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https://www.wired.com/story/doge-government-salaries-elon-musk/
Engineers and executives at the so-called Department of Government Efficiency are drawing healthy taxpayer-funded salaries—sometimes from the very agencies they are cutting.
[...] Jeremy Lewin, one of the DOGE employees tasked with dismantling USAID, who has also played a role in DOGE's incursions into the National Institutes of Health and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, is listed as making just over $167,000 annually, WIRED has confirmed. Lewin is assigned to the Office of the Administrator within the General Services Administration.
Kyle Schutt, a software engineer at the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, is listed as drawing a salary of $195,200 through GSA, where he is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Administrator. That is the maximum amount that any "General Schedule" federal employee can make annually, including bonuses. "You cannot be offered more under any circumstances," the GSA compensation and benefits website reads.
Nate Cavanaugh, a 28-year-old tech entrepreneur who has taken a visible internal role interviewing GSA employees as part of DOGE's work at the agency, is listed as being paid just over $120,500 per year. According to DOGE's official website, the average GSA employee makes $128,565 and has worked at the agency for 13 years.
When Elon Musk started recruiting for DOGE in November, he described the work as "tedious" and noted that "compensation is zero." WIRED previously reported that the DOGE recruitment effort relied in part on a team of engineers associated with Peter Thiel and was carried out on platforms like Discord.
Since Trump took office in January, DOGE has overseen aggressive layoffs within the GSA, including the recent elimination of 18F, the agency's unit dedicated to technology efficiency. It also developed a plan to sell off more than 500 government buildings.
Although Musk has described DOGE as "maximum transparent," it has not made its spending or salary ranges publicly available. Funding for DOGE had grown to around $40 million as of February 20, according to a recent ProPublica report. The White House did not respond to questions about the salary ranges for DOGE employees or how the budget is allocated to pay them.
Some DOGE team members, including Musk, are designated as "Special Government Employees," an advisory role limited to a 130-day work period. These positions can be paid or unpaid; SGEs drawing salaries above a certain grade have to file financial disclosure forms, but the volunteer workers do not. This type of employee is not beholden to the same rules as typical federal workers; they are allowed to keep drawing outside salaries and in some cases do not need to disclose conflicts of interest. Other prominent SGE staffers associated with DOGE include top aide Katie Miller, who continued her prior public relations work through the transition and more than a month into the current administration. Her firm's clients had included Apple and a Saudi-funded golf league, according to The Wall Street Journal.
Other prominent DOGE staffers appear to be unpaid volunteers. Edward Coristine, Ethan Shaotran, Luke Farritor, Derek Geissler, and Nicole Hollander draw no salary through their assignments at the General Services Administration. (It is not currently known whether they are drawing salaries elsewhere within the government.) The agency now openly discusses the idea of compensation on its recruitment page, which describes "full-time, salaried positions for software engineers, InfoSec engineers, and other technology professionals."
In an interview with Sean Hannity of Fox News last month, Musk claimed that "the software engineers at DOGE could be earning millions of dollars a year and instead of earning a small fraction of that as federal employees." In Silicon Valley, the median salary for a software engineer hovers around $184,000, with workers a decade into their careers earning over $220,000, according to Glassdoor.
DOGE honcho Elon Musk is the richest person in the world, with an estimated net worth of over $350 billion. Although Musk does not draw a salary for his work with DOGE, his business ventures often enjoy government support. The Washington Post recently reported that his companies have received more than $38 billion in government funding over the past two decades.
"It does seem worth understanding what these employees are being paid," says Don Moynihan, a public policy professor at the University of Michigan. "Especially if they are being paid significantly more than technologists who have been fired, given that many of the DOGE staff have less relevant experience."
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
The FCC runs an $8 billion federal subsidy program to help bring phone and broadband services to lower income homes and schools called the Universal Service Fund. The program was historically a bipartisan thing, until the extremist Trump administration came to town.
Driven by a fake right wing consumer group called “Consumers’ Research,” the Trumplican-stacked Fifth Circuit court of appeals recently took the radical step of ruling the entire program unconstitutional. The ruling, which ignored past Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, effectively declared the USF an unconstitutional, illegal tax, something seven court dissenters said was a preposterous leap.
Now the Supreme Court has stated they’ll hear the case, which will ultimately determine whether federal efforts to expand broadband access to poor, rural neglected communities is effectively illegal or not.
Not too surprisingly, 15 MAGA loyal Attorneys General, apparently with nothing better to do, have thrown their support behind the effort to effectively make helping poor people afford broadband illegal:
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
United States president Donald Trump last Friday issued a memorandum that suggests imposition of tariffs on nations that dare to tax big tech companies.
