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The Mighty Buzzard writes:

In some shiny good news to us of the tinfoil hat crew, Phoronix is reporting:

Many free software advocates have been concerned by Intel's binary-only Management Engine (ME) built into the motherboards on newer generations of Intel motherboards. The good news is there is now a working, third-party approach for disabling the ME and reducing the risk of its binary blobs.

Via an open-source, third-party tool called me_cleaner it's possible to partially deblob Intel's ME firmware images by removing any unnecessary partitions from the firmware, reducing its ability to interface with the system. The me_cleaner works not only with free software firmware images like Coreboot/Libreboot but can also work with factory-blobbed images. I was able to confirm with a Coreboot developer that this program can disable the ME on older boards or devices with BootGuard and disable Secure Boot. This is all done with a Python script.

Those unfamiliar with the implications on Intel's ME for those wanting a fully-open system can read about it on Libreboot.org.

Looks like I may not have to go ARM on my next desktop build after all.

Original Submission

Phoenix666 writes:

Reddit reports:

In AMD's AMA here, they say they will seriously consider releasing their Platform Security Processor (PSP) source code. This is their equivalent of the Intel Management Engine and would make AMD processors compatible with coreboot/libreboot.

This would be massive. It would make it possible to have a truly open-source machine, with all the security and privacy benefits that entails. At the moment secure boot relies primarily on aging Intel processors from nearly a decade ago.

In 2011, AMD began supporting coreboot, but stopped in 2013 and introduced the PSP. Why? Because they didn't think it was economically worthwhile.

Don't let that happen again! Let's tell AMD there is demand for this. Get into that thread and comment. And – more importantly – message them! If you're reading this after the AMA has ended, contact them anyway!

AMD's Twitter

AMD's Forums

AMD's contact page (You can find details on AMD in your country)

You can also reach them on Facebook.

Original Submission

MrPlow writes:

Submitted via IRC for TheMightyBuzzard

Since 2008, most of Intel's chipsets have contained a tiny homunculus computer called the "Management Engine" (ME). The ME is a largely undocumented master controller for your CPU: it works with system firmware during boot and has direct access to system memory, the screen, keyboard, and network. All of the code inside the ME is secret, signed, and tightly controlled by Intel. Last week, vulnerabilities in the Active Management (AMT) module in some Management Engines have caused lots of machines with Intel CPUs to be disastrously vulnerable to remote and local attackers. While AMT can be disabled, there is presently no way to disable or limit the Management Engine in general. Intel urgently needs to provide one.

[...] EFF believes that Intel needs to provide a minimum level of transparency and user control of the Management Engines inside our computers, in order to prevent this cybersecurity disaster from recurring. Unless that happens, we are concerned that it may not be appropriate to use Intel CPUs in many kinds of critical infrastructure systems.

It's a crying shame the what the EFF says doesn't hold a whole lot of weight.

Source: The Electronic Frontier Foundation

Original Submission

MrPlow writes:

Submitted via IRC for TheMightyBuzzard

Since the launch of AMD Ryzen, a small piece of hardware that handles basic memory initialization as well as many security functions has been the center of some controversy. Called the Platform Security Processor (the "PSP" for short) it is essentially an arm core with complete access to the entire system. Its actions can be considered "above root" level and are for the most part invisible to the OS. It is similar in this regard to Intel's Management Engine, but is in some ways even more powerful.

Why is this a bad thing? Well, let's play a theoretical. What happens if a bug is discovered in the PSP, and malware takes control of it? How would you remove it (Answer: you couldn't). How would you know you needed to remove it? (answer, unless it made itself obvious, you also wouldn't). This scenario is obviously not a good one, and is a concern for many who asked AMD to open-source the PSPs code for general community auditing.

Bit late to the reporting but we haven't covered it yet, so here it is. And I was so looking forward to a new desktop too. Guess this one will have to stay alive until ARM becomes a viable replacement.

