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Forced penetration: If a woman forces a man to have sex, is that rape?

When a man has penetrative sex with a woman without her consent, that's rape. But what if a woman makes a man have penetrative sex with her, without his consent? That's not rape under the law of England and Wales, but the author of a new study of the phenomenon says perhaps it should be.

[...] Aspects of John's story are repeated in the experiences of some of the other men Dr Weare has interviewed. One of her findings is that the perpetrator in "forced-to-penetrate" (FTP) cases is often a female partner or ex-partner (her research focuses only on forced penetration involving men and women), and that the experience is frequently one element in a wider pattern of domestic abuse.

[...] One myth Weare's research dispels is that forced penetration is impossible because men are physically stronger than women. Another is that men view all sexual opportunities with women as positive.

A third myth is that if men have an erection they must want sex. In fact, Weare says, "an erection is purely a physiological response to stimulus".

"Men can obtain and sustain an erection even if they're scared, angry, terrified etc," she says. "There's also research that shows women can respond sexually when they are raped (e.g. have an orgasm) because their body is responding physiologically. This is an issue for both male and female victims that is not discussed enough, but there is clear evidence in this area."

A number of the participants in Weare's 2017 study reported FTP experiences after getting extremely drunk or high, and being unable to stop what was happening. One of those interviewed for the new study describes going home with a woman after a night out clubbing, and blacking out after being given what he suspects was a date rape drug. He says he was then forced to engage in non-consensual sex.

FTP is not rape, but all PIV is rape (of a female).

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Watching the Everyday Astronaut stream.

Would be a nice palate cleanser after the scrubbed CRS-18 launch.

Oh, here's an official stream.

Edit: Confirmed not happening today.

How deeply will this cut into the president's TV ratings?

Are the two in competition, or are they complimentary? Like, is one a condiment for the other?

Na na naaaaaaa...

Note to readers: Be aware that when reading the comments, there are people who are literally paid to defend judges by the government (this is not even a secret). Be skeptical, especially if they post anonymously.

One of the most interesting things about the 11th Circuit lately seems to be their willingness to intentionally misapply the law and ignore precedents. One would hope that judges would apply that law neutrally and to all facts, but it seems that they are only interested in gamesmanship. Don't have an expensive lawyer? Get bullshitted.

Supreme Court says the rule that courts can't address a merits issue before finding jurisdiction is "inflexible and without exception" in Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Company? Ignored by the 11th Circuit. Come on now, the whole "inflexible and without exception" thing should really be taken a bit more seriously, don't you think?

But the 11th Circuit willfully defies the Supreme Court on this issue, and can't bother to overrule themselves. Probably because they don't want everyone to know the 11th Circuit is full of idiots who don't keep up with new Supreme Court cases. Well, seems they are. Not only are they just plain wrong & stupid, but they're exceeding their legal authority to issue judgment, because you know, that's what "jurisdiction" actually means? Seems this went over their heads. And let me put some names to shame here: Charles R. Wilson, James Larry Edmondson, and Frank M. Hull. All of whom are apparently senile.

Some interesting quotes from the Supreme Court:

While some of the above cases must be acknowledged to have diluted the absolute purity of the rule that Article III jurisdiction is always an antecedent question, none of them even approaches approval of a doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction” that enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt. Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment–which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning. Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); Hayburn’s Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792). Much more than legal niceties are at stake here. The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.

Justice Stevens’ arguments contradicting all this jurisprudence–and asserting that a court may decide the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction–are readily refuted. First, his concurrence seeks to convert Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), into a case in which the cause-of-action question was decided before an Article III standing question. Post, at 7—8, n. 8. “Bell,” Justice Stevens asserts, “held that we have jurisdiction to decide [whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action] even when it is unclear whether the plaintiff’s injuries can be redressed.” Post, at 7. The italicized phrase (the italics are his own) invites the reader to believe that Article III redressability was at issue. Not only is this not true, but the whole point of Bell was that it is not true. In Bell, which was decided before Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), the District Court had dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds because it believed that (what we would now call) a Bivens action would not lie. This Court held that the nonexistence of a cause of action was no proper basis for a jurisdictional dismissal. Thus, the uncertainty about “whether the plaintiff’s injuries can be redressed” to which Justice Stevens refers is simply the uncertainty about whether a cause of action existed–which is precisely what Bell holds not to be an Article III “redressability” question. It would have been a different matter if the relief requested by the plaintiffs in Bell (money damages) would not have remedied their injury in fact; but it of course would. Justice Stevens used to understand the fundamental distinction between arguing no cause of action and arguing no Article III redressability, having written for the Court that the former argument is “not squarely directed at jurisdiction itself, but rather at the existence of a remedy for the alleged violation of … federal rights,” which issue is “‘not of the jurisdictional sort which the Court raises on its own motion.’ ” Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 398 (1979) (Stevens, J.), (quoting Mt. Healthy Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 279 (1977)).
Justice Stevens also relies on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. of Railroad Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974). Post, at 8—9. But in that case, we did not determine whether a cause of action existed before determining that the plaintiff had Article III standing; there was no question of injury in fact or effectiveness of the requested remedy. Rather, National Railroad Passenger Corp. determined whether a statutory cause of action existed before determining whether (if so) the plaintiff came within the “zone of interests” for which the cause of action was available. 414 U.S., at 465, n. 13. The latter question is an issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether there is case or controversy under Article III. 2

