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It seems to me that the point in time at which I stopped enjoying using computers came right around the time that "UI" fell out of fashion to be replaced by "UX" - User Experience.

The problem seems to be that all the UX Designers fell the need to come up with something original and unique. The result is that all but a very few applications and websites, I regard as intolerable.

We all know about Firefox but fortunately we have Pale Moon. I have very few gripes about Pale Moon.

What really drives me round the bend are javascript scrollbars. It's not that they're implemented in javascript, it's that they never work right. Perhaps if someone gave away a readymade scrollbar implemented in JS that were used widely but no every single page on the internet has to roll its own scrollbar.

I found Linux Mint unusable until I figured out how to enable scrollbar arrowhead in BOTH Gnome 2 and Gnome 3. The response of The Self-Appointed Experts is that one should grab the thumb then drag it up and down but that does not work well when I'm editing source written by someone else, which source has very long files.

At least I do have my arrowheads back. Now if I could only convince my family and my high school friends to hang somewhere other than FaceBook.

I'd wipe my drive and use only Linux if I could find a text editor I like. And yeah I'm actually quite good at GNU Emacs and at one time I enjoyed it but came to prefer the GUI text editors on the Mac. Bluefish gets me most of the way there but it works poorly with projects that have lots of source files.

I'm working on an in-house app that is built out of multiple Free Software components. Some of them are quite large; I need to modify them. I'm not going to sell my project rather the results of its computations.

My Acer Aspire E 15 mostly works OK when it's plugged in but is reluctant to start up when it's not plugged in, also it has spontaneous shutdowns when it's not plugged in. A couple days ago I "refreshed" my PC, which Windows claimed would be a system reinstall that would delete my apps but save my settings. Well it wiped my settings too.

The problem was alleviated somewhat but did not go away.

If I run memtest86 or memtest86 I have no problems. This leads me to believe it's a problem with software, such as a corrupted system file or setting.

It's still under warranty if I can't diagnose it myself I'll call tech support. I just don't want to have to send it in if I don't absolutely have to because I'd want to run a full backup first, but I've torrented vast quantities of pr0n Open Source installation ISOs.

Norman King suggested I adjust my battery power options, that would rewrite the battery settings. That didn't help.

I found, and posted, this article in 2005. Today, the link is dead. Copy/pasted from where I originally posted it, on Mauisun.org

This article is pretty long, but well worth reading. I'll post it again, for those who weren't here last time I linked to it:

http://www.soul.org.nz/pages/resourc...ry_killing.htm

Students Organised to Uphold Life
A defence of the claim that foeticide and infanticide are morally on par.
[This article was made required course reading for the undergraduate paper "Social and Moral Philosophy" at the University of Waikato (New Zealand) in 1999]
Abortion as Arbitrary Killing
by Matthew Flannagan BSocSci, MSocSci(Hons), MTh
Ethical Advisor to SOUL New Zealand
Introduction
This paper argues that abortion is a form of arbitrary killing. The argument is divided into four sections. In section I., I argue that abortion is a form of discrimination, I will discuss the morality of such discrimination, arguing it is justified only if certain criteria are met. In section II. I will survey contemporary attempts to meet these criteria. I will argue that such attempts fail. Consequently I conclude in section III. that abortion is unjustified. In the final section, IV., I will respond to some objections that have been made against this type of argument.
I. Discrimination and Justification
A. The Contemprary Assumption

Contemporary attitudes towards abortion reveal a profound difference in the way we treat pre-natal and post-natal human life. This is evident in the conflicting approaches towards abortion (the termination of pre-natal human life) and infanticide (the termination of post-natal human life).

Imagine that in 1997, 15,000 children aged under 2 years, were killed by their parents. The killing was done indirectly; parents took their children to professionals called 'terminators,' who killed the children by dismembering them. The government took no action against this, in fact, it provided information on accessing 'termination services' and financial assistance for those unable to afford them.

Most people would find this scenario abhorrent. While sympathising with the pressure, financial stress, and sacrifice of parenting, even the added pressure of parenting alone, few New Zealanders endorse or condone as a solution. In New Zealand infanticide is illegal. The stigma of being a "baby killer" is not a dignified one. The thought of dismembering a baby in exchange for money strikes most as a sickening action. Those who engage in child abuse or who kill children are regarded with particular abhorrence.

While the 'imagined' scenario above is fictitious, an analogous situation occurs in contemporary New Zealand. In 1997, 15,000 abortions occurred, which entails 15,000 pre-natal humans were destroyed. This killing was done indirectly; women went to professionals called abortionists who killed the foetuses by dismembering them. The government took no action against this; in fact, it provided information on accessing abortion services and financial assistance for those unable to afford them.

It is noteworthy that we can stipulate similar motives in these two cases. In the case of infanticide parents might decide they do not want a child, they are not ready to be parents yet, they might find that the child has a disability, or that it is might be an economic burden upon them. They might find parenthood damages their career prospects. With infanticide, these reasons are not sufficient to justify killing an infant. Analogously however, these are precisely the reasons, often given, to justify terminating foetal life. Women can abort because they do not want a child, are not ready to be parents, because of foetal abnormalities, because the pregnancy is financially burdensome.

At the heart of the current analysis is a philosophical assumption about pre-natal life. Society treats pre-natal human life differently to the way it treats post-natal human beings such as infants. What would not justify killing an infant, is accepted as a ground for terminating pre-natal life. Consequently, what is unacceptable when applied to infants is held up as acceptable when applied to the unborn. The unborn and newborn are treated differently. Treating two things differently is to discriminate.

Discrimination between pre-natal and post-natal life is common in many western societies. For example, the United States landmark Supreme Court decision, Roe v Wade (1973) essentially made it a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion on demand. Roe divided a woman's pregnancy into three semesters. In the first two trimesters a woman has a right to procure an abortion, the state being barred from restricting abortion in this period for any reason.[1] In the final semester, the state has a right, and not an obligation, to restrict abortions to only those cases where a woman's health is endangered.

A later ruling, Doe v Bolton (1973) stated that the term 'health' must be defined broadly to include such things as emotional well being and family well being. The result is that the majority of States allow abortion throughout the entire nine months of pregnancy and that any reason a person puts forward to have one, can be subsumed under the title 'health.'[2]

In contrast to this, the US Supreme Court has not ruled that infanticide is a constitutionally protected right. Few people think women have an unrestricted right to terminate a newborn infant on demand. Committing infanticide renders a woman liable for criminal prosecution.

An illustration of this contrast can be seen by to recent incidents in the US. In October '98, President Clinton had vetoed a proposal to ban the abortion procedure popularly dubbed 'partial birth.' This procedure is carried out during the last trimester of pregnancy right up until birth. It involves inverting the foetus in utero and then delivering its entire body accept the head. The termination is then carried out with the foetus' head in the birth canal. The base of the skull is pierced and the brain tissue is removed. The head consequently collapses and the foetus is delivered dead. In mid September of this year, the US Senate voted 64-36 in favour of overturning Clinton's veto. The Senate failed to reach the two-third majority needed to overturn such a veto by 3 votes.

Shortly after, a court in New Jersey sentenced a 20-year-old woman to 15 years incarceration for killing her newborn child. Melissa Drexler had gone to the bathroom during her senior prom and given birth. She confessed that the baby had been born alive in a toilet bowl, she had strangled the baby, cut the umbilical cord on a sanitary napkin disposal bin and tossed the infant into a restroom trash can. She then returned to the dance floor of her prom. Maintenance workers who were called to clean up blood on the restroom floor discovered the baby's body. Drexler pleaded guilty to the charge of aggravated manslaughter.

These two incidents illustrate the assumption mentioned earlier. While there is reluctance to outlaw abortion, even in the final months of pregnancy, killing a newborn is condemned and punishable by incarceration.

Earlier this year, the state of Western Australia has adopted policies similar to Roe. The prosecution of two abortionists led to a campaign to liberalise the State's abortion law. The two doctors faced up to 14 years in prison for performing an illegal abortion. The new abortion laws made abortion permissible for any reason up until 20 weeks gestation. After 20 weeks abortion is allowed on health grounds. Licensed doctors whose practice does not conform to this law are fined up to $50,000. Only unlicensed doctors can face up to 15 years.[3]

I doubt many campaigners in Australia would adopt a similar attitude towards infanticide. The prosecution of 'new-born terminators' would not lead one to campaign for more liberal infanticide laws. Western Australians do not typically think that only a fine should punish baby termination, or that only those who are not licensed to chop up infants should face incarceration. I doubt they think it is permissible to kill one's children provided good counselling is available. The treatment of Lindy Chamberlain is a classic example.

While other western nations have less liberal laws, the practice often does not differ. In New Zealand, abortion is illegal except for certain therapeutic reasons; such as allowing abortion if the mother's mental health is severely endangered by the pregnancy. In practice these laws are not enforced and a de-facto abortion on demand policy exists. In addition to this New Zealand law allows abortion to be performed at any stage of the pregnancy on limited grounds such as health and foetal deformity.