The memorandum mentions the digital services taxes (DSTs) were introduced to capture profits from revenue that tech companies generate in one country but collect in another. Netflix is often cited as an example of why such taxes are needed, because many of its customers around the world paid their subscriptions to an entity in The Netherlands. Governments argued that was inappropriate because Netflix was selling to their citizens, who consumed the vid-streamer’s services in their territory, and that a Netflix subscription therefore represented economic activity in their jurisdictions that should be taxed like any other.
Another reason DSTs were considered was that Netflix’s Netherlands scheme, like many other structures used by Big Tech companies, are legal-but-cynical tax efforts at reducing their tax bills to levels well below those local companies pay.
The OECD developed measures to prevent multinational companies using such tactics, and they have been widely adopted without stopping all of Big Tech’s tax tricks. DSTS were pitched as necessary – perhaps temporarily – while the OECD approach was developed, and adopted.
Trump’s opposition to DSTs is not new: the Biden administration felt they disproportionately targeted US businesses and threatened 25 percent tariffs if they were not removed. The UK and Europe dropped some of the taxes, as did India.
Tariffs are now back on the agenda for remaining digital services taxes. As outlined in a Friday memorandum, Trump stated: “My Administration will not allow American companies and workers and American economic and national security interests to be compromised by one-sided, anti-competitive policies and practices of foreign governments. American businesses will no longer prop up failed foreign economies through extortive fines and taxes.”
“All of these measures violate American sovereignty and offshore American jobs, limit American companies’ global competitiveness, and increase American operational costs while exposing our sensitive information to potentially hostile foreign regulators,” the Memorandum adds.
The document also calls for US authorities to consider DSTs in its report on the OECD tax measures mentioned above, which Trump also feels unjustly penalize American businesses.
The Memorandum instructs the US Trade Representative to “identify tools the United States can use to secure among trading partners a permanent moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions.” Just when those tools will be identified, and implemented, is unknown.
However the administration’s intent is clear: Big Tech should not be taxed by any nation other than the US, which itself struggles to tax its top tech companies thanks to the tax minimization schemes the OECD deal was designed to dent.
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
President Trump, speaking at a press briefing held in Mar-a-Lago on Tuesday, was asked about plans for tariffs on semiconductor chips and pharmaceuticals. He responded that the tariff is set to start at 25%, "and it'll go very substantially higher over the course of a year." Trump has not revealed a timeline for when the proposed tariff might come into effect, but he did say he would give impacted semiconductor and pharmaceutical companies time to build factories in the U.S. before imposing tariffs.
The announcement follows a declaration made by the Trump administration, which claims that the U.S. will create and manufacture the "most powerful" AI chips.
"But we want to give them time to come in because, you know, when they come into the United States and they have their plant or factory here, there is no tariff. So we want to give a little bit of a chance." Trump said. This is likely offering manufacturers, such as Samsung and TSMC, leeway to get set up in the U.S. It takes 38 months to build a fab in the U.S. due to factors like attaining permits, alongside lengthy construction times. Therefore, tariffs may only come into force once companies have been given enough time to set up manufacturing on American soil. Multiple rumors have claimed that TSMC may be accelerating plans to build its Arizona plant to minimize the impact of the tariff.
The U.S. government is seeking to lower the reliance on imported semiconductors and shift its focus to local foundries. Taiwanese factories can currently create more advanced chips, and no current facility in the U.S. can create a similar product. With homegrown foundries on the mind, it was also reported that the administration was pushing for TSMC and Intel to create a joint venture on American soil in hopes that its production in the U.S. may be able to catch up to Taiwan's dominance.
The CHIPS and Science Act award for chip designers and manufacturers was initially intended to lure awardees over to manufacturing semiconductors in the U.S. However, the Trump administration reportedly wishes to assess and change the requirements for the grant.
The suggested tariffs are already set to impact wallets, with Acer CEO Jason Chen announcing that laptop pricing is set to rise by 10% for U.S. customers. Chen further claimed that some manufacturers may use the tariff as an "excuse" to push prices even further.
With the tariff currently set at a proposed 25% or higher, it could lead to price increases for several other product categories. The proposed tariffs would pose pricing challenges for the likes of Nvidia, AMD, and Apple. In fact, Acer announced yesterday that it would increase its pricing by 10% due to the new tariffs.
DOGE as a National Cyberattack - Schneier on Security:
In the span of just weeks, the US government has experienced what may be the most consequential security breach in its history—not through a sophisticated cyberattack or an act of foreign espionage, but through official orders by a billionaire with a poorly defined government role. And the implications for national security are profound.