Much more extensive defenses of the practice of deciding the cause of action before resolving Article III jurisdiction have been offered by the courts of appeals. They rely principally upon two cases of ours, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524 (1976) and Secretary of Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974) (per curiam). Both are readily explained, we think, by their extraordinary procedural postures. In Norton, the case came to us on direct appeal from a three-judge District Court, and the jurisdictional question was whether the action was properly brought in that forum rather than in an ordinary district court. We declined to decide that jurisdictional question, because the merits question was decided in a companion case, Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), with the consequence that the jurisdictional question could have no effect on the outcome: If the three-judge court had been properly convened, we would have affirmed, and if not we would have vacated and remanded for a fresh decree from which an appeal could be taken to the Court of Appeals, the outcome of which was foreordained by Lucas. Norton v. Mathews, supra, at 531. Thus, Norton did not use the pretermission of the jurisdictional question as a device for reaching a question of law that otherwise would have gone unaddressed. Moreover, the Court seems to have regarded the merits judgment that it entered on the basis of Lucas as equivalent to a jurisdictional dismissal for failure to present a substantial federal question. The Court said: “This disposition [Lucas] renders the merits in the present case a decided issue and thus one no longer substantial in the jurisdictional sense.” 427 U.S., at 530—531. We think it clear that this peculiar case, involving a merits issue dispositively resolved in a companion case, was not meant to overrule, sub silentio, two centuries of jurisprudence affirming the necessity of determining jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits. See Clow, 948 F.2d, at 627 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting).

[...]

In any event, the peculiar circumstances of Avrech hardly permit it to be cited for the precedent-shattering general proposition that an “easy” merits question may be decided on the assumption of jurisdiction. To the contrary, the fact that the Court ordered briefing on the jurisdictional question sua sponte demonstrates its adherence to traditional and constitutionally dictated requirements. See Cross-Sound Ferry Servs., Inc. v. ICC, 934 F.2d, at 344—345, and n. 10 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in denial of petition for review).

And

See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355, 365 (1994) (“The question whether a federal statute creates a claim for relief is not jurisdictional”)"

ASUS Announces New ROG Phone II: 120Hz OLED, 6000mAh & Snapdragon 855+

12 GB of RAM, 802.11ad wireless. Phone size, thickness, and weight increased significantly.

Also features one of the new ARM DynamIQ core cluster configs, that I think I've seen on at least one other recent smartphone:

1x Cortex-A76 @ 2.96GHz
3x Cortex-A76 @ 2.42GHz
4x Cortex-A55 @ 1.80GHz

I imagine that in 10 years, every smartphone sold will have specs exceeding this and will be intended for use with a dock and monitor/TV so it can be used as a portable desktop replacement. Or forget the dock, and just use a successor to 802.11ad to connect to a display wirelessly, maybe while laying it down on a nearby charging pad.

Never forget.

Corsair Unveils 32 GB Vengeance LPX DDR4 DIMMs, 64 GB & 128 GB Dual-Channel Kits

$150 for 1× 32 GB @ 2400 MT/s, $155 for 1× 32 GB @ 2666 MT/s (price for 3000 MT/s not specified). Basically no additional charge for 64, 128, and 256 GB kits.

That's the equivalent of $37.50-$38.75 for 8 GB, which isn't so awful but shows how DRAM pricing has stagnated over the last decade. If we had scaled down, we might be looking at $1-2 per GB today. Hopefully we will reach a point where 128 GB costs $100-$150, and larger module capacities could help make that happen.

This one from last month is a bit more expensive: Samsung 32GB DDR4-2666 Non-ECC Memory at Retail: $168

So when do we reach the point when all DIMMs have ECC by default? 64 GB modules? 128 GB? We have to protect against all those cosmic rays, right? ?