I venture to suggest these are not isolated examples. In most western countries a different moral and legal attitude is adopted towards abortion and infanticide. Further in those countries where the law condemns abortion, what is tolerated in practice often reflects such a distinction. While abortion is in principle legally restricted, in practice abortion exists on request. Consequently people can routinely terminate prenatal life for reasons which we would not tolerate the termination of the life of an infant.

B. Natalism
We have established that society treats pre-natal and post-natal life very differently adopting radically differing social, moral and legal stances towards them. Pre-natal beings are given an inferior status and are treated of less worth than post-natal beings. Social attitudes are adopted towards the foetus that would not be adopted towards the very same being after birth.

Some commentators have labelled the aforementioned discrimination 'natalism.'[4] In many non-moral respects, natalism parallels racism. Just as racism signifies discrimination on the basis of race, 'natalism' signifies discrimination on the basis of one's post or pre-natal position. Just as racists advocate social policies, which treat one race as having superior worth and being entitled to greater legal rights, natalists make a similar assumption about post-natal life, and grant post-natal life a superior legal standing to pre-natal beings.

The question arises as to whether natalism and racism are analogous to each other morally i.e. whether natalism is morally equivalent to racism. It is to this question I will now turn.

1. Is this Discrimination Justified?One obvious way of arguing that natalism is morally questionable is to point out that it is a form of discrimination. However, discrimination in itself is not problematic. Many forms of discrimination are justifiable and necessary. An obvious example is that our justice system discriminates between the innocent and guilty, it allows one to have freedom and incarcerates the other. In this situation we have good reasons for discriminating. Similarly at university we discriminate by awarding passes and fails. Those who achieve a certain level of academic excellence receive passing grades. Those who do not are failed.

However, there are other many contexts in which discrimination is clearly problematic. Racism and sexism are obvious paradigms. If a society incarcerated someone simply because they were Maori, or a woman, this would constitute an injustice.

The difference between these two types of discrimination is that in the former cases we have a good reason for discriminating. The criminal has a property of moral guilt; this is correlated with a property of dessert. We think the criminal's status as guilty merits some punishment. The criminal is different from the innocent in a way that warrants unequal treatment. With racial discrimination this factor is absent. While Maori and Pakeha and Women and Men do differ in many respects the differences in this context[5] do not provide good reasons for discrimination. In fact such differences seem arbitrary.

Applying this to the abortion issue contemporary discrimination is acceptable only if we have good reason for it. Without sufficient justification it is arbitrary to treat foetuses and infants differently. In fact, such a practice is morally akin to racism. In order for contemporary practices to be just, there must be a reason grounding our different attitudes towards pre-natal and post-natal life.

(A) What Constitutes Good Reason?
A couple of preliminary points are needed to clarify this. Firstly, this reason must constitute some difference between pre-natal and post-natal human beings. Obviously, if the killing of a foetus differs in no respect from infanticide or other forms of homicide it is morally on par with these practices. Then abortion is straightforward homicide and our current practice of abortion on demand is morally problematic.

Secondly, a mere difference is not enough. Consider genocide, the leader of a nation decides that she will not protect the rights of people who have dark skin. Consequently the leader decriminalises killing of dark skinned people. This is clearly a case of unjustified discrimination, yet there is clearly a difference between the people discriminated against. One group does not have dark skin, the other does. This example demonstrates that a mere difference between two classes or entities is not sufficient to provide reason for discrimination. Instead the difference must be one of a morally relevant kind.

In the context of abortion, a morally relevant difference is a difference that justifies granting or withholding a basic right, such as life. There must be some property possessed by post-natal humans which foetuses lack. This property must justify or ground rights for one and exclude it from the other.

In technical terms, a morally relevant difference translates into necessary and sufficient conditions for a right to life. The difference constitutes a sufficient condition because the fact that post-natal human beings display this property is what leads us to protect them. Similarly, it must be a necessary condition because the fact that foetuses lack this property justifies us destroying them.

For current natalism to be justified then it must be the case that there exists a property (or properties) X such that:

        (i) X is a set ofnecessary and sufficient conditions for having rights,

        (ii) Pre-natal human beings lack X,

        (iii) Post-natal human beings have X.

2. Further ClarificationsA further point often missed is that the proponent of abortion must be aware of X, they must rationally believe that X exits. Consider; I fire an employee because they are Polynesian and I hate Polynesians. In this context I have performed a racist act. Imagine, however, unbeknown to me that in fact there were justifiable grounds for dismissing this employee. The employee was secretly negligent, in a way that no one was aware of. Does it follow that I am exonerated from being a racist? It seems not.

Although there were grounds for dismissal these are not the grounds I base my decision upon. I performed the action because I dislike Polynesians. It is why I perform the action that matters in attaching blame or praise. Consequently, if there are grounds for a discriminating practice this does not necessarily justify a practitioner's engagement in it. What is important is what grounds the practitioner acts upon. If they have no good reason for the action, or are ignorant of such a reason, then they are engaged in a morally problematic practice.

Translating this into the immediate context. Current discrimination between post- and pre-natal life is only justified if proponents of abortion actually have a reason for their discrimination. They must then be aware of X.

Supporters of natalism must also be able to provide an account of their reasons for discriminating. Consider this, I shoot a child, I go to trial, all the evidence suggests I did perform this act. I give no reason as to why I performed this act. I just admit that I did it, I also assure the court I have a good reason for doing so. When asked under cross-examination what my reasons are I am unable to tell you. However, I can provide various character witnesses that I am a good person. In such a scenario I doubt that a court would acquit me.

The need to provide an adequate account is essential to prevent widespread injustice. Imagine the scenario where people could discriminate between a class of beings and not offer any reason for so doing. In this context racism, sexism and various other forms of injustice would go unchecked. Every time a prospective employer fired a minority he could say "I have a good reason for doing this, but I just don't know what it is."

Applying these factors to the immediate context:

        1) Current abortion policies are a form of a discriminatory practice labelled 'natalism.'

        2) As a discriminatory practice, natalism is justified only if there exists a property (or properties) X such that:

                (i) X is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for having a right to life,
                (ii) Pre-natal human beings lack X,
                (iii) Post-natal human beings have X,
                (iii) The practitioner is aware of X's existence,
                (iv) The practitioner can give us an adequate account of X.

I. Alleged Reasons for Discrimination

In this section I will examine many accounts of X. Many people have offered criteria that attempt to account for the crucial difference between post- and pre-natal life. I will classify these accounts into two types: 'popular' and 'sophisticated.' The former are those which dominate in popular discourse about abortion in the community. The latter are more sophisticated, finding a greater following in academia. In my view the latter are more plausible. Nevertheless I will argue that all these criteria fail.

A. Popular Accounts

1. Size
An example of this account is found in a report about sex education in Danish Schools.

        …This was done quite emotively, and it was obvious the students were relieved abortions were no longer illegal. A small stone model of a 12 week old foetus was passed around the class to show them the size and immaturity of the foetus. Inge finished the topic by telling students a 12 weeks foetus was transparent and weighed no more than one A4 piece of paper.[6]

The implication here, is that killing a foetus is acceptable because it weights less than an A4 sheet of paper. Foetuses unlike infants weigh less than an A4 sheet of paper, the reason we can kill a foetus and not kill an infant, is because the former weighs this much and the latter is much heavier.

According to this view, X is weight. For several reasons this is patently absurd. Firstly, it is purely arbitrary to put a particular weight as a necessary condition for a basic human right. Why not the weight of an A5 sheet of paper or an A3 sheet. Why not 3 sheets? What exactly is the significance of the weight of A4 paper that is necessary or sufficient for a being to possess rights?

Secondly, this has the absurd implication that astronauts have no rights. In outer space, people are weightless, therefore they weigh less than an A4 sheet of paper. If I take my victim up in the space shuttle she ceases to have a right to life. Consequently, astronauts can be killed on demand. Similarly, if I slaughter a group of people on a tiny asteroid, then I have performed no injustice.

However perhaps something deeper is meant here, the basic idea is that a foetus is significantly smaller than an infant is. Because of this we are justified in treating them differently. It is size that constitutes the necessary condition and sufficient conditions. This position is problematic in several respects.

(A) Not Unique to Infants
Firstly, it's not clear that foetus' lack this property while infants do not. Some foetuses are larger than some infants. Compare, a premature baby born at 22 weeks to a 30-week foetus, the foetus will be the larger of the two. If size disqualifies the foetus from having a right to life then there is no reason why we cannot kill premature infants.

Late trimester abortions are also problematic on these grounds. The radical size difference between foetus and infants proponent only holds in early stages of pregnancy. A foetus in the last trimester of pregnancy is not significantly smaller or lighter than a newborn infant.

In addition, the size of an infant at birth can vary. Some infants are born very small, while some late term foetuses can be quite large. Consequently, this condition, if correct, would only justify abortion in the earlier trimesters. Foetuses in the later trimesters would have the same rights to life as an infant by virtue of being roughly the same size.