First, it was reported that people associated with the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had accessedtheUSTreasury computer system, giving them the ability to collect data on and potentially control the department's roughly $5.45 trillion in annual federal payments.
Then, we learned that uncleared DOGE personnel had gained access to classified data from the US Agency for International Development, possibly copying it onto their own systems. Next, the Office of Personnel Management—which holds detailed personal data on millions of federal employees, including those with security clearances—wascompromised. After that, Medicaid and Medicare records were compromised.
Meanwhile, only partially redacted names of CIA employees were sent over an unclassified email account. DOGE personnel are also reported to be feeding Education Department data into artificial intelligence software, and they have also started working at the Department of Energy.
This story is moving very fast. On Feb. 8, a federal judge blocked the DOGE team from accessing the Treasury Department systems any further. But given that DOGE workers have already copied data and possibly installed and modified software, it's unclear how this fixes anything.
In any case, breaches of other critical government systems are likely to follow unless federal employees stand firm on the protocols protecting national security.
The systems that DOGE is accessing are not esoteric pieces of our nation's infrastructure—they are the sinews of government.
For example, the Treasury Department systems contain the technical blueprints for how the federal government moves money, while the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) network contains information on who and what organizations the government employs and contracts with.
What makes this situation unprecedented isn't just the scope, but also the method of attack. Foreign adversaries typically spend years attempting to penetrate government systems such as these, using stealth to avoid being seen and carefully hiding any tells or tracks. The Chinese government's 2015 breach of OPM was a significant US security failure, and it illustrated how personnel data could be used to identify intelligence officers and compromise national security.
In this case, external operators with limited experience and minimal oversight are doing their work in plain sight and under massive public scrutiny: gaining the highest levels of administrative access and making changes to the United States' most sensitive networks, potentially introducing new security vulnerabilities in the process.
But the most alarming aspect isn't just the access being granted. It's the systematic dismantling of security measures that would detect and prevent misuse—including standard incident response protocols, auditing, and change-tracking mechanisms—by removing the career officials in charge of those security measures and replacing them with inexperienced operators.
The Treasury's computer systems have such an impact on national security that they were designed with the same principle that guides nuclear launch protocols: No single person should have unlimited power. Just as launching a nuclear missile requires two separate officers turning their keys simultaneously, making changes to critical financial systems traditionally requires multiple authorized personnel working in concert.
This approach, known as "separation of duties," isn't just bureaucratic red tape; it's a fundamental security principle as old as banking itself. When your local bank processes a large transfer, it requires two different employees to verify the transaction. When a company issues a major financial report, separate teams must review and approve it. These aren't just formalities—they're essential safeguards against corruption and error. These measures have been bypassed or ignored. It's as if someone found a way to rob Fort Knox by simply declaring that the new official policy is to fire all the guards and allow unescorted visits to the vault.
The implications for national security are staggering. Sen. Ron Wyden said his office had learned that the attackers gained privileges that allow them to modify core programs in Treasury Department computers that verify federal payments, access encrypted keys that secure financial transactions, and alter audit logs that record system changes. Over at OPM, reports indicate that individuals associated with DOGE connected an unauthorized server into the network. They are also reportedly trainingAI software on all of this sensitive data.
This is much more critical than the initial unauthorized access. These new servers have unknown capabilities and configurations, and there's no evidence that this new code has gone through any rigorous security testing protocols. The AIs being trained are certainly not secure enough for this kind of data. All are ideal targets for any adversary, foreign or domestic, also seeking access to federal data.
There's a reason why every modification—hardware or software—to these systems goes through a complex planning process and includes sophisticated access-control mechanisms. The national security crisis is that these systems are now much more vulnerable to dangerous attacks at the same time that the legitimate system administrators trained to protect them have been locked out.
By modifying core systems, the attackers have not only compromised current operations, but have also left behind vulnerabilities that could be exploited in future attacks—giving adversaries such as Russia and China an unprecedentedopportunity. These countries have long targeted these systems. And they don't just want to gather intelligence—they also want to understand how to disrupt these systems in a crisis.
Now, the technical details of how these systems operate, their security protocols, and their vulnerabilities are now potentially exposed to unknown parties without any of the usual safeguards. Instead of having to breach heavily fortified digital walls, these parties can simply walk through doors that are being propped open—and then erase evidence of their actions.
The security implications span three critical areas.
First, system manipulation: External operators can now modify operations while also altering audit trails that would track their changes. Second, data exposure: Beyond accessing personal information and transaction records, these operators can copy entire system architectures and security configurations—in one case, the technical blueprint of the country's federal payment infrastructure. Third, and most critically, is the issue of system control: These operators can alter core systems and authentication mechanisms while disabling the very tools designed to detect such changes. This is more than modifying operations; it is modifying the infrastructure that those operations use.
