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posted by Fnord666 on Wednesday January 31 2018, @05:14PM   Printer-friendly
from the doesn't-raid-fix-this? dept.

Arthur T Knackerbracket has found the following story:

In 2015, Microsoft senior engineer Dan Luu forecast a bountiful harvest of chip bugs in the years ahead.

"We've seen at least two serious bugs in Intel CPUs in the last quarter, and it's almost certain there are more bugs lurking," he wrote. "There was a time when a CPU family might only have one bug per year, with serious bugs happening once every few years, or even once a decade, but we've moved past that."

Thanks to growing chip complexity, compounded by hardware virtualization, and reduced design validation efforts, Luu argued, the incidence of hardware problems could be expected to increase.

This month's Meltdown and Spectre security flaws that affect chip designs from AMD, Arm, and Intel to varying degrees support that claim. But there are many other examples.


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  • (Score: 2) by JoeMerchant on Thursday February 01 2018, @04:03AM

    by JoeMerchant (3937) on Thursday February 01 2018, @04:03AM (#631337)

    How would validation catch the Spectre bug?

    In our industry we have a fancy acronym that means: get a bunch of people who know something about the issues, force them to sit in a room and seriously consider them at least long enough to write a report and file it. Lately, there's a lot of handwringing around cybersecurity, and I'm constantly pinged by the junior guys who get worried about X, Y, or Z - and 9 times out of 10 it's nothing, but once in a while they bring up a good point, and some of those good points are things like Spectre - things nobody had considered before. Our development process on a single product goes on for a couple of years, the process calls for these cybersecurity design reviews periodically throughout those years, and over that time people do actually come up with this stuff. So, our reports analyze X, Y, and Z, and either write them off as adequately handled, or shut down the project until they are.

    The real problem is culture - like the Shuttle launch culture that couldn't be stopped for handwringing over ice in the O-rings, or a big corporate culture that doesn't want to pay its own engineers to discover vulnerabilities in the product early enough to fix them before the rest of the world.

    I just gave a mini-speech today that included: "it needs to be tested, if we don't test it our customers will."

    Can't validate what you don't know you need to validate.

    No, you can't - but, as world leading experts in the field you should be able to figure out most of the things you need to validate before the world figures them out for you. In the case of processors that serve separate users partitioned by hypervisor, the industry could have (and likely did) think of this exploit before the hacker community. As soon as they thought of it, they should have (and likely did not) feed that knowledge back into the design process to work out effective fixes for the next generation of processors.

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