However, abortion, as it is practised in many western countries, is not restricted to the earlier trimesters. In the United States many late trimester abortions occur every year.[7]

The proponent of this argument does not justify the status quo. In fact, if we were to accept this argument it would call for more restrictive laws and practices than currently exist. It would have to be accepted that late trimester abortions are no different, morally, from infanticide, and violate a fundamental right to life. Consequently, the current practice is akin to racist killings.[8]

(B) Size not a Sufficient Condition
Size is not a sufficient condition for the right to life. To suggest this is the case leads to absurd consequences. Many rocks, trees logs etc. weigh the same as some infants but this does not mean that rocks have a right to life.

(B) Size not a Necessary Condition
It is also questionable that a certain size is a necessary condition. Consider the following case. We come into contact with an alien race, this race is vastly superior to us in terms of rationality, self consciousness and awareness, they speak a language, can feel pain, have projects and goals just like we do. However, there is one major difference between then and us they are only 4 inches in height. Does it follow that this race has no right to life and we could kill them? Or imagine the following scenario, a mad scientist invents a shrinking machine and decides to test it out on you. He takes the machine and zaps you, shrinking you to the size of a few inches in height. Does it follow that you now lack any right to life and that killing you is not problematic?

Further, many cases in our history and tradition suggest that size is not a necessary condition of rights. Consider for example disembodied persons such as, souls, angel's, God. These traditionally are understood as beings that occupy no physical space and so consequently have no size or weight, yet they clearly have rights. Suppose that a disembodied intelligence is mortal and can be killed. Does the fact that it has no size mean we have no moral obligations to it?

(D) Arbitrariness
Size also seems arbitrary in the same way race is. The fact that a person is black or white does not make any moral difference. This feature doesn't carry any evaluative elements or components with it. Similarly with size, the question can always be asked why does size matter? What is it about size that grounds a right to life? There is no answer. Granting the right to life only to those above a certain size is arbitrary.

There is also a sinister side to this argument, stripped down it displays a 'might is right attitude.' It implies it is conceptually true that the big can oppress the smaller, the strong the weak, purely because they are bigger or stronger. What guarantees one's moral worth and standing is how big they are, the small are disqualified.

2. Human Appearance
Many people seem to make much about the appearance of foetuses; they do not look human. This can be seen in the same "Danish Sex Education" discussion cited above. Bonnie Steinbock also mentions this idea.

        The fetus [sic] begins to look recognisably human between 12-16 weeks gestation age (g.a.). Its eyes are obvious, though it does not yet have eyelids. It still has ear slits rather then ears. Its hands, still encased in an enveloping membrane, have well-demarcated fingers and thumbs. It may not look like a baby, but it is clearly a human fetus. By contrast, it is difficult to distinguish a human fetus at 8 weeks g.a. from a cat or pig fetus of the comparable gestational age.[9]

This idea is seen in popular ethical discourse. People are given a picture of an early foetus and told it is not a human, so abortion is acceptable because it looks like a fish or a blob.

(A) Not Unique to Infants
An immediate problem, which Steinbock's article suggests, is that only during the early stages of pregnancy do foetuses look non-human. Premature infants further the problems with this position. Jane English states:

        An early horror story from New York about nurses who were expected to alternate between caring for six-week premature infants and disposing of viable 24 week aborted foetuses [sic] is just that - a horror story. These beings are so much alike that no one can be asked to draw a distinction and treat them so very differently.[10]

In fact a foetus has a human appearance long before 24 weeks. In contrast, the following is taken from a submission put before the US Supreme Court which was signed by over 200 physicians.

        By the end of the seventh week we see a well proportioned small scale baby. In its seventh week, it bears the familiar external features and all the internal organs of the adult. … After the eight week no further primordial will form; everything is already present that will be found in the full term baby … [F]rom this point until adulthood when full growth is achieved somewhere between 25 and 27 years, the changes in the body will be mainly in dimension and in gradual refinement of the working parts.[11]

The foetus takes on a human appearance relatively early in the pregnancy. It is noteworthy that significant proportions of abortions are performed after this point.[12] As a defence of current practice this argument is weak indeed.

(B) Not Sufficient
The appearance of humanness is insufficient condition to ground the right to life. Consider a mannequin or a wax figure. These appear human they can, in fact, be made to look almost identical to any existing human being. Yet it is ridiculous to suggest that mannequins or wax figure have a right to life.

(C) Not Necessary
Appearance is not a necessary condition for the right to life either. Consider such eccentricities as the elephant man or the bearded lady. These creatures actually look more like primates than human beings but it doesn't follow that killing them is permissible.[13]

Similarly, people through various deformities can have their appearance marred significantly. Suppose you were involved in an accident. You were severely burned all over your body. The accident resulted in you needing multiple amputations. However you survive the accident, due to medical technology you are able to retain normal function by use of a specially designed robotic machine which your deformed body is hooked up to. In such a situation you would not look like a normal functioning human. But it does not follow that you have no right to life.

More fanciful counter examples can be constructed. Imagine we come into contact with an intergalactic race of alpha centurions. This race has technology, culture, and civilisation vastly superior to our own. Would the fact that these creatures differ from us in their appearance mean that these creatures have no right to life? That we could wipe them out and plunder their society for our own convenience?

(D) Humanity does not have a Static Form
A further problem with this line of thought is that it assumes humanity possesses a static form.[14] The claim that foetuses do not look human implies there is some form or standard of human appearance that can measure them.

The problem is that no such form exists. Throughout their life span, human beings possess a whole array of different forms and appearances. For example a newborn baby looks different from an infant. An infant looks different from a toddler; a toddler looks different from a child or teenager and so forth. The point drawn from this is that humanity has a dynamic form. What constitutes a normal human appearance depends on the age and maturity of the being in question. A two-year-old infant looks human because it approximates to the way humans look at that age and stage of human development. Similarly a teenager looks human because he has the normal appearance of an adolescent homo-sapien.

Once realised, it is problematic to argue that a foetus does not look human. To succeed at this one would have to assert that the foetus does not look the way a human being typically does when it is at the pre-natal stage of development. This is clearly nonsensical.

What the objector means is that the foetus does not look like a born human. It does not look like an infant or a baby. But why is post-natal appearance the standard by which we judge normal human appearance? The underlying assumption appears to be that normal human beings are post-natal. One suspects some questions are being begged here.

(E) Appearance not Usually a Ground for Discrimination
Its also noteworthy that appearance is normally a very poor ground to discriminate on. In fact, paradigms of arbitrariness such as racism or sexism seem to be rooted manifestations of such thinking. People discriminate against other races because they look different. They are considered less than human because they do not look like ''normal" white people. Similarly women look different, their physiological appearance is different, and consequently they are inferior.

3. Wantedness
Some people argue that what makes infanticide wrong are the attitudes of others towards the infant. Many parents, for example, do not mourn or grieve or at the death of a foetus the way they do for an infant or small child.[15] This suggests that people value and desire the existence of infants more than they do foetuses. In essence infants are more wanted.[16]

(A) Not Unique to Infants
An obvious problem is that being unwanted is not always unique to foetuses. Some children are unwanted after they are born. Some parents disown and reject their children, abandoning them to the streets or selling them into prostitution. Consequently, it is problematic to claim that 'wantedness' constitutes an important difference between infants and foetuses.

(B) Not Sufficient
Further, wantedness is not a sufficient condition for the right to life. Think of a material objects such as a toy or a car. People can intensely want these objects. However, it is a wild stretch of the imagination to think that such objects thereby attain a right to life.

Even if the object in question was a living entity, wanting it is insufficient for it to have a right to life. One might own or love a plant or a pet but it doesn't follow that plants have a right to life.

(C) Not Necessary
Wantedness cannot be a necessary condition for the right to life. If it were, then any being that is unwanted will have no right to life. If we return to the example of infanticide, can a child be killed after it is born because its mother decides she doesn't want it? What if the child is an orphan and no one wishes to adopt it? Does it follow that it has no right to live? Consider societies such as Ancient Sparta, which did not accept children who were born with disabilities. Also consider, those societies where the parents wanted the first-born child to be male. Does it follow that children with disabilities or female babies have no rights to life?

(D) Social Conventions
A cousin of the wantedness position is one that sees rights as being conferred upon individuals by society.[17] A being does not have a right to life unless society conventions recognise it as having one. For example, it is argued that birth is the moment a being gains a right to life because this is when society recognises an individual coming into existence. This is when we grant a birth certificate and why we celebrate birthdays and not conception days, or quickening days.

However, there is an inherent danger here in suggesting that a person's right to life depends upon whether other people in society value him. Consider a society like Nazi Germany that decides that Jewish people are vermin. Or consider those societies like Ancient Sparta who did not want children with disabilities. Would we grant that it was morally permissible for these societies to kill those they considered unwanted?

A missionary I spoke to recounted that in a Hindu society he visited, cows were valued more by society than women.[18] Surely it is not the case that women do not actually have moral rights in such a society?

