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Runaway1956 [soylentnews.org] writes:

Executive Summary
Public engagement on encryption issues surged following the 2015 terrorist attacks
in Paris and San Bernardino, particularly when it became clear that the attackers used
encrypted communications to evade detection—a phenomenon known as “going dark.”
While encryption provides important benefits to society and the individual, it also makes it
more difficult for law enforcement and intelligence professionals to keep us safe.
Some have framed the debate surrounding encryption as a battle between privacy and
security. Our extensive discussions with stakeholders, however, have led us to conclude that
the issue is really about security versus security: encryption protects critical infrastructure,
trade secrets, financial transactions, and personal communications and information. Yet
encryption also limits law enforcement’s ability to track criminals, collect evidence, prevent
attacks, and ensure public safety. Initially, lawmakers and some among law enforcement
personnel believed the solution was simple: statutorily authorize law enforcement access
to obtain encrypted data with a court order. Unfortunately, this proposal was riddled with
unintended consequences, particularly if redesigning encryption tools to incorporate
vulnerabilities—creating what some refer to as “backdoors”—actually weakened data
security. Indeed those vulnerabilities would naturally be exploited by the bad guys—and
not just benefit the good guys.
The global technology industry is undergoing rapid change. Consumers now demand that
companies incorporate encryption into their products and services as a matter of routine
practice. We are just beginning to understand the implications of this transformation. If
the U.S. placed burdensome restrictions on encryption, American technology companies
could lose their competitive edge in the global marketplace. Moreover, studies suggest
that two-thirds of the entities selling or providing encrypted products are outside of the
United States. Thus, bad actors could still obtain the technology from foreign vendors
irrespective of U.S. legislative action.
Over the course of the past 12 months, Members and staff of the House Committee on
Homeland Security have held more than 100 meetings and briefings, both classified and
unclassified, with key stakeholders impacted by the use of encryption. As a result of our
robust investigation, the Committee staff has come to understand that there is no silver
bullet regarding encryption and “going dark.” While we benefited tremendously from our
engagement with stakeholders, we did not discover any simple solutions. No matter what
path emerged, there were always troublesome trade-offs. Thus, in our estimation, the
best way for Congress and the nation to proceed at this juncture is to formally convene a
commission of experts to thoughtfully examine not just the matter of encryption and law
enforcement, but law enforcement’s future in a world of rapidly evolving digital technology.

https://homeland.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Going-Dark-Going-Forward.pdf [house.gov]

Editor - I've done a blockquote directly from a PDF - I don't really know if that works. It does appear to work in my preview of the submission.

The lead was stolen from /. (without apologies) Link to TFA is https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/29/government-encryption-regulation-report-criticism [theguardian.com]

Personally, I find the PDF to be far more interesting than Danny Yadro's comments on it.

Original Submission