To address these vulnerabilities, three immediate steps are essential. First, unauthorized access must be revoked and proper authentication protocols restored. Next, comprehensive system monitoring and change management must be reinstated—which, given the difficulty of cleaning a compromised system, will likely require a complete system reset. Finally, thorough audits must be conducted of all system changes made during this period.
This is beyond politics—this is a matter of national security. Foreign national intelligence organizations will be quick to take advantage of both the chaos and the new insecurities to steal US data and install backdoors to allow for future access.
Each day of continued unrestricted access makes the eventual recovery more difficult and increases the risk of irreversible damage to these critical systems. While the full impact may take time to assess, these steps represent the minimum necessary actions to begin restoring system integrity and security protocols.
Assuming that anyone in the government still cares.
This essay was written with Davi Ottenheimer, and originally appeared in Foreign Policy.
Several sites are noticing a joke (for now) petition for Denmark to take pesky California off the US' hands:
Have you ever looked at a map and thought, "You know what Denmark needs? More sunshine, palm trees, and roller skates." Well, we have a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make that dream a reality.
Let's buy California from Donald Trump!
Yes, you heard that right.
California could be ours, and we need your help to make it happen.
See also English language articles like "Danes offer to buy California to spite Trump's Greenland aims: 'We'll bring hygge to Hollywood'" at The Guardian and "Petition for Denmark to buy California for $1 trillion surpasses 200,000 signatures" at CBS, among others.
I think we need a "Humor" topic. Can you better this?
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
A federal judge appointed by a Republican President has castigated Trump administration officials — and ordered them to immediately restore public health websites that they abruptly abruptly shut down.
The lawsuit against the website removal, brought by a group of physicians known as Doctors for America, concerns sites operated by the Department of Health and Human Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the Food and Drug Administration. Doctors for America says the scrubbing of the sites makes it more difficult for them to treat patients.
U.S. District Judge John Bates, appointed by George W Bush, agreed. He ordered the government to restore the pages by the end of the day of his ruling (Tuesday Feb. 11).
The TL;DR of Bates' ruling? It "was done without any public rationale, recourse or ability to challenge the decisions, despite laws and regulations that typically require them," as Politico summarized.
Sites removed by Trump officials concern HIV care, plus information on contraception drugs and student health. In their lawsuit filed against the Office for Personnel Management, HHS, CDC, and the FDA, Doctors for America says the removal of websites offering them guidance on these subjects is creating confusion, which eats up time that is better spent treating patients.
Justice Department attorneys defended the government's decision to remove the sites, saying doctors could still access the information by using the Wayback Machine, which archives offline websites. But that didn't fly with the judge.
"The Wayback Machine does not capture every webpage, and there is no information to suggest that is has archived each removed webpage," Bates wrote. "Additionally, pages archived on the Wayback Machine do not appear on search engines. In other words, a particular archived webpage is only viewable to a provider if the provider knows that the Wayback Machine exists and had recorded the pre-removal URL of the requested webpage."
News of mass immigration arrests has swept across the US over the past couple of weeks. Reports from Massachusetts to Idaho have described agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Ice) spreading through communities and rounding people up. Quick Google searches for Ice operations, raids and arrests return a deluge of government press releases. Headlines include "ICE arrests 85 during 4-day Colorado operation", "New Orleans focuses targeted operations on 123 criminal noncitizens", and in Wisconsin, "ICE arrests 83 criminal aliens".
But The Guardian took a closer look at these Ice reports tells a different story.
All the archived Ice press releases soaring to the top of Google search results were marked with the same timestamp and read: "Updated: 01/24/2025".
So, it looks like rather than actually doing any immigration raids, they're simply changing the timestamps on [some] raids dating back to 2008 to claim credit again for raids they did long [ago]. Once again, hype over substance.
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
The Federal Communications Commission's long-standing effort to establish stronger oversight of the internet was dealt a decisive blow this week when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the FCC lacks the authority to regulate wireless and home broadband services under the same set of rules that have traditionally governed telephone service.
The court's decision hinged on the recent Supreme Court ruling that overturned the Chevron deference, a precedent that had previously granted federal agencies significant leeway in interpreting ambiguous statutory language. This ruling significantly curtailed the FCC's ability to implement and enforce net neutrality regulations.
Net neutrality, a principle that advocates for equal treatment of all internet traffic, has been a contentious issue in American politics for over a decade. The concept aims to prevent internet service providers from favoring certain websites or services over others – a practice that could potentially stifle competition and innovation.