B. Sophisticated Responses
The popular arguments for X fair badly upon examination. However, in philosophical literature more sophisticated and plausible responses are available. While acknowledging that such things as appearance, size or utility are irrelevant ways of demarcating right bearers, other hypotheses are put forward.

1. Pain and Sentience
One such position is sentience. A being is sentient when it is capable of experiencing sensations such as pain. Peter Singer gives the rationale for this position:

        The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. It would be nonsense to say that was not in the interest of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing we could do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare. A mouse on the other hand, does have an interest in not being kicked along the road because it will suffer if it is.[19]

The underlying idea is that if a being cannot feel pain, it cannot be harmed. It has no capacity to enjoy and no interests consequently we do not harm it by depriving it of something. Given this, we cannot commit a wrong against it; sentience is essential to possessing rights.

(A) Does a Foetus Lack Sentience?
Firstly, it is unclear that foetuses lack sentience. An obvious example of this is a premature infant. A child born at 32 weeks gestation, in terms of its psychological development, is less advanced than a foetus in the 39th week of gestation. Given that infants can be prematurely born as early as 21 weeks it seems that from at least the second trimester onwards, foetuses and infants can be the same in terms of sentience.

Further, there is evidence of early development of sentience in foetuses, much earlier than 21 weeks. There is some evidence to suggest the foetus can feel pain fairly early in the pregnancy. Certain physiological structures are essential for pain sensations. These are pain receptive neural cells, neural pathways, and the thalamus. These structures begin developing in the unborn child at 8 weeks and are established by around 12 weeks. Consequently, it is certain the unborn can feel pain at least as early as 13 weeks. However, seeing the requisite structures for pain are at least partially laid down during the 8-13 week period it is probable threat the foetus can feel pain during this period as well.[20]

One objection to this argument is that the cerebral cortex is not fully developed and so the foetus lacks the requisite higher physiological conditions for pain.[21] However, Dr Vincent Collins, Professor of Anaesthesiology at North-Western University and the University of Illinois points out:

        The presence of a functioning cortex is not necessary to pain sensation. Even complete removal of the cortex does not eliminate the sensation of pain; no portion of the cortex if artificially stimulated results in pain sensation. … Neither the presence of the cortex nor transmission of pain impulses to the cortex are essential to pain sensation.[22]

In fact, as John Noonan points out, that lack of a fully developed cortex may actually increase pain intensity.[23]

The thesis that foetuses can feel pain early in the second trimester is collaborated by many medical authorities. There is a well-documented letter for example to Ronald Reagan, which is signed by over twenty-five experts in the field of pain, obstetrics, and gynaecology. The letter backed Reagan's statements that foetuses are sentient. Citing various studies, they stated that no finding of modern foeteology invalidates the conclusion that the foetus can feel pain by the close of the first trimester.[24]

According to the 1997 New Zealand Abortion Supervisory Committee Report, 10% of abortions performed in 1996 were performed after 12 weeks. This means that around 1,480 abortions are performed annually after the foetus can feel pain.

Similarly 59% of abortions were performed at between 10-12 weeks gestation in the same year. This means that around 8,779 abortions are performed annually at a time when it is probable that the unborn can feel pain. It is arguable, that the majority of abortions kill sentient beings.

(B) Sentience not Suffucient for a Right to Life
Sentience is obviously not sufficient to ground a right to life. Consider animals, such as deer or pigs, these are sentient beings, they are in some contexts more sentient than human beings. Animals such as these are farmed, killed eaten, used as clothing; however, they do not have a right to life. One is not prosecuted for murder for hunting deer.

(B) Sentience not Necessaryfor a Right to Life
Sentience is also not necessary for a right to life. Consider a person who has been knocked unconscious or is temporarily comatose. We do not think it permissible to kill such people.

One attempt to circumvent this counter example is to draw attention to the fact that a comatose patient is sentient at some point in their life. While he or she can lack sentience at the time of the killing, what grounds one's right to life is the fact that they posses sentience at some other point in time.

This response is inadequate. The counter example shows that one need not be sentient in the present for a right to life. Consequently, to hold this position, the proponent must require the entity in question be sentient in either the future or the past. If what is necessary is that one become sentient in the future, then the application to abortion is dubious; A foetus typically will be sentient in the future if left to its normal development. Consequently, foetuses cannot be disqualified from having a right to life.[25]

What needs to be asserted then is that a being was sentient at some point in the past. However this claim is subject to a disconfirming thought experiment.

Imagine two children Tom and Bob, both are born in a coma. Within an hour of birth, Bob wakes up for a few minutes, but falls back into the coma. Medical evidence suggests conclusively that they both will wake up in two days. Does it make sense in this situation to say that Bob has a right to life whereas Tom does not? If a doctor treated Tom as if he had no rights,[26] this would be seen as legitimate, yet if Bob were treated the same way the doctor would be condemned. When this scenario is examined, Tom and Bob do not seem sufficiently different to justify treating one as a full being with rights and the other not.[27]

Secondly, the idea that being sentient in the past is a necessary condition for a right to life goes against the very spirit of the sentience criteria. As noted above the reason proponents of this position argue that a non-sentient being cannot be harmed.

The problem is that a being who was sentient in the past and no longer is, cannot be harmed either. Consider someone who is permanently and irreversibly comatose, such a being cannot be harmed in the relevant sense yet this being was sentient in the past. If one makes sentience in the past the criterion for rights that person divorces their position from the very notions that motivate it and give it plausibility.

2. Viability
Viability refers to the time when an unborn child can live independently of the mother, outside the mother's womb. At present this is around 20-23 gestation. Prior to this, the foetus is completely dependent on its mother. Because of this dependency, it is argued the foetus does not have moral status that would confer on it a right to life. An example of such argumentation comes from Susan Sherwin.

        Arguments that focus on the similarities between infants and fetus's, however generally fail to acknowledge that a fetus inhabits a women's body and is wholly dependent upon her unique contribution it its maintenance, whereas a new born is physically independent though still in need of a lot of care. …[28]

(A) Initial Problems with Viability
Several features are worth noting here. Firstly, viability depends on the technology available at the time. Advancing technology is increasingly pushing back the age of viability. In 1973, for example, viability was between 24-28 weeks. Now foetuses can be viable from 20 weeks. Further research with animals show that it is possible with advanced incubation techniques to make the foetus viable at any time. This latter scenario would make all foetuses technically viable.

What this means is that whether or not one has any rights depends on how advanced a civilisation one lives in. Children conceived in richer economically and technologically advanced societies, such as here in the West, will have rights. Children at the same level of development in poorer eastern countries will have no rights and have the moral status of animals.

It also implies that two children exactly the same in physiology, development and age will have different moral status depending on the year they are conceived in. What now is a sub-human animal with no rights will in 10 or so years become a human being with rights, despite the fact that nothing will have changed in the nature of the creature in question. Further, children of richer parents, who can afford better medical care and more sophisticated hospitals, will have the moral status of a human being whereas children of poor parents will not.

Furthermore viability differs for various racial groups and even between the sexes. Evidence suggests Negro children tend to be viable before Caucasians. Statistically female babies born prematurely, have a much higher chance of survival than males at the same stage of development. This is due in part to the fact that the lungs of female foetuses develop earlier, and their hearts tend to be stronger.[29] According to the viability position, it follows that two foetuses of the same age, but differing sex or race, may differ in which rights each possesses. The white or male child can be justifiably treated as an animal. This would also suggest that it is acceptable at certain stages in the pregnancy for white women to have abortions when it is not acceptable for black women to.

(B) Dependance not Ended at Birth
Another objection to the viability criteria is that dependence is not ended by viability. Newborn children can not exist with out the constant care and sacrifice of others. Children, after birth, need someone to feed them, clothe, educate, and love them or they will die, as surely as a foetus will, independent of its mother.

In fact there is a sense in which newborn infants require more sacrifice and effort on the part of the mother than pregnancy does. Think for example of the constant getting up in the middle of the night, the financial burden. The constant crying out for attention, breast-feeding problems, post-natal depression, the whole nappies and toilet training saga. If the ability to exist independently of the mother is what guarantees rights, then the killing of newborn infants is also justifiable. Women have the right not only to kill their children before birth, but after birth as well.

An associate of mine recently gave birth to a boy. For the sake of this essay we will call her Anne and the child William. Anne had a fairly normal pregnancy with no complications. However, once William was born she came down with severe post-natal depression. Further, William turned out to be more difficult than most, it was almost impossible to get him into a routine, he constantly kept Anne and her husband up so that they got little sleep for several months. They couldn't take the child out because of this and baby sitters that could handle the child were difficult to come by. The stress caused by rearing a newborn child can be severe. Anne is typical of a case where the pregnancy was the easy part and the dependence caused after birth was far more stressful on the parents.

Some suggest the distinction is that after birth other options are available. The women can adopt or hand the care on to someone else. Before viability, however, this is not the case. Hence, while infanticide is wrong, abortion, prior to viability is not.

