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Runaway1956 [soylentnews.org] writes:

PDF warning - the entire report is in the from of a PDF. To get your copy, clicky the linky:

https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4165160/USS-Fitzgerald-and-USS-John-S-McCain-Collision.pdf [documentcloud.org]

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON , DC 20350-2000
MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION
Enclosure (1) Report on the Collision between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel
ACX CRYSTAL
Enclosure (2) Report on the Collision between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor
Vessel ALNIC MC
The collisions were avoidable between USS FITZGERALD (DDG 62) and Motor Vessel
ACX CRYSTAL, and between USS JOHN S MCCAIN (DDG 56) and Motor Vessel ALNIC
MC. Three U.S. Navy investigations concerning each of these incidents are complete.
Command and Admiralty investigations in each case retain legal privilege to protect the
interests of the United States Government in future litigation. The third investigation for each
incident, termed the Line of Duty Investigation (LODI), is not under legal privilege as its
purpose is to determine that Sailors perished in the line of duty and thus enable their
beneficiaries to receive appropriate compensation. Collisions at sea between U.S. registered
vessels and foreign registered vessels are also subject to an additional investigation, a Marine
Casualty Investigation, conducted independently on behalf of the National Transportation
Safety Board (NTSB) by the United States Coast Guard (USCG). These investigations are
ongoing in each case the results of each will be published by the NTSB when complete.
As Chief of Naval Operations, I have determined to retain the legal privilege that exists with
the command Admiralty investigations in order to protect the legal interests of the United States
Government and the families of those Sailors who perished. At the same time, it is paramount
that the Navy be transparent as to the causes and lessons learned to the families of those Sailors,
the Congress and the American people, and to make every effort to ensure these types of
tragedies do not happen again. With these competing interests at hand, I authorized the
preparation and release of reports on each collision, enclosed with this memorandum.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - USS FITZGERALD_________________________________
1.1 Introduction
USS FITZGERALD collided with Motor Vessel ACX CRYSTAL on 17 June 2017 in the
waters of Sagami Wan in vicinity of the approaches to Tokyo Wan.
FITZGERALD is an Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer commissioned in 1995 and homeported
in Yokosuka, Japan, as part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces and Carrier Strike Group
FIVE. Approximately 300 Sailors serve aboard FITZGERALD. FITZGERALD is 505 feet in
length and carries a gross tonnage of approximately 9000 tons.
Figure 1 illustrates the relative sizes of the vessels. ACX CRYSTAL (CRYSTAL) is a
Philippines flagged container ship built in 2008. CRYSTAL is 728 feet long with a gross tonnage
of approximately 29,000 tons.
The collision between FITZGERALD and CRYSTAL resulted in the deaths of seven U.S.
Sailors due to impact with FITZGERALD’s berthing compartments, located below the waterline
of the ship. CRYSTAL suffered no fatalities. U.S. Sailor fatalities were:
GMSN Kyle Rigsby of Palmyra, Virginia, 19 years old.
YN2 Shingo Alexander Douglass, of San Diego, California, 25 years old.
FC1 Carlos Victor Ganzon Sibayan of Chula Vista, California, 23 years old.
PSC Xavier Alec Martin of Halethorpe, Maryland, 24 years old.
STG2 Ngoc Turong Huynh of Oakville, Connecticut, 25 years old.
GM1 Noe Hernandez of Weslaco, Texas, 26 years old.
FCC Gary Rehm, Jr., of Elyria, Ohio, 37 years old.
4
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
1.2 Summary of Findings
The Navy determined that numerous failures occurred on the part of leadership and
watchstanders as follows:
Failure to plan for safety.
Failure to adhere to sound navigation practice.
Failure to execute basic watch standing practices.
Failure to properly use available navigation tools.
Failure to respond deliberately and effectively when in extremis.