The Obama administration introduced robust net neutrality rules in 2015, which were subsequently repealed in 2017 under the Trump administration. In 2021, President Biden signed an executive order calling for the reinstatement of these regulations. The FCC, under the leadership of Chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel, voted to restore net neutrality rules in 2024.
The Sixth Circuit Court's decision effectively nullifies the FCC's Safeguarding Order, which would have reinstated net neutrality regulations. The court declared that broadband internet service providers offer only an "information service" as defined under current US law, and therefore, the FCC lacks the statutory authority to impose net neutrality policies through the "telecommunications service" provision of the Communications Act.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the FCC cannot classify mobile broadband as a "commercial mobile service," which would have allowed the agency to impose net neutrality regulations on those services. The Sixth Circuit explicitly cited the absence of Chevron deference in its ruling, stating that they no longer afford deference to the FCC's interpretation of the statute.
In response to the court's decision, Rosenworcel called on Congress to enshrine net neutrality principles in federal law – an acknowledgment that the FCC's regulatory efforts have reached an impasse.
On the other hand, Republican FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr, who is set to become the agency's chair later this month, praised the court's ruling. Carr criticized the Biden administration's approach, stating that their plan relied on "persuading Americans that the internet would break in the absence of these so-called 'net neutrality' regulations."
As for the future of net neutrality, the ball is now in Congress's court. However, given the current political landscape and the other pressing issues facing the government, it remains uncertain whether Congress will take up this challenge. With Carr poised to take the helm, it also seems unlikely that the agency will pursue further regulatory action on net neutrality.
Arthur T Knackerbracket has processed the following story:
This flavor of Scorched Earth has been dubbed the Broken Nest.
Elbridge Colby, the nominee for U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, is known to favor the destruction of Taiwan’s chip fabs in the event of a Chinese invasion. As recently as last year, Colby publicly asserted that “destroying TSMC” was imperative if an aggressive PRC attempted to capture these facilities, reports Datacenter Dynamics. Furthermore, the security policy professional asserts that TSMC’s destruction shouldn’t be left to Taiwan’s government or military.
Colby’s particular take on the Scorched Earth strategy has become known as the ‘Broken Nest’ deterrent, a term coined by a U.S. Army College paper in 2021. The full title of the paper is Broken Nest: Deterring China from Invading Taiwan, and though it is 15 pages long, you can understand the deterrent immediately from the title. A key thread throughout the paper is that China has started to find Taiwan more and more attractive as the island’s semiconductor prowess has grown, largely through TSMC's chipmaking abilities.
Would the Chinese Communist Party (mainland China, PRC) care so much about the relatively small earthquake and typhoon-prone island of Taiwan (ROC) if the semicon business were out of the equation? The linked paper thinks not, and Colby has echoed the paper’s central thrusts, repeatedly. Being unequivocal about TSMC’s destruction in the event of a Chinese invasion is thus extremely important in the minds of some policymakers.
“Disabling or destroying TSMC is table stakes if China is taking over Taiwan,” wrote Colby on Twitter/X earlier this year. “Would we be so insane as to allow the world's key semiconductor company fall untouched into the hands of an aggressive PRC?”
Disabling or destroying TSMC is table stakes if China is taking over Taiwan. Would we be so insane as to allow the world's key semiconductor company fall untouched into the hands of an aggressive PRC? Taiwanese should realize that would be *the least* of their problems. https://t.co/Z8qmKxjWe9 href="https://twitter.com/cantworkitout/status/1761514916224139737" data-url="https://twitter.com/cantworkitout/status/1761514916224139737" target="_blank" referrerpolicy="no-referrer-when-downgrade" data-hl-processed="none">February 24, 2024
However, destroying TSMC and other advanced semiconductor facilities might not be easy. China would likely make great efforts to shield these locations from any wider aggression. Moreover, in 2023, we learned that Taiwan’s Minister for National Defense, Chiu Kuo-cheng (邱國正), would not tolerate any U.S. attempts to destroy TSMC in the event of a war with China. If the US and China are in a high-stakes game of chicken, Taiwan isn't (or wasn't) playing.
Colby, who was picked by Trump as Undersecretary of Defense for Policy over the weekend, has some other views that could cause a stir across the Taiwan Strait. A report published by the Taiwan News this week says he would be in favor of pushing Taiwan to increase its defense spending from 2.5 to 5% of GDP. Interestingly, he also recently suggested that the U.S. should prioritize arming Taiwan rather than Ukraine. Europe should do more for its neighbor, he argued.