The problem with this argument is that it makes ones right to life depend on whether we are wanted by others. Suppose the mother tries to adopt her child out but no one takes it, can she then be allowed to kill her child? Suppose society is racist and refuses to adopt black children? Does it follow that white children, though dependent on their mother, have rights while black ones do not? Suppose society is sexist, or people only wish to adopt babies with blond hair and blue eyes? Once this move is made we come back to the wantedness position.

3. Criteria of Personhood
Some argue that in order to have rights a being must be a 'person,' they must display something like the following characteristics:

        1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain;
        2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems);
        3) Self motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control);
        4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics;
        5) The presence of self-concepts, self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both; [30]

This list comes from Mary Anne Warren. Philosophers such as Michael Tooley and Joseph Fletcher have offered similar lists.

Its important to note that proponents of this position see personhood as a necessary and sufficient criterion for rights in general, not just the right to life. Joel Feinberg, for example, argues that these features are essential to the ability to act as an agent and assume responsibilities, to have values and interests. These features are what confers upon someone membership of the moral community, and consequently a bearer of rights. [31]

(A) Personhood not Suffucient for a Right to Life
I venture to suggest that 'personhood' in the above sense is not a sufficient condition for the right to life. Consider the concept of God, it would be absurd to say that God has a right to life. Yet he clearly is a 'person' in orthodox theism. Imagine a race of highly intelligent beings that have the property of immortality. Such beings will be 'persons' but they do not have a right to life. Such a right would not be applicable to them.

(B) Personhood not Necessary for a Right to Life
There are also problems if 'personhood' is construed as necessary for the right to life. Doing so excludes many groups from the right to life that we think the right should apply to.

While it is true that foetuses do not display most of Ms Warren's criteria, neither do infants. New-born children and children aged up to about age 18 months typically do not display most of the criteria. An infant becomes self-conscious at age 18 months, typically infants cannot speak a language until around age 2-3yrs, and neither can they reason. Further, these capacities develop slowly even around age 2yrs a child's rational and linguistic capacity is limited. Consequently, if 'personhood' is necessary for a right to life, infanticide is also permissible.

Further things follow from this position. For example, newborn cows actually display features to a greater extent than infants.[32] As noted, this position is put forward as necessary for possessing any basic rights. Consequently, this position entails that a cow has a greater moral standing than a child. If this is so then such actions as cannibalism are justified. If we can eat cows and cows have the same moral standing as children, then there can be nothing problematic about eating children. If one thinks we should legalise abortion, then we should also legalise Kentucky Fried Baby Outlets.

Plenty of other things follow, for example we use cows as work animals to plow fields, and we can sell them. As children are morally on par with cows then there is nothing wrong with child slavery. We could sell children in pet stores, shoot them when they break a leg or require expensive medical treatment. Stray children can be killed or left to starve to death.

A similar problem arises in regard to people with severe mental impairments. Peter Singer has pointed out that some such people will never reach the intelligence level of a dog. An intelligent pig will, in terms of the above criteria, excel over some mentally impaired humans. Consequently, this position implies that the severely mentally impaired have no rights, they are morally less worthy of protection than cows or pigs so we can treat them as animals.

III. Conclusions

I will now bring section I. and II. together, in section I. I sketched the following argument.

        1) Current abortion policies are a form of a discriminatory practice labelled 'natalism.'

        2) As a discriminatory practice, natalism is justified only if at there exists a property (or properties) X such that:

                (i) X is a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for having a right to life,
                (iii) Pre-natal human beings lack X,
                (iv) Post-natal human beings have X,
                (iii) The practitioner is aware of X's existence,
                (iv) The practitioner can give us an adequate account of X.

The preceding survey of contemporary theories suggest that:

        3) It is not the case that X exists.

This paper suggests that there is no property which is necessary and sufficient for a right to life that is lacked by pre-natal human beings but possessed by infants, which abortion practitioners are aware of and can give an adequate account for. In fact, the current debate suggests most such accounts are inadequate. Much of the debate and diversity within it suggest people are unaware of why they make the discrimination.

From 2) & 3) we get

        4) It is not the case that natalism is justified.

But by 4) & 1)

        5) It is not the case that current abortion policies are justified.

We can now return to the question posed earlier: are natalism and racism morally on par? The conclusion drawn is yes. What makes racism morally odious is that it is a form of unjustified discrimination, we discriminate against a class of beings on the basis of a morally irrelevant difference. Here a precisely analogous situation arises; we discriminate against pre-natal human beings on the basis of morally irrelevant differences.

Further, this discrimination is the process whereby we grant life or death. We allow and even support the killing of pre-natal humans. Contemporaneously, we legislates against and the killing of infants.

In addition, the number of beings killed on the basis of this discrimination is very high. Not only is this the basis by which we grant life or death, but the basis by which we grant life and death to millions. For example, 1.6 million foetuses were aborted in the US in 1993.

Taken together these facts paint a sinister picture. Western society kills millions of beings on a purely arbitrary basis. Abortion is the moral equivalent of a holocaust. Just as German society denied the rights to millions on the basis of their ethnicity (a morally irrelevant difference), so our society kills humans on an equally arbitrary basis, in much greater amounts.

Such a thesis would have radical implications for the way we understand and insert ourselves in the social order. Politicians who support abortion are comparable to cabinet ministers of The Third Reich. Doctors who perform abortions are like the agents at concentration camps. Family Planning organisations look, from this perspective, more like the Ku Klux Clan than admirable health professionals.

IV. Some Objections

A. Limited Explanation
One objection to the above analysis is to argue that it has a limited application. An application so limited that it becomes irrelevant.

What I have argued is that there is no reason to discriminate between pre-natal and post-natal human beings. The only difference between pre- and post-natal human beings by definition is birth. So all I have established is that birth is not a legitimate place to demarcate those who have rights from those who do not.

This is a very limited conclusion. It is compatible, for example, with drawing the demarcation somewhere earlier in the pregnancy. In fact, as late trimester abortions are rare, around 1% of them take place in the third trimester, this move would still justify the majority of abortions and be compatible with the above criticisms which only rule out demarcation at birth. Several points can be made in response to this argument.

Firstly, the fact that late trimester abortions are rare, in and of itself, is irrelevant. What is important is that they are permitted. We can see this with an analogy. Suppose a society decreed that African Americans had no rights, one could kill them for whatever reason one saw fit. By complete coincide, however, no one actually decided to exercise this right. As such, no African Americans are exterminated. Such a society is still extremely racist; the fact that African Americans are not killed is irrelevant. The point is that society has decided that killing them is permissible, if millions were killed society would do nothing. In the same way the fact that late trimester abortions are rare is irrelevant. What matters is that current practice is such that it allows for millions of late trimester abortions.

Second, when one considers the number of abortions that takes place, late trimester abortions are only rare proportionally. As stated around 1% of all abortions are performed in the third trimester. However this is 1% of around 1.6 million, so it is close to 16,000 late trimester abortions per year, 43 a day.

According to this position, one would have to concede that 16,000 people were arbitrarily denied the right to life, annually, with government support. To give some comparable figures, the South American dictator, Pinochet, in his reign killed 7,000 people on an arbitrary basis. It is estimated that the Spanish Inquisition burned 12,000[34] people. With the number killed in all countries estimated to total around 30,000 people.[35]

Even if we were to adopt the strategy suggested, the implications would still be grave. While perhaps not the equivalent of the holocaust, in terms of numbers, current abortion practice is comparable to many atrocities that make us recoil in horror, atrocities where thousands of people were arbitrarily slaughtered and killed. A condemnation of late trimester abortions is far from trivial.

Finally, it is inaccurate to suggest that the above argument has only criticised birth as the demarcation point. In coming to this conclusion sentience, personhood viability, size, wantedness and appearance have all been rejected as demarcating rights.

B. Biting the Bullet
One straightforward objection is to bite the bullet and endorse infanticide. I have argued that there is no reason for treating pre- and post-natal humans differently. The proponent of liberal abortion laws could agree. The argument could then be advanced one step further; that infanticide is a legitimate social practice.

Note that it is not just a matter of allowing infanticide. If there is no reason for discriminating between pre and post-born humans, then one must adopt the same stance towards abortion and infanticide. Consequently, the defender of liberal abortion laws would have to argue for liberal infanticide laws, or come up with some morally relevant distinction between the practices. This would have several implications.

Firstly, any reason one saw for terminating a foetus must equally apply to an infant. To cite common examples, a mother could terminate her infant if it was deformed, mentally impaired, interfered with her career or education or if it caused her emotional stress. If one advocated abortion on demand, one would have to argue for infanticide on demand.

Secondly, those who saw abortion as a fundamental right, essential to liberating women, would have to argue that infanticide was such a right as well. This would lead to a two-fold conclusion, that a woman cannot be truly equal with men until they can kill their children and that a society that does not allow a women to do so is unjust.

