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posted by Fnord666 on Monday June 29 2020, @04:21AM   Printer-friendly

http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article;sid=20200622052207

The WireGuard VPN protocol has been available on OpenBSD as a port for a while, first as the wireguard-go implementation in Go, but later also as the wiresep port in C, both using tun(4) devices, much like OpenVPN and others, which incurs a slight penalty for crossing the kernel/userspace border for each packet.

WireGuard is a layer3 tunnel that can be run in passive mode, only sending packets when something needs to reach the other side (unless you enable heartbeats). It only allows selected modern crypto algorithms and hashes, chosen to be performant on CPUs which lack crypto accelerators, while still being secure. WireGuard packets are sent over UDP, and can run over and transport both IPv4 and IPv6. It handles NAT/port redirects and endpoints changing IP addresses, which is very nice when changing from wired to wifi or vice versa.

https://man.openbsd.org/wg


Original Submission

Related Stories

Using OpenBSD Routing Tables to Segment the Home Network for Privacy 13 comments

OpenBSD user Lari Huttunen has a blog post in which he dives into using OpenBSD's rdomain(4) feature to sort work VPNs into separate kernel-level routing tables. This segregates the network traffic in such a way as to prevent traffic in separate routing tables from interacting. With many working from home, insecure work networks have begun to intrude into the home LANs via work-related VPNs. By adding the home network to a work VPN, the LAN becomes merged with work's internal network, usually quite insecure at that. His goal is to keep his personal home devices, especially the IoT items, separate from the now mandatory work-related VPNs on his small-office / home-office network. That way, the work networks can no longer access his appliances.

Problem Statement

Over the years, companies and corporations have become ever more hungry for everything related to their users' geolocation, telemetry, demography, relationsip with one another, interests, convictions, social preferences - you name it. At the same time, users wanting to consume digital services meet a lot of ridiculous restrictions depending on where they live and how they access the Internet. Ecojails, in one form or another are created by multi-national corporations in order to capitalize everything about their users' behavior. In 2020, this has all been exacerbated by everyone suddenly working from home if possible.

Motivation

This is why I wanted to research how identity-based routing could enhance users' privacy in a totally transparent way. I've never been a big fan of VPNs as a security solution, but have come to realize that they have a role to play in privacy. Since soon everything needs to be online to function from a vacuum cleaner to dish washer to toaster, it is increasingly difficult to keep the Internet of Targets at bay. Moreover, our personal telemetry devices feed out a constant stream of information to the ecojail masters, be they Apple, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, Alibaba or Netflix. Taking back control will not be easy and one will evidently need to compromise along the way, but realization is the first step to recovery.

Lari's solution works from tools provided by OpenBSD's base system.

Previously:
(2020) WireGuard Imported Into OpenBSD
(2019) How SSH Key Shielding Works
(2019) Dutch Govt Explains the Risks Behind DNS-Over-HTTPS Move
(2014) OpenSSH No Longer has to Depend on OpenSSL


Original Submission

Recent and Not So Recent Changes in OpenBSD That Make Life Better 21 comments

Consultant and author Peter N M Hansteen has written up an overview of recent and not so recent changes in OpenBSD that make life better (and may turn up elsewhere too). He covers a few decades of developments that he has found particularly useful and explains why. He covers greylisting, spam filters, OpenSSH, and of course PF.

When I found OpenBSD more than twenty years ago, my main Unix exposure was from working with Linuxes and FreeBSD. What attracted me to OpenBSD and finally had me buy an OpenBSD 2.5 CD set was the strong focus on security and code correctness. When the CD set and the classic wireframe daemon T-shirt finally arrived in the mail, I set about at first to install it on whatever spare hardware I had lying around.

[...] OpenBSD has had traffic shaping available in the ALTQ subsystem since the very early days. ALTQ was rolled into PF at some point, but the code was still marked experimental 15 years after it was written, and most people who tried to use it in anger at the time found the syntax inelegant at best, infuriating or worse at most times.

So Henning Brauer took a keen interest in the problem, and reached the conclusion that all the various traffic shaping algorithms were not in fact needed. They could all except one be reduced to mere configuration options, either as setting priorities on pass or match rules or as variations of the theme of the mother algorithm Hierarchical Fair Service Curve (HFSC for short).

Soon after, another not-small diff was making the rounds. The patch was applied early in the OpenBSD 5.5 cycle, and for the lifetime of that release older ALTQ setups were possible side by side with the new queueing system.

OpenBSD is a complete operating system and originally forked from NetBSD back in 1995 which forked from 386BSD which was ported from 4BSD. It's emphasis is on portability, standardization, correctness, proactive security, and integrated cryptography. The current release, 6.9, is its 50th release.

Previously:
(2020) Using OpenBSD Routing Tables to Segment the Home Network for Privacy
(2020) The OpenBSD Project's 25th Anniversary
(2020) WireGuard Imported Into OpenBSD
(2017) OpenBSD and the Modern Laptop
and many more...


Original Submission

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  • (Score: 2) by canopic jug on Tuesday June 30 2020, @11:30AM (1 child)

    by canopic jug (3949) Subscriber Badge on Tuesday June 30 2020, @11:30AM (#1014449) Journal

    The example in the manual page is rather abstract. I am obtuse enough that I would appreciate a more concrete example. Then again, I don't have much of an opinion of VPNs, even FOSS ones like Wireguard and OpenVPN. I would prefer instead a retiurn to the 1980s approach to not trust the network and to stop pretending that portions can be cordoned off and made safe. Yes, pieces can be cordoned off, but the safety is then only an illusion. At least Wireguard is higher quality and has a better price than Cisco equivalents.

    If a service can't be put on the net without trying to hide it, then it shouldn't be on the net in the first place VPN or not.

    --
    Money is not free speech. Elections should not be auctions.
    • (Score: 1, Interesting) by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday June 30 2020, @06:11PM

      by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday June 30 2020, @06:11PM (#1014614)

      The example in the man page is basically what you need to do, but wg1 would be your local box, wg2 would be your VPN (so you'd get that information from your VPN provider). You wouldn't need to include the rdomain stuff unless you were using rdomains already.

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