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hubie [soylentnews.org] writes:

OSU research shows how hackers can target smart meters to destabilize electricity grid [oregonstate.edu]:

A power transmission grid can be destabilized by hackers who manipulate smart meters to create an oscillation in electricity demand, researchers in the Oregon State University College of Engineering have shown.

[...] A smart meter is a digital device that collects electricity usage data and sends it to a local utility through a telecommunications connection. The meters can help customers learn more about their electricity use, and they can also be used to remotely shut off customers' power, such as in the case of unpaid bills.

Like circuit breakers in a household panel, power grid components can "trip" and shut off when demand, or load, is too high or problematic for some other reason. The result is load being passed on to other parts of the grid network, which may also shut down, creating the possibility of a domino effect that can lead to a blackout.

[...] One of the types of attacks made possible by the new technologies involves hacking into the advanced metering infrastructure, often abbreviated as AMI, and controlling the smart meter switches to cause load oscillations.

"Imagine calling everyone you know and saying, 'OK, at 6 p.m. we are all going to turn the lights on," Cotilla-Sanchez said. "Even if you got a couple thousand people to do that, it would be unlikely to cause much instability because the grid is able to absorb fairly big changes in supply and demand – for example solar panels at the end of the day do not produce electricity and we are able to anticipate and compensate for that.

"But if a person were to remotely coordinate a large number of smart meters to switch customers on and off at a particular frequency, that would be a problem."

[...] The findings, while unsettling, provide a jump-off point for grid operators to develop countermeasures, he added.

"For example, if they detect this type of oscillation on the load side, they could take lines A and B out of service, intentionally islanding the affected area and thus avoiding propagation of the instability to a broader area of the grid," he said. "Another solution, which could be complementary, might be to change the generation portfolio enough – for example, curtail some wind generation while ramping up some hydro generation – so the overall dynamic response is different to what the attack was designed toward, so the impact will be smaller and won't be enough to tip the system."

Journal Reference:
Falah Alanazi, Jinsub Kim, and Eduardo Cotilla-Sanchez, Load Oscillating Attacks of Smart Grids: Vulnerability Analysis [open], IEEE Access, 2023. DOI: 10.1109/ACCESS.2023.3266249 [doi.org]

Original Submission