Thirdly, those who argue for public funding and education to access abortion services should be willing to adopt a similar stance towards infanticide. Teenagers should be taught about how to get their children terminated in state schools. Public hospitals should offer to terminate infants as a basic core health service.

If appears that in this scenario we have a dilemma, a clash of intuitions, on one hand there is the widely held belief that abortion is permissible. On the other there are the deeply ingrained beliefs about child rearing, that infanticide is abhorrent, that parents have a duty to sacrifice, provide and care for their newborn children. As I have argued, these two notions are set on collision course.

There is a lot at stake in this discussion. If we cannot establish the existence of X, society faces a dilemma with far reaching cultural and political implications. Either our deeply held revulsion against killing infants is abandoned; leading to a reassessment of the various attitudes towards childbearing and parenting that go with it. Or, we accept that our society is perpetuating a holocaust and view our political and social institutions accordingly. Either way society's position on this issue cannot stay where it is, we must embrace one horn of the dilemma or the other.

My own intuitions incline me towards rejecting abortion. I suspect that for many people their revulsion for infanticide far outweighs any acceptance they have towards abortion. In fact, it seems widely held that abortion is a necessary evil a tragedy, or perhaps something that should be allowed only in certain hard cases. Consequently, I think that the parity between abortion and infanticide is for many, a powerful argument against abortion.

I am aware there are some who will respond to this dilemma by embracing infanticide. This problem, however, is inherent in any philosophical argument. If one accepts the premise, the conclusion follows. Those confronted with an inference have two options; they can only deny the premise or the conclusion (or logic).

With any argument, those we are trying to convince can always respond by denying a premise in stead of accepting the conclusion. Unless our premises are self evident or universally accepted (and few arguments for any thesis of significance can be established by self-evident or universally accepted premises), our arguments will always fail to convince some. It will always be possible to reject an argument by biting the bullet and rejecting a premise.

C. No Positive Criteria Offered
One objection raised against my position is that it is wholly negative. I put forward various positions relating to when a being acquires moral status, and then criticise them. However, I fail to present my own position.

Firstly, failure to put forward an alternative does not invalidate criticism of a position. Alvin Plantinga articulates this point with characteristic wit:

        I may think it unlikely, on the evidence that I will be the next Pope, however, that doesn't commit me to having a candidate I think is likely to win. … You and I find a watch in the woods behind your house; I propose the hypothesis that it was dropped there by Saddam Hussein; you are entirely within your rights in pointing out that this hypothesis is unlikely, on our evidence, even if you are not prepared to propose as probable some hypothesis as to who did drop it there.[36]

Secondly, I suspect that any positive position will be the result of many broader theoretical concerns. For example, one relevant factor in theorising will be "what is a correct ethical theory?" For example, if one believes that moral notions supervene upon facts such as pleasure, pain, or utility, then the ability to feel pain, pleasure and utility will be of importance in deciding which beings have rights. If we have a more contractual understanding of morality, then ideas of autonomy will come into play. If morality is a way of serving peoples interests, then only beings that have interests can be morally wronged.

Equally influential will be issues of philosophical anthropology. Much of the discussion in this area revolves around the issues of personhood and humanity. What is it about human beings that make them significant? How are they special?

Consequently, any answer to this question will be part of a broader perspective about who human beings are, what makes us significant and important and what is the nature of the good and moral life. Any answer we give will be convincing only to those who share similar perspectives. At the roots then, the question of abortion becomes a religious question.[37]

        When we converse with one another in our pluralistic world, we discover that we live with different moral visions, each vision intertwined with different understandings of reality and none grounded in what all rational persons accept immediately. In our conversations with one another we can sometimes offer our partners good reasons for giving up some part of their moral vision. Sometimes these good reasons are also effective reasons: our partners accept the reasons and change their views. And sometimes our partners have good reasons to alter their views apart from the reasons that anyone gives them; it doesn't all depend on conversation. The rationality of a moral vision lies mainly in whether one has responded adequately to these good arguments, not on whether that vision has been grounded on consensus foundations.[38]

This Kuyperian understanding of the abortion debate provides me with the resources to reply to the above objection. I do think it is valuable to try and find a plausible theory about what features a being must have in order to possess rights. However, such an undertaking would involve delving into broader religious issues beyond the scope of this essay. It would involve clearly articulating a perspective and applying it to the current context. It would involve critical encounter with opposing views and reflection on the various issues involved. It would also involve, perhaps, a reflection of how this answer is to be taken in a pluralistic society where this perspective is not widely accepted.

While such a research project is valuable, it would take us well beyond the scope of this paper and require vastly more time and space than I can at present muster. Consequently, it will have to wait for another time.

Endnotes

1. Except such restrictions as "the procedure must be performed by a licensed physician."
2. See the discussion of Roe v Wade in chapter 2 of Beckwith, F Politically Correct Death Answering Arguments for Abortion Rights (Baker Books, 1993).
3. "Humanity" Vol. 22 No 3, May 1988, 1.
4. Supra n.2, 98.
5. There may be some contexts in which racial differences do constitute good reasons for warranting unequal treatment. Think of a person wanting to employ an actor to play Martin Luther King in a movie. In such a situation, there are justifiable reasons for hiring an African American actor over a Caucasian one.
6. Flyvberg, M. F., "What we can learn from the Danish Situation to Lower the Rate of Teenage Pregnancies in New Zealand? A report to the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust on a Study Tour of Denmark in 1996."
7. Infra section C. No Positive Criteria Offered, in this text.
8. Infra section C. No Positive Criteria Offered, inthis text, for further articulation of this point.
9. Steinbock, B "Abortion: A Pro-Choice Perspective," 330. This article was given to me as a photocopied course hand out by the Waikato University Philosophy Department, so I cannot reference the book and publisher it is drawn in.
10. English, J "Abortion and the Concept of a Person" in Morality in Practice ed. Sterba, J (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991) 166.
11. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in support of Apellees. Cited in Supra n.2, 44.
12. Infra (A) Does a Foetus Lack Sentience? andA. Limited Application , inthis text.
13. Supra n. 2, 98.
14. Jefferson, J. D., Abortion and the Christian, 1984, 58.
15. Supra n. 2, 98.
16. This argument is obviously problematic, the fact that one mourns more for a child only means that they have a deeper bond with it, not that it has more rights. If we mourn much more for our own children than we do for children killed in Ethiopia, then it does not follow that Ethiopians children have less rights than our own children.
17. Paul Flood suggested in a conversation, that what counted as a bearer of rights was a determined by social convention.
18. Apparently, the running over of a cow and a man were serious offences, while running over a woman was a lesser offence, punishable by a fine.
19. Singer, P, "All Animals are Equal" in Morality in Practice ed. Sterba (Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1991) 425.
20. Supra n. 2, 48.
21. Supra n.9, 331.
22. Collins, V, Zielinski, S, and Marzen, T. J., "Fetal Pain and Abortion: The Medical Evidence Studies" in Law and Medicine (Chicago: Americans United for Life Defence Fund, 1984) no 18, 6.
23. Noonan, J, "The Experience of Pain by the Unborn" in The Zero People ed. Hensley, J. L., (Ann Arbor, Mich: Servant, 1983) 149.
24. The original statement, is as follows:

        As physicians, we, the undersigned, are pleased to associate ourselves with you in drawing the attention of people across the nation to the humanity and sensitivity of the human unborn.
        That the unborn, the prematurely born, and the newborn of the human species is a highly complex, sentient, functioning, individual organism is established scientific fact. That the human unborn and newly born do respond to stimuli is also established beyond any reasonable doubt.
        The ability to feel pain and respond to it is clearly not a phenomenon that develops de novo at birth. Indeed, much of enlightened modern obstetrical practice and procedure seeks to minimize sensory deprivation of, and sensory insult to, the fetus during, at, and after birth. Over the last 18 years, real time ultrasonography, fetoscopy, study of the fetal EKG (electrocardiogram) and fetal EEG (electroencephalogram) have demonstrated the remarkable responsiveness of the human fetus to pain, touch, and sound. That the fetus responds to changes in light intensity within the womb, to heat, to cold, and to taste (by altering the chemical nature of the fluid swallowed by the fetus) has been exquisitely documented in the pioneering work of the late Sir William Liley -- the father of fetology.
        Observations of the fetal electrocardiogram and the increase in fetal movements in saline abortions indicate that the fetus experiences discomfort as it dies. Indeed, one doctor who, the New York Times wrote, "conscientiously performs" saline abortions stated, "When you inject the saline, you often see an increase in fetal movements, it's horrible."
        We state categorically that no finding of modern fetology invalidates the remarkable conclusion drawn after a lifetime of research by the late Professor Arnold Gesell of Yale University. In The Embryology of Behavior: The Beginnings of the Human Mind (1945, Harper Bros.), Dr. Gesell wrote, "and so by the close of the first trimester the fetus is a sentient, moving being. We need not speculate as to the nature of his psychic attributes, but we may assert that the organization of his psychosomatic self is well under way."