Source: https://www.techpowerup.com/235313/amd-confirms-its-platform-security-processor-code-will-remain-closed-source

Previous:
The Intel Management Engine, and How it Stops Screenshots
Intel x86 Considered Harmful
Of Intel's Hardware Rootkit
Intel Management Engine Partially Defeated
EFF: Intel's Management Engine is a Security Hazard
Malware uses Intel AMT feature to steal data, avoid firewalls

Original Submission

DannyB writes:

Positive Technologies has posted an interesting article about disabling the Intel Management Engine 11 via an undocumented mode.

Our team of Positive Technologies researchers has delved deep into the internal architecture of Intel Management Engine (ME) 11, revealing a mechanism that can disable Intel ME after hardware is initialized and the main processor starts. In this article, we describe how we discovered this undocumented mode and how it is connected with the U.S. government's High Assurance Platform (HAP) program.

[...] Intel Management Engine is a proprietary technology that consists of a microcontroller integrated into the Platform Controller Hub (PCH) chip and a set of built-in peripherals. The PCH carries almost all communication between the processor and external devices; therefore Intel ME has access to almost all data on the computer. The ability to execute third-party code on Intel ME would allow for a complete compromise of the platform.

[...] Unfortunately, analysis of Intel ME 11 was previously impossible because the executable modules are compressed by Huffman codes with unknown tables. Nonetheless, our research team (Dmitry Sklyarov, Mark Ermolov, and Maxim Goryachy) managed to recover these tables and created a utility for unpacking images. The utility is available on our GitHub page.

Hey, the government isn't the only one who wants "high assurance" for their computers. We trolls and average peons would like to think our systems are secure as well.

But it gets better.

takyon writes:

It's time to update your Management Engine:

Intel has issued a security alert that management firmware on a number of recent PC, server, and Internet-of-Things processor platforms are vulnerable to remote attack. Using the vulnerabilities, the most severe of which was uncovered by Mark Ermolov and Maxim Goryachy of Positive Technologies Research, remote attackers could launch commands on a host of Intel-based computers, including laptops and desktops shipped with Intel Core processors since 2015. They could gain access to privileged system information, and millions of computers could essentially be taken over as a result of the bug. Most of the vulnerabilities require physical access to the targeted device, but one allows remote attacks with administrative access.

The company has posted a detection tool on its support website for Windows and Linux to help identify systems that are vulnerable. In the security alert, members of Intel's security team stated that "in response to issues identified by external researchers, Intel has performed an in-depth comprehensive security review of its Intel® Management Engine (ME), Intel® Trusted Execution Engine (TXE), and Intel® Server Platform Services (SPS) with the objective of enhancing firmware resilience."

Intel® Management Engine Critical Firmware Update (Intel SA-00086)

takyon writes:

HP's Endpoint Security Controller: More Details About A New Chip in HP Notebooks

One of HP's key announcements this spring was its revamped security initiative for PCs that includes hardware, software, and deep learning-based approaches. The software and DL parts of the things were discussed earlier this month, but the hardware-based Endpoint Security Controller remained more or less a mystery. This is why we asked HP to talk about it in more detail.

When it was announced, the company said that the HP Endpoint Security Controller is indeed a separate piece of silicon that sits inside HP's PCs and performs certain security-based tasks. The ESC features a general-purpose processor core, HP's custom hardware IP blocks, and embedded software. What is interesting is that HP has been installing the controller into its laptops since the EliteBook 800 G1 series launched in 2013, but has been very secretive about it until recently.

Initially, HP used the Endpoint Security Controller only for its Sure Start technology that can 'heal'/recover the system BIOS. Fast forward to 2019, and the controller has gained capabilities. HP now uses it to protect Intel's Management Engine, and to enable its Sure Run and Sure Recover capabilities.

Would you rather purchase a Huawei or HP laptop?

[We have covered the Intel Management Engine many times before. --Ed]

Original Submission