AM (#192356)

    Which is -- if used properly -- able to keep someone like Snowden from doing what he did. If the NSA doesn't even eat its own dog food here I really doubt they'd use forward security for document transfers properly, either.

  • (Score: 2, Insightful) by trimtab on Friday June 05 2015, @04:35AM

    by trimtab (2194) on Friday June 05 2015, @04:35AM (#192371)

    Signing blocks of messages for validation as untampered is part of PGP from the early 90s.

    This is nothing, but PR for suckers.

    • (Score: 2) by kaszz on Friday June 05 2015, @01:30PM

      by kaszz (4211) on Friday June 05 2015, @01:30PM (#192511) Journal

      The catch is how do you sign the signature of the previous log without that signature also being compromised.

      • (Score: 2, Informative) by trimtab on Friday June 05 2015, @07:31PM

        by trimtab (2194) on Friday June 05 2015, @07:31PM (#192643)

        If you are using text like in PGP, you simply chain multiple new signatures as you add data to log and sign all the previous log data with later signatures that include the previous signatures. It could all be in text files with marks and signatures at whatever rate you are willing to use CPU to create the signatures.

  • (Score: 2, Insightful) by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @06:59AM

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @06:59AM (#192396)

    Stop the Next Snowden

    Because the people in power are so f*cking scared of democracy (rule of the people) that they will do anything to prevent the people from knowing what they are doing.

  • (Score: 0) by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @09:43AM

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday June 05 2015, @09:43AM (#192435)

    Doesn't stop someone taking records who doesn't care about being logged that such transactions have taken place. Might reduce the window of opportunity if anyone's actually monitoring and acting upon such logs realtime as opposed to logs merely being collected for an after-the-event analysis.

  • (Score: 2) by Gravis on Friday June 05 2015, @10:33AM

    by Gravis (4596) on Friday June 05 2015, @10:33AM (#192444)

    they reason the NSA doesn't know what Ed Snowden took is NOT because he tampered with access logs, it's because he made it look like he copied just about everything. so when your log says you copied an entire ocean, you dont know what glass of water he actually copied.