The medical specialists who signed this statement claiming they agreed with it:
Dr. Richard T. F. Schmidt, Past President, A.C.O.G., Professor of Ob/Gyn, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati, OH
Dr. Vincent Collins, Professor of Anesthesiology, Northwestern University, University of Illinois Medical Center
Dr. John G. Masterson, Clinical Professor of Ob/Gyn, Northwestern University
Dr. Bernard Nathanson, F.A.C.O.G., Clinical Assistant Professor of Ob/Gyn, Cornell University
Dr. Denis Cavanaugh, F.A.C.O.G., Professor of Ob/Gyn, University of South Florida
Dr. Watson Bowes, F.A.C.O.G., Professor of Material and Fetal Medicine, University of North Carolina
Dr. Byron Oberst, Assistant Clinical Professor of Pediatrics, University of Nebraska
Dr. Eugene Diamond, Professor of Pediatrics, Strict School of Medicine, Chicago, IL
Dr. Thomas Potter, Associate Clinical Professor of Pediatrics, New Jersey Medical College
Dr. Lawrence Dunegan, Instructor of Clinical Pediatrics, University of Pittsburgh
Dr. Melvin Thornton, Professor of Clinical Pediatrics, University of Texas (San Antonio)
Dr. Norman Vernig, Assistant Professor of Pediatrics, University of Minnesota (St. Paul)
Dr. Jerome Shen, Clinical Professor of Pediatrics, St. Louis University
Dr. Fred Hofmeister, Past President, A.C.O.G., Professor of Ob/Gyn, University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee)
Dr. Matthew Bulfin, F.A.C.O.G., Lauderdale by the Sea, FL
Dr. Jay Arena, Professor Emeritus of Pediatrics, Duke University
Dr. Herbert Nakata, Assistant Professor of Clinical Pediatrics, University of Hawaii
Dr. Robert Polley, Clinical Instructor of Pediatrics, University of Washington (Seattle)
Dr. David Foley, Professor of Ob/Gyn, University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee)
Dr. Anne Bannon, F.A.A.P., Former Chief of Pediatrics, City Hospital (St. Louis)
Dr. John J. Brennan, Professor of Ob/Gyn, Medical College of Wisconsin, (Milwaukee)
Dr. Walter F. Watts, Assistant Professor of Ob/Gyn, Strict School of Medicine, Chicago, IL
Dr. G. C. Tom Nabors, Assistant Clinical Professor of Ob/Gyn, Southwestern Medical College, Dallas, TX
Dr. Konald Prem, Professor of Ob/Gyn, University of Minnesota (Minneapolis)
Dr. Alfred Derby, F.A.C.O.G., Spokane, WA
Dr. Bernie Pisani, F.A.C.O.G., President, NY State Medical Society, Professor of Ob/Gyn, New York University

Some further sources are listed below:

        The first detectable brain activity in response to noxious (pain) stimuli occurs in the thalamus between the ninth and tenth weeks.

Reinis & Goldman, The Development of the Brain, Thomas Publishers, 1980, pp. 223-235.

        By 13 weeks, organic response to noxious stimuli occurs at all levels of the nervous system, from the pain receptors to the thalamus. Thus, at that point, the fetal organic response to pain is more than a reflexive response. It is an integrated physiological attempt to avert the noxious stimuli.

Wm. Matviuw, M.D., Diplomate, Amer. College of OB & GYN.

        Lip tactile response may be evoked by the end of the 7th week. At 11 weeks, the face and all parts of the upper and lower extremities are sensitive to touch. By 13.5 to 14 weeks, the entire body surface, except for the back and the top of the head, are sensitive to pain."

S. Reinis & J. Goldman, The Development of the Brain .

        As early as eight to ten weeks gestation, and definitely by thirteen and a half weeks, the human fetus experiences organic pain.

V. Collins, M.D., Diplomate and Fellow, Amer. Board of Anesthesiologists

        Dilatation and evacuation, for example, where fetal tissue is progressively punctured, ripped, and crushed, and which is done after 13 weeks when the fetus certainly responds to noxious stimuli, would cause organic pain in the fetus. Saline amnioinfusion, where a highly concentrated salt solution burns away the outer skin of the fetus, also qualifies as a noxious stimulus.

T. Sullivan, M.D., FAAP, Amer. Academy of Neurosurgeons

        Functioning neurological structures necessary for pain sensation are in place as early as 8 weeks, but certainly by 13 1/2 weeks of gestation. Sensory nerves, including nociceptors, reach the skin of the fetus before the 9th week of gestation. The first detectable brain activity occurs in the thalamus between the 8th and 10th weeks. The movement of electrical impulses through the neural fibers and spinal column takes place between 8 and 9 weeks gestation. By 13 1/2 weeks, the entire sensory nervous system functions as a whole in all parts of the body ...

        By 10 weeks, the palms of the hands are sensitive to touch, and at 11 weeks the face and extremities likewise respond to tactile stimuli. By 13 1/2 weeks, these responses are sufficiently elaborate and sufficiently avoidant to warrant the definite conclusion that the fetus responds aversively, not reflexively. They evidence an integrated physiological attempt to escape noxious stimuli. In response to experiments performed on 12 to 16 week fetuses, movements of the head, body, and limbs have been observed. These movements were vigorous, and consisted of ventro- or dorsoflexion of the trunk, flexion of the limbs, and turning of the head, indicating the presence of acute fetal pain. It is agreed that a fetus must be heavily sedated before intrauterine manipulation, such as transfusions, because such painful stimuli cause the fetus to move, making the procedure difficult.

Vincent J.Collins, M.D., Steven R Zielinski, M.D., and Thomas J. Marzen, Esq., Fetal Pain and Abortion: The Medical Evidence.

        "In the sixth to seventh weeks, nerves and muscles work together for the first time. If the area of the lips, the first to become sensitive to touch, is gently stroked, the child responds by bending the upper body to one side and making a quick backward motion with his arms. . . In the ninth and tenth weeks, the child's activity leaps ahead. Now if the forehead is touched, he may turn his head away and pucker up his brow and frown.... In the same week, the entire body becomes sensitive to touch." Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in Support of appellees, submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term, 1971, No. 70-18, Roe v. Wade, and No. 70-40, Doe v. Bolton.

Prepared by Dennis J. Horan, et.al. (The List of Amici contains the names of over 200 physicians.).

Further Dr D. Gareth Jones, the Professor of Anatomy at Otago University an expert in human brain development and a moderate supporter of abortion, states in his book Manufacturing Humans mentions that the foetus probably feel pain around 14 weeks g.a.
25. Paul Flood has suggested that this is not the case. If I abort a foetus I see to it that it will not have a future, consequently any foetus that I carry out an abortion on will not be sentient in the future. However, this line of reasoning, brings us back to the initial problem because a precisely analogous line of reasoning would justify killing the temporarily comatose and unconscious. If I kill a person who has been knocked unconscious and is in a coma, I am seeing to it that they will not be sentient in the future.
26. Note that Singer suggests that sentience is a necessary condition of possessing any rights at all, not just the right to life.
27. This example is adapted from Schartz, S, The Moral Question of Abortion (Chicago: Loyola University Press) 90.
28. Sherwin, S, Abortion a Feminist Perspective (Another Waikato University Philosophy Department handout with no citation) 364.
29. In addition, the female capacity for endurance and longevity tends to be higher than males.
30. Warren, M. A., "On the legal and Moral Status of Abortion" in Supra n.19,156.
31. See citation in Marquis, D, "Why Abortion is Immoral" in The Journal of Philosophy vol. 83, No 4, 187.
32. Supra n 2, 110.
33. Journal of Pediatrics 1983, vol. 72, 128 cited in Overman,C, Assumptions that Affect our Lives (Micah 6.8, Chatsworth CA, 1996) 112-113.
34. Barret, D, Cosmos, Chaos and Gospel, 30.
35. Lockyer, The Man Who Changed the World, vol. 1, 270.
36. Plantinga, A, Evolution, Neutrality and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to McMullin and Van Til, Christian Scholars Review XXI: 1.
37. I use the word religion here broadly, to refer to a fundamental perspective or way of thinking about what the world is like, what we ourselves are like, what is most important about the world, what our place is in it, and what we must do to live the 'good life.'
38. Wolterstorff, N, Until Justice and Peace Embrace, vii-viii.

ÓSOUL New Zealand 2000

Lobbyists, in Strategy Session, Conclude That Refugee Crisis “Helps Us” Defeat Regulations

In an audio recording of a strategy session obtained by The Intercept, major trade association lobbyists discussed how the refugee crisis has changed the political dynamics in Washington to their advantage.

In the conference call held last week, lobbyists representing a number of high-polluting industries agreed that the battle between Congress and President Obama on refugee policy will give them the cover they need to attach a legislative rider to the omnibus budget bill that rolls back newly expanded clean water regulation.

“I think that probably helps us,” one participant said, referring to the coming confrontation over refugee policy.