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY - USS JOHN S MCCAIN_____________________________
1.1 Introduction
USS JOHN S MCCAIN collided with Motor Vessel ALNIC MC on 21 August 2017 in the
Straits of Singapore.
JOHN S MCAIN is a Flight 1 Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer, commissioned in 1994 and
homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, as part of the Forward Deployed Naval Forces and Carrier
Strike Group FIVE. Approximately 300 sailors serve aboard MCCAIN. MCCAIN is 505 feet in
length and carries a gross tonnage of approximately 9,000 tons.
ALNIC MC is a Liberia flagged oil and chemical tanker built in 2008. ALNIC MC is
approximately 600 feet long and has a gross tonnage of approximately 30,000 tons.
The collision between JOHN S MCCAIN and ALNIC resulted in the deaths of 10 U.S.
Sailors due to impact with MCCAIN’s berthing compartments, located below the waterline of
the ship. ALNIC suffered no fatalities. U.S. Sailor fatalities were:
ETC Charles Nathan Findley of Amazonian, Missouri, 31 years old.
ICC Abraham Lopez of El Paso, Texas, 39 years old.
ET1 Kevin Sayer Bushell of Gaithersburg, Maryland, 26 years old.
ET1 Jacob Daniel Drake of Cable, Ohio, 21 years old.
ITl Timothy Thomas Eckels Jr. of Baltimore, Maryland, 23 years old.
ITl Corey George Ingram of Poughkeepsie, New York, 28 years old.
ET2 Dustin Louis Doyon of Suffield, Connecticut, 26 years old.
ET2 John Henry Hoagland III of Killeen, Texas, 20 years old.
IC2 Logan Stephen Palmer of Harristown, Illinois, 23 years old.
ET2 Kenneth Aaron Smith of Cherry Hill, New Jersey, 22 years old.
43
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
1.2 Summary of Findings
The Navy determined the following causes of the collision:
Loss of situational awareness in response to mistakes in the operation of the JOHN S
MCCAIN’s steering and propulsion system, while in the presence of a high density of
maritime traffic.
Failure to follow the International Nautical Rules of the Road, a system of rules to govern
the maneuvering of vessels when risk of collision is present.
Watchstanders operating the JOHN S MCCAIN’s steering and propulsion systems had
insufficient proficiency and knowledge of the systems.

The report, in it's entirety, is 72 pages long. There are a lot of details about how, precisely, the accidents happened. There are also photos in the PDF, before and after the respective events. The reports are damning. As already summarized, inattentive, and poorly trained officers were in charge of evolutions which they seem to have poorly understood. From page 26 in the report,

0125 CRYSTAL was approaching FITZGERALD from the right (starboard)
side at 3 nautical miles. FITZGERALD watchstanders at this time held
two other commercial vessels in addition to CRYSTAL. One was
calculated to have closest approach point at 2000 yards and the other
was calculated to risk collision. No contact reports were made to the
Commanding Officer and no additional course and speed determinations
were made on these vessels.
25
UNCLASSIFIEDUNCLASSIFIED
0125 The Officer of the Deck noticed CRYSTAL rapidly getting closer and
considered a turn to 240T.
0127 The Officer of the Deck ordered course to the right to course 240T, but
rescinded the order within a minute. Instead, the Officer of the Deck
ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port).
These orders were not carried out.
0129 The Bosun Mate of the Watch, a more senior supervisor on the bridge,
took over the helm and executed the orders.
As of 0130 Neither FITZGERALD nor CRYSTAL made an attempt to establish
radio communications or sound the danger signal.
As of 0130 FITZGERALD had not sounded the collision alarm.
0130:34 CRYSTAL’s bow struck FITZGERALD at approximately frame 160 on
the right (starboard) side above the waterline and CRYSTAL’s bulbous
bow struck at approximately frame 138 below the waterline.

As a former watch stander, it is incomprehensible to me, that the OOD could have issued orders, then quickly rescinded them, immediately gave different orders, and then that THE HELMSMAN DID NOT CARRRY OUT THOSE ORDERS!! It was necessary for Boats to take the helm, to carry out the OOD's orders?

Of course, it was far to late already, when the orders were issued. Orders should have been given a half hour earlier to request the Captain's presence on the bridge.

Original Submission