[...] “We’re suddenly not the big issue,” said one call participant. “I mean, this is all going to turn on refugees.”

“I think that helps us,” said another call participant. “I think it helps us with the White House being on defense,” another legislative strategist on the call said.

The remarks were made during a political strategy call hosted last week by energy utility industry lobbyists. A recording was sent to The Intercept by someone on the call.

Coal CEO Thanks Lamar Smith, Asks Him to Expand Probe of Climate Scientists

Koch "Alliance" on Criminal Justice Reform Exposed as Trojan Horse

How the Gates Foundation Reflects the Good and the Bad of "Hacker Philanthropy"

Over the years, I've used a number of monitors. My first monitor was rather small - maybe 12 or 13 inches. Black and white CRT thing, just like an ancient black and white television. I resisted upgrading to a color monitor, but the wife insisted, and we got something about 15 inches. All was good, for a long time. Then, I needed a decent monitor in a place where there was really no room to put a huge ass monitor. Enter the first LED screen. Wow - I saw colors on that LED that I didn't know existed. So, I was good for years with a nice 15" LED monitor. Then, I inherited a 19" Dell monitor. When I plugged it in, things got easier to read, so I used it. Then, I got the bright idea of using BOTH monitors! I can do whatever I'm doing on the big monitor, and keep my email and system monitors on the smaller screen. That worked nicely for quite a long while. It never bothered me that the videos and movies I might watch were cramped into half the space they were intended to fill.

Well - now the larger monitor started showing signs of age. Strange phenomenon that were never meant to happen convinced me that it might be wise to upgrade, before the monitor just crapped out. Talked to my kid, and he told me what to look for. Dithered for a couple weeks over the size I wanted. Finally went with a screen that supports 1080p. And, bearing in mind that two screens are nice, I bought two of them.

Alright, they aren't "state of the art". I wasn't willing to spend a thousand dollars on monitors, after all. But, HOLY SHIT! I can have two browsers open, all my system monitors, a file manager, qbittorrent, a calculator, email, and still have lots of room on the desktop! The movies? Hell, I can see the texture of people's skin! Pretty awesome.

It's a whole new world on my computer.

I've been planning the architecture and design goals of the first to-be-public release of SubLinux for about half a year.
SubLinux is the personal XFCE i586+ distro I built from source, and from which I am writing this. Generally, only me, family and friends are ever given copies of SubLinux. Source for SubLinux 1 has been lost.

Some background
SubLinux 1 was released in mid-2012, and was also an i586 distro. However, it had many severe flaws, and while functional, bugs were often encountered. It had a busybox/GNU hybrid userland, and while efficient, this frequently caused problems with software compilation. It was a small system, less than 2GB big once installed. It came with the Midori browser.
It was mostly used as a Fedora substitute on machines with no i686/CMOV support, and on thumbdrives as a portable system.
It used the syslinux bootloader instead of GRUB, which is used by most distributions. It did not support UEFI.

SubLinux 2 was released in early 2014, and has replaced Fedora on all of my desktops, excluding my server.
It's also i586-based, but has a true GNU userland. It shipped with XFCE 4.10, but has since been upgraded to 4.12, and has had numerous kernel upgrades. It has no package manager, was built from source, and provides both a PAE and non-PAE kernel. Unlike SubLinux 1, it has debugging symbols stripped from all binaries, yet provides both static and shared libraries of all system libraries, and all headers are present at installation, and thanks to the stability of the GNU userland, SubLinux 2 has proven to be an outstanding system for software development. It has a GCC 4.8.2 based toolchain. Like SubLinux 1, it also uses the syslinux bootloader. SubLinux 2 does not support UEFI. Systems wishing to use it must boot in "legacy" mode.

Moving forward
There are a handful of reasons I want to make SubLinux 3 a public, supported distribution.
* I am spoiled now that I've had a distribution that suits my tastes precisely, and I'd like to share it with the like-minded.
* It will showcase my Epoch Init System, my anti-systemd vaccine.
* There is a lack of distributions with the desired "vibe" of freedom, catering to power users, and enabling development.

Major design goals:
* Support for both i586 and x86_64, possibly in one single build, with the userland being primarily i586, but containing all libraries necessary to execute x86_64 code, and providing an optional x86_64 kernel. This would guarantee that no matter which system you boot it on, it will indeed boot. And, if the system supports x86_64, such applications will be able to run.
The compiler toolchain should also support both i586 and x86_64.
* Great for development, making it easy to deal with a large variety of programming languages.
* Vanilla software, only adding patches to software that are required to compile it. This includes the kernel.
* A complete graphical desktop, probably XFCE.
* Includes other power user tools, like terminator, isomaster, etc.
* No unnecessary duplicate applications in the default installation. One that runs in the CLI, one that runs in GUI. For example, mousepad will be installed, but leafpad will not.
* Efficient, with a focus on keeping system resource usage down to a minimum while still providing the aforementioned complete GUI and desktop.
* Annual release, with updates provided over the internet periodically.

SubLinux 3 will be a desktop-oriented distribution, with a full GUI. It will, again, include all development related files (excluding complete source) in each default package, so you'll never need to install some "-devel" package. And like SubLinux 2, it will include both static and shared libraries for every package. It will likely ship with XFCE as the default desktop, and will rely on (me-endorsed) community builds for other desktops. And that's where our next piece of the puzzle comes in.

packrat, a new package manager
I've been writing a package manager called packrat. It has one major design goal: Make it really easy to create packages.
As a consequence of this, it does not include dependency resolution support, making it similar to Slackware's package management scheme. You can, at present, in the unstable builds of packrat, create a package with one command. It uses tarballs for storage, and has metadata and sha1 checksum file verification. Packages will likely not support signing.
It will support downloading "action lists" from the internet for updates and deprecations, and will include a *built in* GTK frontend, eliminating the need for 3rd party tools for graphical package management.

That's about it for now guys. I'll let you know if I come up with any other brilliant ideas. :^)

-Subsentient

If you read the news you often read about the incredible cruelty shown towards the homeless, for example about "police sweeps" in which - just a couple weeks ago - 150 people were tossed out of their tent camp in Vancouver, Washington, followed by a bulldozer "cleaning up" what were once their possessions.

But in my actual experience the kindness shown towards homeless people such as myself is far, far more common than is the cruelty. It's just that the cruelty gets more press.

I often hang out at all-night restaurants as I prefer to sleep during the day - during the day there are day centers for the homeless but at night one must either brave the cold, or find a restaurant that will permit one to hang out all night long in return for purchasing one single coffee.

The restaurant I'm at right now gives me my coffee absolutely free of charge. I tell them they don't have to do that, they I sing on the street for tips and so have the means to pay.

"You should accept help when it is offered to you," pointed out one of the waitresses. Just now she asked me if I wanted breakfast.

This isn't the first time, a while back the manager of a Carl's Jr. bought me breakfast, also the owner of a Burger King bought me lunch.

I finally applied for Social Security Disability Insurance, as a result of my Aphasia (not my mental illness). The clerk who took my application was confident it would be approved but there is some problem with my tax records that I expect I can straighten out.

When one's SSDI is approved one's first check is backdated to the lesser of one year before one's application or the date one became disabled. For me that would be quite a lot of money.

I am not dead certain but I contemplate donating all that money to the charities that look after people like me.

So, here's the recent happenings on twitter in as few words as possible:

Kotaku: Fuck gamers

Bethesda: Fuck Kotaku

Kotaku: Help us, gamers!

Gamers: LOL

SJW: BUT ETHICS!!!

Black Friday 2015

Laptops

• $99: 11.6 inch Chromebook, Best Buy
• $300: Core i3, 15.6 inch, Best Buy
• $140: Celeron, 15.6 inch, Best Buy

Storage

• $100: 4 TB Western Digital My Book external hard drive, Best Buy
• $100: 4 TB Toshiba Canvio external hard drive, Office Max and Office Depot
• $120: 5 TB Seagate external hard drive, Costco
• $120: 5 TB Toshiba Canvio external hard drive, Office Max and Office Depot
• $40: 1 TB Seagate portable hard drive, Staples
• $200: SanDisk Ultra II 2.5" SSD 960GB, Newegg

Consoles

• $300: Dell Home & Office Black Friday: Xbox One Gears of War: Ultimate Edition Bundle Plus Fallout 4 & Extra Controller
• $300: Target Black Friday: 500GB Xbox One Console w/ Gears of War Digital Download Code + $60 Target Gift Card

Categories

• Blank Media (CDs, DVDs)
• USB Flash Drives
• Hard Drives

Articles

Best Laptops: Holiday 2015
Best SSDs: Holiday 2015

I'm watching my oldest son read The Black Cauldron by Lloyd Alexander, second book in my favorite childhood book series. He's near the end of the book where things really get exciting and horrific, he seems amazingly absorbed, his eyes are wide, and he looks a bit horrified.

Unlike me, he's read the entire book in pretty much a day. Having trouble keeping up with the voracious book appetite around here, which is a great problem to have.